The history of philosophy might well be rewritten by contrasting those metaphysicians and epistemologists who argued for some form of productive causation as contrasted with those who abjured such robust ontic commitments. In the former group belong Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel and, at least, Machamer (of Machamer, Darden and Craver, MDC 2000). The latter group is comprised by those who eschew metaphysics or at least offer a sparser metaphysics regarding the natural world. In this group belong Ockham, Berkeley, Malebranche and the occasionalists, Hume (though only of book I of the Treatise), and Carnap when he is in accord with the anti-metaphysical logical positivists. The difference between the two groups centers on what they have to say about fundamental nature of causation. The main question is: does causation and the correlative intelligibility of nature (including humans) depend on some concept of activity? Specifically, is change in the world explained by, and only made intelligible by, the productive activities by which things in the world are brought about? Alternatively, the opposing view may be seen when laws and a static view of ontologically and epistemologically independent states and object-properties came to prominence in 18th Century, displacing cause as fundamental. I will examine this notion of productive activity, and elaborate on the theme of production even while claiming that no general definition of causation is necessary or possible. I will take the production metaphor seriously, including its teleological component. Information then may be explained in terms of productive causality and its teleology, but this will not be information in any way resembling mathematical information theory. It will information for producing. Finally, I shall say some provocative words about where this leaves the mechanistic explanation program, and why one ought to desire to be on the side of the good, fecund philosophical tradition rather than with the meager, metaphysical minimalists.