Nowadays there is a growing interest among moral philosophers, philosophers of action and social action, and philosophers of the social sciences in the topic of collective responsibility. The philosophical interest is part of the more general trend of broadening the scope of morality to collectivities, groups, and business corporations. Until lately almost all Western moral philosophers have approached the subject of responsibility armed with the assumption that the only interesting and important things to be said on that topic must be about individual human beings. But not anymore. Environmental problems, the oppression of minorities, and corporate crime are examples of the issues that create problems of responsibility that are extremely difficult to be dealt with with conceptual tools of the strongly individualistic moral philosophy. The research done in the philosophy of social action during the last three decades has provided us with conceptual tools that can be fruitfully used in dealing with the problems of collective responsibility. This paper is a selective review on the recent discussion on collective moral responsibility. In this paper collective moral responsibility is to be understood as moral responsibility attributed to a collective as opposed to moral responsibility attributed collectively to individual agents. I will study the arguments presented in the literature for and against holding a collective morally responsible. The basic question here is whether a collective is the sort of thing that could bear moral responsibility.