Sometimes we treat two or more things as one, ignoring the difference between them. Call this "confusion". Sometimes we're confused because we don't realize at all that there are distinct things involved, as when I thought that Sam Neill and Sam Rockwell were the same actor, and just thought of him as something like "that Sam actor guy". Other times, we do realize there's a difference but we don't bother ourselves about it, as when we are familiar with the distinction between relativistic and proper mass, but still measure out 200 grams of flour without a thought in the world about which sort of mass it's 200 grams of. Whatever the reason for our confusing distinct things, though, it poses some difficulties for the logical reconstruction of our reasoning and action. Different authors have offered different ways of proceeding with the task. In this talk, I will argue that the best-known of these approaches, due to Hartry Field, fails to grapple with important aspects of confusion. I'll provide a different philosophical and formal framework, and show that it is not subject to the same objections. Finally, I will use this framework to argue that vagueness of the familiar sort is in fact a kind of confusion.