A causal connection between an intention to F and intentionally F-ing (moving one's body in order to F) (Davidson 1963) not a sufficient condition for intentionally F-ing. The connection between the conceptual level of planning, intention-formation and means-end reasoning and the low-level information-processing that steers the motor system must preclude (a) deviant realizations of the intention, (b) account for the agent's control of what he is doing and (c) find a suitable functional role for the intention while acting on it. We argue that the conceptual level of planning and the Motor System the plan activates is connected by an action sustaining intention (ASI) which is demonstratively linked to the agent's bodily movement. Following Campbell's account of reference as tied to attention (Campbell 2002), I claim that an ASI in which a demonstrative manifests conscious attention to his bodily movements connects the two levels: while being rationally derived from future-directed intentions, the demonstrative intention fixes an object of attention (bodily movements steered by the agent's feature map of his environment) and sustains the movement steered by the parameter settings exercized by subpersonal systems. The demonstrative in the intention does not provide the materials for the control the setting of those parameters but sustains the outcome of those settings in view of the plan of which it is a part. Its functional role is to identify at the level of the agent’s subjective life what must be caused and justified by the plan the demonstrative intention is part of. This account connects Bratman's theory of planning (Bratman 1987) with aspects of the cognitive neuroscience of action (Jeannerod 1997).