<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Blancke, Stefaan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kosolosky, Laszlo</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">What science is fair? Representations of science in a Dutch creationist campaign</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Public Understanding of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Submitted</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In the Netherlands, creationists have started up a civil initiative by which they demand fair science. This paper offers an analysis of this peculiar notion. Fair science depends on two representations of science, one as an unimpressive label, and one as an authority. Each of these representations hinges on a different conception of the authority of science: on the one hand, science is endowed with authority because it produces technology and is able to make reliable predictions. On the other hand, sciences authority is only a matter of reputation. To the extent that these two conceptions tap into representations of science and its authority among the larger public, the notion of fair science might prove to be a compelling rhetorical tool. Suggestions are made as to how the appeal of the notion can be reduced.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Straßer, Christian</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verdée, Peter</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Which Style of Reasoning to Choose in the Face of Conflicting Information?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Logic and Computation</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">26</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">361--380</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In the context of non-monotonic reasoning different kinds of consequence relations are defined for reasoning from (possibly) inconsistent information. Examples are consequence relations that are characterized in terms of maximal consistent subsets of the premise set. The &lt;em&gt;strong consequences&lt;/em&gt; are those formulas that follow by Classical Logic from every maximal consistent subset. The &lt;em&gt;weak consequences&lt;/em&gt; follow from some maximal consistent subset. The &lt;em&gt;free consequences&lt;/em&gt; follow from the set of formulas that belong to every maximal consistent subset. In this paper the question is discussed which of these consequence relations should be applied in which reasoning context. First the concerns that are expressed in the literature with respect to the usefulness of the weak consequences are addressed. Then it is argued that making weak inferences is sensible for some application contexts, provided one has a (dynamic) proof theory for the corresponding consequence relation. Such a dynamic proof theory is what adaptive logics offer. Finally, all this is illustrated by means of a very simple adaptive logic reconstruction of the free, strong, and weak consequences&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Straßer, Christian</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Šešelja, Dunja</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wieland, Jan Willem</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ippoliti, Emiliano</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Withstanding Tensions: Scientific Disagreement and Epistemic Tolerance</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heuristic Reasoning</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">113–146</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Many philosophers of science consider scientific disagreementto be a major promoter of scientific progress. However, we lack an ac-count of the epistemically and heuristically appropriate response scien-tists should have towards opposing positions in peer disagreements. Eventhough some scientific pluralists have advocated a notion of tolerance,the implications of this notion for ones epistemic stance and, more gen-erally, for the scientific practice have been insuficiently explicated in theliterature. In this paper we explicate a characteristic tension in whichdisagreeing scientists are situated and on this basis we propose a notionof epistemic tolerance.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wieland, Jan Willem</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">What Carrolls tortoise actually proves</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ethical theory and moral practice</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">983–997</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Rationality requires us to have certain propositional attitudes (beliefs, intentions, etc.) given certain other attitudes that we have. Carrolls Tortoise repeatedly shows up in this discussion. Following up on Brunero (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:557569, 2005), I ask what Carroll-style considerations actually prove. This paper rejects two existing suggestions, and defends a third.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leuridan, Bert</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">What are mechanisms in social science? (review)</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Metascience</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">395-398</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Why should we introduce the notion of analytical sociology into the field of sociology, and why should it be linked to the concept of mechanism? With these two principal questions, Pierre Demeulenaere, Professor of Sociological Theory and Philosophy of the Social Sciences at the University of Paris-Sorbonne, opens his Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms, a collection of thirteen papers written by social scientists and philosophers of the social sciences (1). Not every contributor should be considered an analytical sociologist. Rather than being a manifesto either pro or contra analytical sociology and the use of mechanisms, it is an attempt to reflect upon the key issues involved in sociological explanation (3). Even though several chapters raise very interesting points, the overall impression one gets from this book is that analytical sociology fails to redeem its main promise, viz. to add clarity, precision, and conceptual rigor to sociology, especially regarding one of it&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Le Roy, Frederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stalpaert, Christel</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aerts, Diederik</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">What is there beyond Mertonian and dollar green science? Exploring the contours of epistemic democracy</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Drunk on capitalism : an interdisciplinary reflection on market economy, art and science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35–48</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9789400720817</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The story is sometimes told as follows: Once science was a disinterested activity giving scientists the opportunity to freely solve the puzzle of nature to the benefit of all. Nowadays science seems more and more driven by the search for patents and dollars compelling scientists to follow the logic of capitalism and corporatization. Take-home lesson: science is for sale and we should do everything to reverse this evolution. In this contribution, I want to analyze the narrator’s assumptions implicit in this account of science. In particular, the rosy description of earlier disinterested forms of scientific research will be questioned, as well as the lack of alternatives to the dichotomy disinterested versus corporatized. I will argue that beyond the dichotomy an interest-driven science can be conceived framed within an epistemic democracy.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Boudry, Maarten</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leuridan, Bert</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Where the design argument goes wrong: auxiliary assumptions and unification</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophy of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/661753</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">78</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">558–578</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Sober (2008) has reconstructed the biological design argument in the framework of likelihoodism, purporting to demonstrate that it is defective for intrinsic reasons. We argue that Sober’s restrictions on the introduction of auxiliary hypotheses is too restrictive, as it commits him to rejecting types of everyday reasoning that are clearly valid. Our account shows that the design argument fails, not because it is intrinsically untestable, but because it clashes with the empirical evidence and fails to satisfy certain theoretical desiderata (in particular, unification). Likewise, Sober’s critique of the arguments from imperfections and from evil against design is off the mark.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kosolosky, Laszlo</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Who guards the guardians/experts? Philosophers?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">32e Vlaams-Nederlandse Filosofiedag, Proceedings</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ghent University, Department of Philosophy and moral sciences</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ducheyne, Steffen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Whewell's tidal researches: scientific practice and philosophical methodology</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.12.011</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">26–40</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Primarily between 1833 and 1840, William Whewell attempted to accomplish what natural philosophers and scientists since at least Galileo had failed to do: to provide a systematic and broad-ranged study of the tides and to attempt to establish a general scientific theory of tidal phenomena. I document the close interaction between Whewells philosophy of science (especially his methodological views) and his scientific practice as a tidologist. I claim that the intertwinement between Whewells methodology and his tidology is more fundamental than has hitherto been documented.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Waar stoppen?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">102</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">196–198</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aerts, Diederik</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">What About Interdisciplinarity Within Philosophy?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and Its Implications For Our Perspectives on the World</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">World Scientific Publishing Company</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10–25</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">D'Hooghe, Bart</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Why social emergence? Discussing the use of analytical metaphysics in social theory</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Worldviews, science and us : studies of analytical metaphysics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789814299053\_0010</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">World Scientific Publishing Company</style></publisher><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9789814295819</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Recently the concept of emergence has been used in social theory to understand and defend social causation and nonreductive individualism (cf., Refs. 1, 2 and 3). In this paper, I want to analyse what the contribution of analytical metaphysics, and, in particular, the concept of emergence is, or might be, to the discussion in social theory. Especially Keith Sawyer's use of emergence in his defence of social explanation will be scrutinized. Therefore, it will be important to distinguish ontological from epistemological emergence. Where Sawyer focuses on ontological emergence, I will argue that social explanation might better be defended by putting emphasis on pragmatic aspects of explanation and considering emergence as an epistemological category.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mey, Tim</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Speybroeck, Linda</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Braeckman, Johan</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">William Harvey en de ontdekking van de bloedsomloop.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fascinerend Leven. Markante Figuren en Ideeën uit de Geschiedenis van de Biologie.</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nieuwezijds</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Amsterdam</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In print&lt;/p&gt;</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Vreese, Leen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Work in Progress in Causal and Probabilistic Reasoning</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Reasoner</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">141</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Where the Epistemic and the Political Meet.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Social Sciences and Democracy</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Social Sciences and Democracy</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Palgrave Macmillan</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1–13</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-0230224391</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ducheyne, Steffen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Whewell, necessity and the inductive sciences: a philosophical-systematic survey</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">South African Journal of Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">28</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">333–358</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper Whewell's concept of necessity is scrutinized and its historical development is outlined (ca. 1833-1860). Particular attention will be paid to how Whewell interpreted the laws of the inductive sciences as being necessary since the laws of nature are concretizations of the Fundamental Ideas which can be partially described by Axioms.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Garnett, Rob</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olsen, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Starr, Martha</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Why should I adopt pluralism?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Economic Pluralism</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Routledge</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;If the most perplexing thing in the world is a lack of theory, the second mostperplexing must be an abundance of it. This contribution clarifies the notion of pluralism byintroducing an often neglected but crucial distinction between different levels at whichpluralism can be situated. It intends to provide a framework for scholars dealing with thequestion how to manage the divergence of views they are confronted with.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mol, Liesbeth</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bullynck, Maarten</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Beckmann, Arnold</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dimitracopoulos, Costas</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Löwe, Benedikt</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A week-end off: the first extensive number-theoretical computation on the ENIAC</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Theory of Algorithms</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer Verlag</style></publisher><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-3-540-69405-2</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The first extensive number-theoretical computation run on the ENIAC, is reconstructed. The problem, computing the exponent of 2 modulo a prime, was set up on the ENIAC during a week-end in July 1946 by the number-theorist D.H. Lehmer, with help from his wife Emma and John Mauchly. Important aspects of the ENIAC's design are presented-and the reconstruction of the implementation of the problem on the ENIAC is discussed in its salient points.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wieland, Jan Willem</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">What problem of universals</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">81</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7–21</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;What is the Problem of Universals? In this paper we take up the classic question and proceed as follows. In Sect. 1 we consider three problem solving settings and define the notion of problem solving accordingly. Basically I say that to solve problems is to eliminate undesirable, unspecified, or apparently incoherent scenarios. In Sect. 2 we apply the general observations from Sect. 1 to the Problem of Universals . More specifically, we single out two accounts of the problem which are based on the idea of eliminating apparently incoherent scenarios, and then propose modifications of those two accounts which, by contrast, are based on the idea of eliminating unspecified scenarios. In Sect. 3 we spell out two interesting ramifications.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ducheyne, Steffen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Whewell's metaphorical usage of light and the ultimate reality underlying it</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Semiotica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">November</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">172</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">269–278</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this article, I seek to study Whewell as writer of philosophical doctrines by focusing on his frequent usage of the metaphor of light, which symbolized (human) knowledge. It is my primary claim that Whewell choose to visually illustrate his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas, which are the bearers of ultimate reality and meaning in Whewell's epistemology, by means some key metaphors that made reference to light.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Horsten, Leon</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Douven, Igor</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wetenschapsfilosofie.</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Koninklijke Van Gorcum</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">238 p.</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-90-232-4312-0</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Malinowski, Jacek</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pietruszczak, Andrzej</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A World of Experiences, an Adequate Language, and Self-Reference Revised</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Essays in Logic and Ontology</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rodopi</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">243–256</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The paper presents a new, intuitive formal language, L E , that fits in with a world view in which experiences are central entities. It is shown how classical logic and an &quot;objective making&quot; adaptive logic can be applied to formulas of L E . The latter logic sheds an interesting light on the creation of theories about &quot;the objective world&quot;. The paper also contains a small comment on sentences that are not translatable in L E . In the last section, I revise self-referring sentences by means of their translations in L E.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Dyck, Maarten</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weighing Falling Bodies. Galileo's Thought Experiment in the Development of his Dynamical Thinking.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Unpublished</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wie rookt gaat sneller dood en betaalt dus meer: Over het belang van oorzaak-gevolg-relaties in verzekeren en de moeilijkheid bij het onderzoeken ervan</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ethiek en Maatschappij</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">58–69</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Smokers die sooner and therefore pay more. On the importance of cause-effect- relations in insurance and the difficulties researching them. For insurers, a correct knowledge of causes are important. An insurance companies who failes to adequatly assess the causes of particular risks will loose its market position due to wrong price setting. In this paper, I discuss possible methods determine the causes of risks, as well as problems and imperfections of those methods.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">When unveiling the epistemic fallacy ends with committing the ontological fallacy. On the contribution of critical realism to the social scientific explanatory practice</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">71</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">81–98</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Clercq, Kristof</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Why the logic of explanation is inconsistency-adaptive.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistency in science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">165–184</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-4020-0630-6</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Christiaens, Wim</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">World Models and Inconsistencies.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Foundations of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">285–311</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;A worldview has sic components. We concentrate on the first two: descriptive world model and the explanatory world model. In the first half of the paper we make some general remarks on the methodology of world construction. In the second part, we discuss inconsistencies in world models. Adding new fragments to our world model can lead to inconsistencies Three strategies are distinguished: (i) a partial return to instrumentalism, (ii) paraconsistency, and (iii) the adaptive option. The latter option is elaborated by means of several historical examples and by means of the EPR paradox.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anapolitanos, Dionysios</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Baltas, Aristides</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tsinorema, Stavroula</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">What, if anything, is an experiment in mathematics?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophy and the Many Faces of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1998</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rowman &amp; Littlefield</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">172–182</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wetenschap en religie: zo verzoenbaar als men maar wil.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mores</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1997</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">381-388</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wetenschappelijke ontdekking en creativiteit. Een poging tot theorievorming op basis van een conceptuele, methodologische en logische studie</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1997</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">March 12</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Universiteit Gent (Belgium)</style></publisher><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">phd</style></work-type><custom1><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Diderik Batens&lt;/p&gt;</style></custom1></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cornelis, Gustaaf C</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Waarom Wesley Salmons causaal-mechanische model van verklaring niet volstaat</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. Acta 16de Nederlands-Vlaamse Filosofiedag</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1994</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">VUB Press</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">81-86</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9789054870845</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">van Dooren, Wim</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hoff, Tineke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wetenschappelijke verklaringen en subjectief verwacht nut</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Actueel Filosoferen</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1993</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eburon</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Delft</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">53-60</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wetenschap en Vrijzinnige Waarden</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De specificiteit van Vrijzinnig Humanistische Waarden</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1986</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">UPV</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1–14</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record></records></xml>