<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">van Benthem, Johan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pacuit, Eric</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Quasi-merging and Pure-arbitration on Information for the family of Adaptive Logics ADM</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of the Workshop on Logic and Intelligent Interaction</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The present paper introduces two new information merging protocols for the family of adaptive logics &lt;strong&gt;ADM&lt;/strong&gt;, for which majority merging has been defined in [19]. The new adaptive operators re ect the negotiation processes of quasi-merging and pure arbitration, known from the Integrity Constraints framework introduced in [13]. The &lt;em&gt;Adaptive Variant Counting&lt;/em&gt; selection provides a result equivalent to the &lt;em&gt;GMax&lt;/em&gt; family of merging operators: it selects a collective model for a multi-set of belief bases based on the number of disagreements verified by the various models according to a leximax function. The &lt;em&gt;Adaptive Minimax Counting&lt;/em&gt; selection is a quasi-merging operator which applies a minimax function and it obtains a larger spectrum of possibilities than the previous selection: it simulates the behaviour of the &lt;em&gt;Max&lt;/em&gt; family of operators from the Integrity Con- straints framework, avoiding some of its counterintuitive results.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Questioning structurism as a new standard for social scientific explanations</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Graduate Journal of Social Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">204–226</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;As the literature on Critical Realism in the social sciences is growing, it is about time to analyse whether a new, acceptable standard for social scientific explanations is being introduced. In order to do so, I will discuss the work of Christopher Lloyd, who analysed contributions of social scientists that rely on (what he called) a structurist ontology and a structurist methodology, and advocated a third option in the methodological debate between individualism and holism. I will suggest modifications to three points of Lloyd's analysis, without abandoning Lloyd's intuitions completely. Firstly, the intuitions of the structurist ontology can be made explicit in a different way, without loosing the individual-society dualism. Secondly, opting for a structurist ontology does not necessarily imply opting for a structurist methodology. Ontology and methodology are related, but not as strongly as Lloyd supposes. Thirdly, the idea of a complete explanation, present in the structurist methodology, confuses causation and explanation while denying the pragmatics of explanation. A broader spectrum of explanatory forms can be defended. Criticizing Lloyd on these three points will lead me to the defence of an explanatory pluralism, which I relate to a minimal ontology. The intention of this reconceptualisation of structurism (and related Critical Realist applications) is to broaden possible perspectives on the explanatory praxis of the social scientist, and to question the reunification of the social sciences. It will also stipulate which form of interdisciplinarity is preferable for the social sciences.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mey, Tim</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">J. Leilich, P. Reynaert</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Veldeman, J.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Qualia, spectruminversie en filosofische zombies.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Het bewustzijn in de fysische wereld: Filosofische essays over materialisme en fenomenaal bewustzijn</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Peeters</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leuven</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">171-194</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record></records></xml>