<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pawlowski, Pawel</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Urbaniak, Rafal</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Many-valued logic of informal provability: a non-deterministic strategy</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Review of Symbolic Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In Press</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frans, Joachim</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kosolosky, Laszlo</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mathematical proofs in practice: Revisiting the reliability of published mathematical proofs</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">345–360</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gervais, Raoul</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mechanistic and non-mechanistic varieties of dynamical models in cognitive science: explanatory power, understanding, and the 'mere description' worry</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Synthese</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">192</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43–66</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In the literature on dynamical models in cognitive science, two issues have recently caused controversy. First, what is the relation between dynamical and mechanistic models? I will argue that dynamical models can be upgraded to be mechanistic as well, and that there are mechanistic and non-mechanistic dynamical models. Second, there is the issue of explanatory power. Since it is uncontested the mechanistic models can explain, I will focus on the non-mechanistic variety of dynamical models. It is often claimed by proponents of mechanistic explanations that such models do not really explain cognitive phenomena (the mere description worry). I will argue against this view. Although I agree that the three arguments usually offered to vindicate the explanatory power of non-mechanistic dynamical models (predictive power, counterfactual support, and unification) are not enough, I consider a fourth argument, namely that such models provide understanding. The Voss strong anticipation model is used to illustrate this.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frans, Joachim</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mechanistic Explanation and Explanatory Proofs in Mathematics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophia Mathematica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">231–248</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Although there is a consensus among philosophers of mathematics and mathematicians that mathematical explanations exist, only a few authors have proposed accounts of explanation in mathematics. These accounts fit into the unificationist or top-down approach to explanation. We argue that these models can be complemented by a bottom-up approach to explanation in mathematics. We introduce the mechanistic model of explanation in science and discuss the possibility of using this model in mathematics, arguing that using it does not presuppose a Platonist view of mathematics and allows one to gain insight into why a theorem is true by answering what-if-things-had-been-different questions.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Clarke, Brendan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leuridan, Bert</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Williamson, Jon</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modelling mechanisms with causal cycles</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Synthese</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">191</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1651–1681</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Mechanistic philosophy of science views a large part of scientific activity as engaged in modelling mechanisms. While science textbooks tend to offer qualitative models of mechanisms, there is increasing demand for models from which one can draw quantitative predictions and explanations. Casini et al. (Theoria 26(1):533, 2011) put forward the Recursive Bayesian Networks (RBN) formalism as well suited to this end. The RBN formalism is an extension of the standard Bayesian net formalism, an extension that allows for modelling the hierarchical nature of mechanisms. Like the standard Bayesian net formalism, it models causal relationships using directed acyclic graphs. Given this appeal to acyclicity, causal cycles pose a prima facie problem for the RBN approach. This paper argues that the problem is a significant one given the ubiquity of causal cycles in mechanisms, but that the problem can be solved by combining two sorts of solution strategy in a judicious way.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gauderis, Tjerk</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modelling abduction in science by means of a modal adaptive logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">611–624</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Scientists confronted with multiple explanatory hypotheses as a result of their abductive inferences, generally want to reason further on the different hypotheses one by one. This paper presents a modal adaptive logic MLA (s) that enables us to model abduction in such a way that the different explanatory hypotheses can be derived individually. This modelling is illustrated with a case study on the different hypotheses on the origin of the Moon.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Christiaens, Wim</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aerts, Diederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Broekaert, Jan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">D'Hooghe, Bart</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Note, Nicole</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Metaphysics and Cinema</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">World Scientific Publishing Company</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Singapore</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">118-141</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Taddeo, Mariarosaria</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A modal type theory for formalizing trusted communications</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Applied Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">92–114</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper introduces a multi-modal polymorphic type theory to model epistemic processes characterized by trust, defined as a second-order relation affecting the communication process between sources and a receiver. In this language, a set of senders is expressed by a modal prioritized context, whereas the receiver is formulated in terms of a contextually derived modal judgement. Introduction and elimination rules for modalities are based on the polymorphism of terms in the language. This leads to a multi-modal non-homogeneous version of a type theory, in which we show the embedding of the modal operators into standard group knowledge operators.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verdée, Peter</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modelling defeasible reasoning by means of adaptive logic games</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic Journal of the IGPL</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">417–437</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this article, I present a dynamic logic game for defeasible reasoning. I argue that, as far as defeasible reasoning is concerned, one should distinguish between practical and ideal rationality. Starting from the adaptive logic framework, I formalize both rationality notions by means of logic games. The presented adaptive logic games are based on (i) standard logic games on the one hand and (ii) dynamic proof procedures for adaptive logic on the other hand. The games are similar to standard logic games, but have the extra property that some moves are revisable. This is handled by means of a main control game, which starts different standard logic games. I argue that the adaptive logic games form intuitive reasoning models for rationality in defeasible reasoning contexts. Moreover, I will also demonstrate that the games give a good insight in the computational complexity of defeasible reasoning forms.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A multi-modal type system and its procedural semantics for safe distributed programming</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Intuitionistic Modal Logic and Applications Workshop (IMLA11), Nancy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper we present a multi-modal polymorphic type system for a computational interpretation of programs with distributed resources. Polymorphism induces a distinction between programs whose code is safe at location, and programs whose value is safe overall. We formulate judge- mental modalities to express such distinction and use their introduction and elimination rules to express mobility of code and values within a net- work. The syntactic formulation is completed by a procedural semantics interpreted over states of an abstract machine for which a standard sound- ness result is given in the form of a type safety theorem.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wieland, Jan Willem</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Metaphysical explanatory asymmetries</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">211</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">53</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">345–365</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The general view is that metaphysical explanation is asymmetric. For instance, if resemblance facts can be explained by facts about their relata, then, by the asymmetry of explanation, these latter facts cannot in turn be explained by the former. The question however is: is there any reason to hold on to the asymmetry? If so, what does it consist in? In the paper we approach these questions by comparing them to analogous questions that have been investigated for scientific explanations. Three main asymmetry criteria have been proposed for the latter: (i) causation, (ii) unification, and (iii) explanatory dependence. We argue that the last criterion, but not the former two, can be of help to metaphysical explanation: metaphysical explanations are asymmetric if the explanatory dependence criterion (in modified format) holds of them.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Models in Science: Essays on Scientific Virtues, Scientific Pluralism and the Distribution of Labour in Science</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">April 19</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ghent University</style></publisher><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">phd</style></work-type><custom1><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Erik Weber and Jeroen Van Bouwel&lt;/p&gt;</style></custom1></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Multi-Modal Dependent Type Theory for Representing Data Accessibility in a Network.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Electronic Proceedings of the Federated Logic Conference 2010 (Proof Systems for Program Logics Workshop)</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Citeseer</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper we present a multi-modal polymorphic constructive type theory for a computational interpretation of programs equipped with locations for data accessibility in the context of distributed processing.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mainstream economics: searching where the light is</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/PKE0160-3477320109</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">32</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">137–150</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The starting point of this paper is the question of how to explain mainstream economics' great level of acceptance in the face of its poor empirical track record. An explanation is provided in terms of a combination of unification and, most importantly, inference to the best explanation. This paper asks whether the appeal of mainstream economics to inference to the best explanation is justified and as a consequence questions one of the main reasons for the dominance of mainstream economics today. The final section integrates the ideas from the previous sections into a general framework for explanatory pluralism.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Urbaniak, Rafal</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Mathematics of Logic by Richard Kaye (review).</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bulletin of Symbolic Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">02</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">216–218</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mol, Liesbeth</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Libert, Thierry</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marage, Pierre</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanpaemel, Geert</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mathematics through man-computer interaction. A study of the early years of computing.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten</style></publisher><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9789065690432</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van den Bossche, M.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vandemeulebroecke, R.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Menselijke rationaliteit en identiteit.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Humanismen</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">VUB Press</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">163-172</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Wat volgt is een aanzet tot een zuiver beschrijvende analyse van de relatie tussen de ontwikkeling van de menselijke identiteit en de drie sociaal- psychologische fenomenen xenofobie, etnocentrisme en tolerantie. Het werkkader voor deze analyse is een conceptueel, speculatief model van de menselijke rationaliteit.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Urbaniak, Rafal</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rostalska, Agnieszka</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Libert, Thierry</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marage, Pierre</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanpaemel, Geert</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modal Logic and Philosophy. A case study.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Brussel</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">79-83</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mainstream economics: searching where the light is</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of the 10th Anniversary Conference of the Association of Heterodox Economics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">July</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anglia Ruskin University</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Majority Merging by Adaptive Counting</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Synthese (KRA Serie)</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">165</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">203–223</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The present paper introduces a belief merging procedure by majority using the standard format of Adaptive Logics. The core structure of the logic ADM(c) (Adaptive Doxastic Merging by Counting) consists in the formulation of the conflicts arising from the belief bases of the agents involved in the procedure. A strategy is then defined both semantically and proof-theoretically which selects the consistent contents answering to a majority principle. The results obtained are proven to be equivalent to a standard majority operator for bases with partial support.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mey, Tim</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vermeersch, Etienne</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Braeckman, Johan</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Middeleeuwse en Arabische Wijsbegeerte</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De rivier van Herakleitos: Een eigenzinnige visie op de wijsbegeere</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://lib.ugent.be/catalog/pug01:683245</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Houtekiet</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">93–101</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978 90 8924 035 4</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A model for processing updates with inconsistent information on propositional databases</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%"> College Publications</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In the present paper a model for information update on propositional databases is formulated using the standard format of Adaptive Logics. The core structure of the update procedure is represented by the ab- normal expressions of the language that formalize received information contradicting previous contents. The strategy dened to restrict abnor- malities works by establishing, at each stage of the process, the most re- cent and reliable information, updating constantly the base and removing older data.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verdée, Peter</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modeling sorites reasoning with adaptive fuzzy logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fuzzy Sets and Systems</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">14</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">159</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1869–1884</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;We present and discuss a new solution for reasoning with sorites series and their related paradoxes.We argue that a suitable logic for sorites series should be able to apply specific classical logic rules like modus ponens until and unless it becomes apparent that these applications generate unacceptable results. When the latter happens, the logic should be able to retract those applications of classical logic rules that are problematic. The formal core of our solution consists of several adaptive logics based on a Łukasiewicz fuzzy logic extended with the Baaz △-operator and a non-singleton interval of designated values. The natural dynamics characteristic of adaptive logics allows these logics to perform necessary retractions in an intuitive and elegant manner. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heeffer, Albrecht</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mathematics Education Through Lesson Study in the Asia-Pacific Region</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">History and Pedagogy of Mathematics Newsletter</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">66</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4–6</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A modal language for contextual computations</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">June</style></date></pub-dates></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, we present a modal language for contextual computing, corresponding to the fragment of constructive ΚΤ with necessity and pos- sibility operators. We interpret absolute and contextual computations as difierent modes of verifying the truth of propositions. The semantics of the language L cc interprets absolute computations by a direct verification function valid in every state; contextual computations are interpreted in terms of a verification function valid under &lt;em&gt;unverified&lt;/em&gt; information. Modal- ities are used to express extensions of contexts in order to dene local and global validity. This semantics has a (weak) monotonicity property, de- pending on satisfaction of processes in contexts. In the corresponding axiomatic system &lt;em&gt;c&lt;/em&gt;ΚΤ&lt;sub&gt;⋄&lt;/sub&gt; a restricted version of the deduction theorem for globally valid formulas holds, soundness and completeness are proven and decidability is shown to hold for the necessitation fragment of the language by a restricted finite model property..&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mol, Liesbeth</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mathematics and Pictures. Some popular examples</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Unpublished</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Mathematics is a science that is traditionally known as a highly abstract discipline. Due to its apparent possibility of deducing abstract formulas without the necessity of back-linking to the outside reality, pure mathematics status is often experienced as being isolated from and superior to the dubious reality and our evenly ambiguous perception of it. Despite this attitude, several examples can be given of the usefulness of this back-linking. Moreover, since the commercialisation of the computer, new possibilities for mathematical research became available. These possibilities though can only be reached through experimenting. One of the aspects of this experimental approach to mathematics is the use of computer generated images. On the one hand they are used as testing instruments, on the other hand they are necessary tools for certain mathematical theories to be possible - as the outside reality is the object of observation of a physicist, computer generated images are the reality to be observed and perceived by the mathematician.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heeffer, Albrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dhompongsa, G</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bhatti , F</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kitson , Q</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Methodological Relevance of the History of Mathematics for Mathematics Education</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of the International Conference on 21st Century Information Technology in Mathematics Education</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Mathematics education benefits from an integration of the history of mathematics within the mathematics curriculum. We provide three basic arguments for such integration. The first is epistemological and addresses a contextual view on mathematical knowledge. The second concerns the phylogenic aspects of the development of mathematics. Conceptual difficulties with teaching children mathematics often correspond with historical periods of conceptual crisis in mathematics. A third, historical argument, draws on the vast repository of experience in mathematics education. We provide examples for each of these arguments from the history of algebra.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ducheyne, Steffen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mathematical models in Newton's Principia: a new view of the 'Newtonian Style'.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">International Studies in the Philosophy of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1–19</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this essay I argue against I. Bernard Cohens influential account of Newtons methodology in the Principia: the Newtonian Style. The crux of Cohens account is the successive adaptation of mental constructs through comparisons with nature. In Cohens view there is a direct dynamic between the mental constructs and physical systems. I argue that his account is essentially hypothetical-deductive, which is at odds with Newtons rejection of the hypothetical-deductive method. An adequate account of Newtons methodology needs to show how Newtons method proceeds differently from the hypothetical-deductive method. In the constructive part I argue for my own account, which is model based: it focuses on how Newton constructed his models in Book I of the Principia. I will show that Newton understood Book I as an exercise in determining the mathematical consequences of certain force functions. The growing complexity of Newtons models is a result of exploring increasingly complex force functions (intra-theoretical dynamics) rather than a successive comparison with nature (extra-theoretical dynamics). Nature did not enter the scene here. This intra-theoretical dynamics is related to the autonomy of the models.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Preester, Helena</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Micro-explanations of laws.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Structures in Scientific Cognition. Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rodopi</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Amsterdam/New York</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">177–186</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9042016485</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;After a brief introduction to Kuipers' views on explanations of laws we argue that micro-explanations of laws can have two formats: they work either by aggregation and transformation (as Kuipers suggests) or by means of function ascriptions (Kuipers neglects this possibility). We compare both types from an epistemic point of view (which information is needed to construct the explanation?) and from a means-end perspective (do both types serve the same purposes? are they equally good?).&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mey, Tim</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mey, Tim</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mere Logical Possibility: A Bridge too Far</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modal Epistemology</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">53-62</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>6</ref-type><contributors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mey, Tim</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modal epistemology.</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">{Koninklijke {V}laamse {A}cademie van {B}elgië</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">106 p.</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">N/A</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Models of intentional explanation.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophical Explorations</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">233–247</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The controversy about intentional explanation of action concerns how these explanations work. What kind of model allows us to capture the dependency or relevance relation between the explanans, i.e. the beliefs and desires of the agent, and the explanandum, i.e. the action? In this paper, I argue that the causal mechanical model can do the job. Causal mechanical intentional explanations consist in a reference to the mechanisms of practical reasoning of the agent that motivated the agent to act, i.e. to a causally relevant set of beliefs and desires. Moreover, the causal mechanical model can provide in efficient and unproblematic applications, unlike action explanations using ceteris paribus laws or counterfactuals. The drawback of the latter models of explanation is their modal requirement: the explanans must mention or implies sufficient and/or necessary conditions for the explanandum. Such a requirement is too strong when it comes to intentional explanation of action.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Minimally abnormal models in some adaptive logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Synthese</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">125</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5–18</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In an adaptive logic &lt;strong&gt;APL&lt;/strong&gt;, based on a (monotonic) non-standard logic &lt;strong&gt;PL&lt;/strong&gt;, the consequences of &lt;img src=&quot;ggamma.gif&quot; alt=&quot;Gamma&quot; /&gt; can be defined in terms of a selection of the &lt;strong&gt;PL&lt;/strong&gt;-models of &lt;img src=&quot;ggamma.gif&quot; alt=&quot;Gamma&quot; /&gt;. An important property of the adaptive logics &lt;strong&gt;ACLuN1&lt;/strong&gt;, &lt;strong&gt;ACLuN2&lt;/strong&gt;, &lt;strong&gt;ACLuNs1&lt;/strong&gt;, and &lt;strong&gt;ACLuNs2&lt;/strong&gt; logics is proved: whenever a model is not selected, this is justified in terms of a selected model (Strong Reassurance). The property fails for Priest's &lt;strong&gt;LP&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;sup&gt;m&lt;/sup&gt; because of its way of measuring the degree of abnormality of a model is incoherent–-correcting this delivers the property.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Minimizing Ambiguity and Paraconsistency.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">165-166</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39–160</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Ambiguity-adaptive logics offer a natural and rich formal solution to (possibly) inconsistent theories. Three views on ambiguities result in three different, intuitively correct ambiguity-adaptive logics with interesting applications. We present their semantics and proof theory, and illustrate that ambiguity-adaptive logics form an excellent alternative to paraconsistent logics that focus on the characteristics of the logical constants.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Magnani, Lorenzo</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nersessian, Nancy</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Thagard, Paul</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Model-Based Reasoning in Creative Processes</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer/Plenum</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">199–217</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Combining a contextual approach to problem solving with results on some recently developed (non-standard) logics, I present in this paper a general frame for the methodological study of model-based reasoning in creative processes. I argue that model-based reasoning does not require that we turn away from logic. I also argue, however, that in order to better understand and evaluate creative processes that involve model-based reasoning, and in order to formulate guidelines for them, we urgently need to extend the existing variety of logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Douven, Igor</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Horsten, Leon</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mathematical Experiments and Mathematical Pictures</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Realism in the Sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1996</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Universitaire Pers</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leuven</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">203–216</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Menselijke kennis. Pleidooi voor een bruikbare rationaliteit</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1992</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Garant</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Antwerpen/Apeldoorn</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Models of explanation: an evaluation of their fruitfulness</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">COMMUNICATION &amp; COGNITION : MONOGRAPHIES</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1992</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">339–352</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pitt, J. 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