<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heeffer, Albrecht</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the interpretation of early Italian bartering problems</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Submitted</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Urbaniak, Rafal</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hansson, Sven Ove</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hendricks, Vincent F.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Induction</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Handbook of Formal Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">induction</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">logic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">probability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-3-319-77433-6</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wieland, Jan Willem</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wouters, Dietlinde</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Internalism Does Entail Scepticism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Argumentation &amp; Reasoning</style></tertiary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Internalism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Knowledge</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Regress</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rule</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Scepticism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer Netherlands</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">247-260</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-94-017-9010-9</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Let Internalism be the view that our inferences are justified depending on whether we have knowledge of the logical rules on which they are based, and Scepticism the view that none of our inferences are justified. Boghossian has shown that Internalism entails Scepticism, and Philie has attempted to block the entailment by invoking an assumption on rationality. In this contribution, I enforce the entailment claim and argue that Philies solution misses the target: Internalism does entail Scepticism.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Froeyman, Anton</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">'I began with the desire to speak with the dead': de ethiek als 'eerste filosofie' van de geschiedschrijving</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ghent University</style></publisher><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9789083125053</style></isbn><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">phd</style></work-type><custom1><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Gertrudis Van De Vijver&lt;/p&gt;</style></custom1></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Reydon, Thomas</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Boon, Mieke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Houkes, Wybo</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vermaas, Pieter</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The ICE-theory of technical functions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Metascience</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23–44</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Beirlaen, Mathieu</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Straßer, Christian</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Philosophical Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">285–315</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic \sys{DP}$^r$, a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts. On the other hand, \sys{DP}$^r$ still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (\sys{SDL}). \sys{DP}$^r$ interprets a given premise set as normally as possible with respect to \sys{SDL}. Whereas some \sys{SDL}-rules are verified unconditionally by \sys{DP}$^r$, others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of \sys{DP}$^r$&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Urbaniak, Rafal</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van De Putte, Frederik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Induction from a single instance: Incomplete frames</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Foundations of science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">641–653</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper we argue that an existing theory of concepts called dynamic frame theory, although not developed with that purpose in mind, allows for the precise formulation of a number of problems associated with induction from a single instance. A key role is played by the distinction we introduce between complete and incomplete dynamic frames, for incomplete frames seem to be very elegant candidates for the format of the background knowledge used in induction from a single instance. Furthermore, we show how dynamic frame theory provides the terminology to discuss the justification and the fallibility of incomplete frames. In the Appendix, we give a formal account of incomplete frames and the way these lead to induction from a single instance.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gervais, Raoul</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inferential explanations in biology</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">44</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">356–364</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Among philosophers of science, there is now a widespread agreement that the DN model of explanation is poorly equipped to account for explanations in biology. Rather than identifying laws, so the consensus goes, researchers explain biological capacities by constructing a model of the underlying mechanism. We think that the dichotomy between DN explanations and mechanistic explanations is misleading. In this article, we argue that there are cases in which biological capacities are explained without construct- ing a model of the underlying mechanism. Although these explanations do not conform to Hempels DN model (they do not deduce the explanandum from laws of nature), they do invoke more or less stable generalisations. Because they invoke generalisations and have the form of an argument, we call them inferential explanations. We support this claim by considering two examples of explanations of biological capacities: pigeon navigation and photoperiodism. Next, we will argue that these non-mechanistic expla- nations are crucial to biology in three ways: (i) sometimes, they are the only thing we have (there is no alternative available), (ii) they are heuristically useful, and (iii) they provide genuine understanding and so are interesting in their own right. In the last sections we discuss the relation between types of explanations and types of experiments and situate our views within some relevant debates on explanatory power and explanatory virtues.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Vreese, Leen</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aerts, Diederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Broekaert, Jan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">D'Hooghe, Bart</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Note, Nicole</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Interdisciplinary Focus on the Concept of Causation: What philosophy can learn from psychology</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">World Scientific Publishing Company</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Singapore</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55-71</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In philosophy of science, it is still a mainstream practice to search for the `truth' about fundamental scientific concepts in isolation, blind to knowledge achieved in other domains of science. I focus on the topic of causation. I argue that it is worthwhile for philosophy of science to leave its metaphysical tower in order to pick up knowledge from other domains where empirical research on causal reasoning is carried out, such as psychology. I will demonstrate what the psychologist Peter White's theory, on the origin and development of causal reasoning, can impart to philosophy of causation. It concerns different but interre- lated subjects with respect to the philosophy of causation: conceptual pluralism, a core causal concept of causation, the analysis of \what cau- sation is&quot;, epistemological pluralism, causation as a secondary quality and weak causal realism. The divide between metaphysical and epis- temological approaches to causation|and hence between philosophy and psychology|may be much smaller than is often presupposed. Keywords: philosophy of causation, developmental psychology, causal pluralism, interdisciplinarity&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Intuitionistic Logic of Proofs with dependent proof terms</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Preprint Series of the Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematical Sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The basic logic of proofs extends the usual propositional language by expressions of the form &quot;&lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt; is a proof of &lt;em&gt;A&lt;/em&gt;&quot;, for any proposition &lt;em&gt;A&lt;/em&gt;. In this paper we explore the extension of its intuitionistic fragment to a language including expressions of the form &quot;&lt;em&gt;t&lt;/em&gt; is a proof of &lt;em&gt;B&lt;/em&gt;, dependent from &lt;em&gt;s&lt;/em&gt;being a proof of &lt;em&gt;A&lt;/em&gt;&quot;. We aim at laying down a ground comparison with equivalent constructions present in theories of dependent types, especially those similarly based on the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics. We further translate this extended language to a natural deduction calculus which allows for a double interpretation of the construction on which a proof term may depend: as actually proven, or valid assumption, or as possibly proven, locally true assumption. We show meta-theoretical properties for this calculus and explain normalisation to a language with only unconditional proofs. We conclude by stating the characterization of our calculus with standard intutionistic logic of proofs&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">It might have been Classical Logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">218</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">241–279</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, a propositional logic Q is presented. This logic is more attractive than classical propositional logic P for explicating actual proofs. Moreover, while Q and P assign the same consequence set to consistent premise sets, Q assigns a sensible and non-trivial consequence set to in- consistent premise sets.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leuridan, Bert</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">McKay Illari, Phyllis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russo, Federica</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Williamson, Jon</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The IARC and mechanistic evidence</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Causality in the Sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Oxford University Press</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91–109</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9780199574131</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is an organization which seeks to identify the causes of human cancer. For each agent, such as betel quid or Human Papillomaviruses, they review the available evidence deriving from epidemiological studies, animal experiments and information about mechanisms (and other data). The evidence of the different groups is combined such that an overall assessment of the carcinogenicity of the agent in question is obtained. In this paper, we critically review IARC's carcinogenicity evaluations. First we show that serious objections can be raised against their criteria and procedures - more specifically regarding the role of mechanistic knowledge in establishing causal claims. Our arguments are based on the problems of confounders, of the assessment of the temporal stability of carcinogenic relations, viz. How we should treat the carcinogenicity evaluations that were based on the current procedures. After showing that this question is important we argue that an overall dismissal of the current evaluations would be too radical. Instead, we argue in favour of a stepwise re-evaluation of the current findings.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">van Eck, Dingmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Incommensurability and rationality in engineering design: the case of functional decomposition</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY &amp; TECHNOLOGY QUARTERLY ELECTRONIC JOURNAL</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">118–136</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Vreese, Leen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Indispensability arguments in favour of reductive explanations</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal for General Philosophy of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33–46</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction – traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism – can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kosolosky, Laszlo</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerkhove, Bart</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Libert, Thierry</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanpaemel, Geert</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marage, Pierre</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The intended window of epistemic opportunity: a comment on Miriam Solomon</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I argue that Miriam Solomon fails to show that medical consensus conferences, as organised by the National Institute of Health (NIH), miss the intended window of epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007: 170), and thus typically take place after the experts have reached consensus. This is done, on the one hand, by differentiating between, what I intend to call, ‘academic’ and ‘non-academic consensus’, and, on the other hand, by analyzing the arguments and argumentation style Solomon uses to make her claim explicit. At the very least, the overall argument suggests that her statement is inadequately supported, if not that the opposite claim is true. In this manner, I intend to bring additional insight into the notion of ‘consensus’ when applied in scientific practice. Any decision as to change the NIH consensus development program should take these actual achievements into account.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lycke, Hans</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tanaka, Koji</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Berto, Francesco</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mares, Edwin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Paoli, Francesco</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistency-adaptive modal logics: on how to cope with modal inconsistency</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Logical Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.logika.umk.pl/llp/pi.html</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">31–61</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I will characterize a new class of inconsistency–adaptive logics, namely inconsistency–adaptive modal logics. These logics cope with inconsistencies in a modal context. More specifically, when faced with inconsistencies, inconsistency–adaptive modal logics avoid explosion, but still allow the derivation of sufficient consequences to adequately explicate the intended part of human reasoning.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Greiff, Matthias</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Increasing returns in science: a model of the dynamics of scientific activity</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic Journal of the IGPL</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">278-294</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">D'Hooghe, Bart</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Introduction: Contemporary Analytic Metaphysics, Its Crisis and Challenge</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Worldviews, Science and Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics. A Selection of Topics From a Methodological Perspective</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">World Scientific Publishing Company</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4–9</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-981-4295-81-9</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ducheyne, Steffen</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rusu, Iulian</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Isaac Newton's 'Of The Church' Manuscript Description and Analysis of Bodmer Ms. in Geneva</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European journal of science and theology</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.ejst.tuiasi.ro/issue.html</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25–35</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this essay, a manuscript description and analysis of Isaac Newton's manuscript 'Of the Church' (Bodmer Ms., Fondation Martin Bodmer, Geneva, Switzerland) is provided.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heeffer, Albrecht</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An introduction to wasan, native Japanese mathematics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">History and Pedagogy of Mathematics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/1854/11413</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">68</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20–24</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ducheyne, Steffen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&quot;Ignorance is Bliss&quot;: On Bernard Nieuwentijt's Doctrina Ignorantia and His Contribution to Our Understanding of Scientific Idealisation</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rivista di storia della filosofia</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">62</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">699-710</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vosniadou, S.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kayser, D.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Athanassios, P.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the Implementation of Concept Structures in Fuzzy Logic.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of the European Cognitive Science Conference 2007</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;A procedure is presented which can modify a large number of fuzzy logics in such a way that the result integrates a logically meaningful representation of the family resemblance structure of fuzzy concepts. The most important aspect of this modification is the implementation of so-called concept matrices. The interpretation and construction of these new formal objects is based upon Fintan Costellos Diagnostic Evidence Model (2000), a contemporary cognitive scientific model of concept structure and concept combination. As a result, it becomes possible to formalize, explain and simulate new logical aspects of cognitive fuzziness such as meaning transformations by means of non-scalar hedges, and interpretational and inferential operations over non-intersective concept combinations.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Arlsdale, John Z.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The idea of social mechanisms in social scientific explanations.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Progress in Social Psychology Research</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Advances in social psychology research</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nova Science</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">83–95</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1594546584</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mey, Tim</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Imagination's Grip on Science</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Metaphilosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">222–239</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In part because ˝imagination˝ is a slippery notion, its exact role in the production of scientific knowledge remains unclear. There is, however, one often explicit and deliberate use of imagination by scientists that can be (and has been) studied intensively by epistemologists and historians of science: thought experiments. The main goal of this article is to document the varieties of thought experimentation, not so much in terms of the different sciences in which they occur but rather in terms of the different functions they fulfil. I argue that thought experimentation (and hence imagination) plays a role not only in theory choice but in singular causal analysis and scientific discovery as well. I pinpoint, moreover, some of the rules governing the use of thought experiments in theory choice and in singular causal analysis, that is, some of the criteria they should meet in order to fulfil those functions successfully.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Horsten, Leon</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">INUS Conditions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Encyclopedia of statistics in behavioral science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">John Wiley &amp; Sons</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">955–958</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">0470860804</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Imperialistische tendensen in de economiebeoefening en politieke wetenschappen. Over heterodoxie en pluralisme in de sociale wetenschappen</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ethiek &amp; maatschappij</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">32–45</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cuypers, Stefaan</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Introduction: beyond Empiricism in the Social Explanation of Action</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophical Explorations</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">197–201</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistencies and the Dynamics of Science</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Logical Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11/12</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">129–148</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In Defence of a Programme for Handling Inconsistencies</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistency in Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">129–150</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper states and defends the philosophical programme underlying the Ghent approach to adaptive logics. Two central arguments are epistemic in nature, one logical. The underlying claim is that even people with rather classical views should see adaptive logics as the only sensible way to handle the inconsistencies that regularly arise in human knowledge, including scientific theories.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Krach, Helghe</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanpaemel, Geert</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marage, Pierre</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistencies in Scientific Discovery. Clausius's Remarkable Derivation of Carnot's Theorem</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">History of Modern Physics. Acta of the XXth International Congress of History of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Brepols</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Turnhout (Belgium)</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">143–154</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistencies in the history of mathematics: the case of infinitesimals.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistency in Science</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Origins</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_3</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer Academic</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43–57</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-4020-0630-6</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper I will not confine myself exclusively to historical considerations. Both philosophical and technical matters will be raised, all with the purpose of trying to understand (better) what Newton, Leibniz and the many precursors (might have) meant when they talked about infinitesimals. The technical part will consist of an analysis why apparently infinitesimals have resisted so well to be formally expressed. The philosophical part, actually the most important part of this paper, concerns a discussion that has been going on for some decennia now. After the Kuhnian revolution in philosophy of science, notwithstanding Kuhns own suggestion that mathematics is something quite special, the question was nevertheless asked how mathematics develops. Are there revolutions in mathematics? If so, what do we have to think of? If not, why do they not occur? Is mathematics the so often claimed totally free creation of the human spirit? As usual, there is a continuum of positions, but let me sketch briefly the two extremes: the completists (as I call them) on the one hand, and the contingents (as I call them as well) on the other hand.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vermeir, Timothy</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Carnielli, Walter A.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Coniglio, Marcelo E.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Loffredo D'Ottaviano, Itala M.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Inconsistency-Adaptive Proof Procedure for Logic Programming</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marcel Dekker</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New York</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">323-340</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;It is the goal of this paper to de ne a paraconsistent proof procedure that has the best of two mechanisms, in casu logic programming and inconsistency-adaptive logics. From logic programming we will maintain the ease of computing, and from adaptive logics their paraconsistency, dynamics and non-monotonicity. This will be done by combining the notion of competitor from logic programming together with the conditionallity that is common in all adaptive proofs.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ducheyne, Steffen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Isaac Newton on space and time: metaphysician or not?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">67</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77–114</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;But whereas we can blame Bohr, Schrodinger and Einstein for our problems, Newton has only God to blame for his. (Tamny, 1979: 58). After all, if Newton does not believe in the reality of space and time themselves, over and above the material inhabitants of them, who does? (Sklar, 1990: 68).&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vermeir, Timothy</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistency-adaptive Arithmetic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">167-168</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">221-241</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this article, it is shown that inconsistent arithmetic, as proposed by Jean Paul Van Bendegem and Graham Priest, does not have all the properties they claim the system has. The search for a system of inconsistent arithmetic that does have the intended properties, will lead us through different axiomatizations and different logics, the final result being inconsistency-adaptive arithmetic.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Orłowska, Ewa</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic at Work. Essays Dedicated to the Memory of Helena Rasiowa</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Physica Verlag (Springer)</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heidelberg, New York</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">445–472</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;After a general description of adaptive logics and their intended applications, I study the proof theory and semantics of two closely related predicative inconsistency-adaptive logics, &lt;strong&gt;ACLuN1&lt;/strong&gt; and &lt;strong&gt;ACLuN2&lt;/strong&gt;. To this end, I first describe their monotonic basis: the paraconsistent logic &lt;strong&gt;CLuN&lt;/strong&gt; obtained by dropping the consistency requirement from classical logic. The propositional fragments of these inconsistency-adaptive logics have been studied elsewhere. The predicative versions involve several interesting difficulties that lead to new results.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Introduction.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">231–234</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistencies and Beyond. A Logical-Philosophical Discussion</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Revue Internationale de Philosophie</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1997</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">200</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">259–273</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The paper starts off by epistemological arguments for the need of paraconsistent logics. Next it is argued that some contexts require that one allows for other abnormalities, next to or instead of inconsistencies. The feasibility of such moves is defended in terms of a contextual epistemology. Finally, adaptive logics are defended as means to interpret theories `as normally as possible', even if they contain some abnormalities.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Douven, Igor</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Horsten, Leon</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In-world realism vs. reflective realism.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Realism in the Sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1996</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Universitaire Pers</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leuven</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35–53</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In defence of discrete space and time</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1995</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">150-151-152</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">38</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">127-150</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper several arguments are discussed and evaluated concerning the possibility of discrete space and time.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics and the Foundation of Non-Monotonic Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1994</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">145</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">57–94</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper contains the reconstruction of (what I shall call) mixed non-monotonic logics as a combination of a deductive and a preferential component. The first leads from the premises to a possibly inconsistent consequence set; the second weeds out the inconsistencies. Among the candidates for the deductive component inconsistency-adaptive logics prove most suitable. The ensuing preferential component is formulated in terms of models and is itself split into two parts: (i) a transparent, purely logical procedure leads from a set of inconsistent models to a set of associated consistent models and (ii) the choice between the latter relies on the preferences. The real fight between mixed non-monotonic logics should concentrate on this last aspect. The outlined approach has a broader domain of application than mixed non-monotonic logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Appeared 1996</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Meirvenne, Joachim</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Indexed Inconsistency-Adaptive Logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1994</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">145</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41-55</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The indirect practical functions of explanations</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">PHILOSOPHICA (GENT)</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1993</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">105–124</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Introduction</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1993</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5–7</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Incommensurability is not a threat to the rationality of science or to the anti-dogmatic tradition</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1983</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">32</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">117–132</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Block, A.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ten Have, T.T.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Keyser, C.C.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inductie</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Standaard Encyclopedia voor Opvoeding en Onderwijs</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1977</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Standaard</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">180</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Block, A.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ten Have, T.T.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Keyser, C.C.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inferentie</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Standaard Encyclopedie voor Opvoeding en Onderwijs</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1977</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Standaard</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">382–383</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inductieve logica. Een inleiding tot enkele basisproblemen</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Communicatie en Cognitie</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1969</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">128–154</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record></records></xml>