<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Baartmans, Tim</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kosolosky, Laszlo</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Groepsbeslissingen: kwaliteit, autoriteit en vertrouwen</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tijdschrift voor Filosofie</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In Press</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gervais, Raoul</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The 'green cheese' and 'red herring' problems reconsidered. Epistemological versus methodological tasks for Philosophers of Science</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year></dates><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">433-455</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Díez, José</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Khalifa, Kareem</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leuridan, Bert</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">General theories of explanation: buyer beware</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Synthese</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">190</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">379–396</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;We argue that there is no general theory of explanation that spans the sciences, mathematics, and ethics, etc. More specifically, there is no good reason to believe that substantive and domain-invariant constraints on explanatory information exist. Using Nickel (Noûs 44(2):305328, 2010) as an exemplar of the contrary, generalist position, we first show that Nickels arguments rest on several ambiguities, and then show that even when these ambiguities are charitably corrected, Nickels defense of general theories of explanation is inadequate along several different dimensions. Specifically, we argue that Nickels argument has three fatal flaws. First, he has not provided any compelling illustrations of domain-invariant constraints on explanation. Second, in order to fend off the most vehement skeptics of domain-invariant theories of explanation, Nickel must beg all of the important questions. Third, Nickels examples of explanations from different domains with common explanatory structure rely on incorrect formulations of the explanations under consideration, circular justifications, and/or a mischaracterization of the position Nickel intends to critique. Given that the best and most elaborate defense of the generalist position fails in so many ways, we conclude that the standard practice in philosophy (and in philosophy of science in particular), which is to develop theories of explanation that are tailored to specific domains, still is justified. For those who want to buy into a more ambitious project: beware of the costs!&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mol, Liesbeth</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Zenil, H.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Generating, solving and the mathematics of Homo Sapiens. Emil Posts views on computation</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Computable Universe: Understanding and Exploring Nature as Computation</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">World Scientific Publishers</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45–62</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cieśliński, Cezary</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Urbaniak, Rafal</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gödelizing the Yablo sequence</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of philosophical logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9244-4</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">679–695</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;We investigate what happens when 'truth' is replaced with 'provability' in Yablo's paradox. By diagonalization, appropriate sequences of sentences can be constructed. Such sequences contain no sentence decided by the background consistent and sufficiently strong arithmetical theory. If the provability predicate satisfies the derivability conditions, each such sentence is provably equivalent to the consistency statement and to the Godel sentence. Thus each two such sentences are provably equivalent to each other. The same holds for the arithmetization of the existential Yablo paradox. We also look at a formulation which employs Rosser's provability predicate.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frans, Joachim</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Game of Fictional Mathematics. Review of Mathematics and Reality by Mary Leng</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Constructivist Foundations</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">126–128</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Leng attacks the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects. She offers an account that treats the role of mathematics in science as an indispensable and useful part of theories, but retains nonetheless a fictionalist position towards mathematics. The result is an account of mathematics that is interesting for constructivists. Her view towards the nominalistic part of science is, however, more in conflict with radical constructivism.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The generation of abductive explanations from inconsistent theories</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic Journal of the IGPL</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">400–416</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this article I will show how the goal-directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the 'inconsistency-adaptive' logic CLuN(r)from Batens (2005, J. Appl. Logic, 3, 221-250) called pCLuN(r) allows for generating sensible abductive explanations from finite inconsistent theories. Before this is shown, I give a more general account on how goal-directed proof procedures contribute to the study of abduction as backward reasoning. Between these two parts, I describe the goal-directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the 'inconsistency-adaptive' logic CLuNr from Batens (2005, J. Appl. Logic, 3, 221-250).&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van De Putte, Frederik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Generic Formats for Prioritized Adaptive Logics. With Applications in Deontic Logic, Abduction and Belief Revision</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">May 24</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ghent University</style></publisher><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">phd</style></work-type><custom1><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Joke Meheus and Peter Verdée&lt;/p&gt;</style></custom1></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Giovanni Sommaruga (ed): Formal Theories of Information: From Shannon to Semantic Information Theory and General Concepts of Information (Review)</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Minds and Machines</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">119-122</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Clercq, Kristof</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Carnielli, Walter A.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Coniglio, Marcelo E.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Loffredo D'Ottaviano, Itala M.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Goal-Directed Tableaux</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Many Sides of Logic</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studies in Logic</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">London</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">241–256</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper contains a new format for analytic tableaux, called goal-directed tableaux. Their main interest lies in the fact that the search for a closed tableau proceeds in a highly constrained way. The goal-directed tableaux do not form a complete decision method for propositional classical logic (because they do not sustain Ex Falso Quodlibet). For consistent sets of premises, however, they lead to the same results as the usual analytic tableaux for classical logic.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ducheyne, Steffen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Galileo and Huygens on free fall: Mathematical and methodological ifferences</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dynamis</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">28</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">243–274</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this essay, I will scrutinize the differences between Galileo's and Huygens's demonstrations of free fall, which can be found respectively in the Discorsi and the Horologium, from a mathematical, representational and methodological perspective. I argue that more can be learnt from such an analysis than the thesis that Huygens re-styled Galilean mechanics which is a communis opinio. I shall argue that the differences in their approach on free fall highlight a significantly different mathematical and methodological outlook.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Priest, Graham</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Graham Priest and Diderik Batens Interview Each Other</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Reasoner</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2–4</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leuridan, Bert</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russo, Federica</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Williamson, Jon</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Galton's blinding glasses: modern statistics hiding causal structure in early theories of inheritance.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Causality and probability in the sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">243–262</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-904987-35-4</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ducheyne, Steffen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Galileo's interventionist notion of &quot;cause&quot;</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of the History of Ideas</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">67</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">443–464</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this essay, I shall argue that Galileo introduced a new scientifically useful notion of causality. This new notion of causality was an interventionist notion, according to which causal relations can be discovered by actively exploring and manipulating natural processes. The presence of this conception can be seen from Galileo's explanation of floating bodies and his theory of the tides. I shall point to the similarity between Galileo's notion of &quot;cause&quot; and recent interventionist accounts of causation in the philosophy of science (especially James Woodward's).&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Dyck, Maarten</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gravitating towards stability: Guidobaldo's Aristotelian-Archimedean synthesis</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">History of science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/1854/10929</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">146</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">44</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">373–407</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Graham Allisons modellen voor de analyse van internationale betrekkingen: een pluralistische kritiek</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ethiek &amp; Maatschappij</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">64–77</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;A call for epistemic pluralism is credible only when showing enough pluralism itself. Graham Allisons three conceptual models made such a call, but do his models differ enough? Based on a fundamental theoretical analysis, disentangling the ontological and methodological aspects of Allisons models, I conclude they do not. Subsequently, arguing that additional diversity is necessary and not an impossible endeavour, I construct a fourth model based on Alexander Wendts Social Theory of International Politics. This model is fundamentally different from Allisons models, and in combination with them a more convincing case for epistemic pluralism.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A General Characterization of Adaptive Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">173-175</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">44</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45–68</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper contains a unified characterization of adaptive logics. The general structure is presented in the simplest possible guise, both for flat and prioritized adaptive logics. The latter are presented as a special case of combined adaptive logics. The aim of the paper is to provide the general framework underlying several other papers in this volume and to prepare the unified metatheory of adaptive logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Appeared 2003</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerckhove, Christian</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Grondslagen van het vrijzinnig humanisme. Een kennistheoretisch pleidooi</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Grondslagen Vrijzinnig Humanisme</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1997</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Humanistisch Vrijzinnige Dienst</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Antwerpen</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">75–104</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record></records></xml>