<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Bal, Inge</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">From one to many: generalisation and evidence in failure analysis.</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Submitted</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I use cases and reasoning from failure analysis (a part of engineering&lt;br /&gt;science which deals with artefact failure and its causes) to draw attention to a relatively&lt;br /&gt;unstudied problem of knowledge generalisation: when we are focusing on creating new&lt;br /&gt;things; designing new artefacts and technologies. Using three cases from failure&lt;br /&gt;analysis practice, I present a two-fold mechanism-based procedure to determine when&lt;br /&gt;generalisations to non-existing artefacts are warranted. This procedure builds on (1)&lt;br /&gt;Cartwright's notion of capacities (2) literature on mechanisms and (3) Steel's&lt;br /&gt;comparative process tracing, developed for the biomedical sciences. I will show that,&lt;br /&gt;while they provide guidance, these literatures and concepts are not enough to grasp&lt;br /&gt;how we use information from current artefacts and failures to create new things - we&lt;br /&gt;will need a lot more specific information and adequate ways to present it. The account&lt;br /&gt;developed in this paper is relevant for both philosophers and failure analysts. For&lt;br /&gt;philosophers, it can provide input for a theory of evidence. For failure analysts, it allows&lt;br /&gt;them to present stronger arguments for their recommendations by making the required&lt;br /&gt;evidence explicit. My account can furthermore provide inspiration for similar inferences&lt;br /&gt;in other innovation contexts such as pharmacology.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gauderis, Tjerk</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Magnani, Lorenzo</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bertolotti, Tommaso</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Feasibility of Modeling Hypothetical Reasoning by Formal Logics. Including an Overview of Adaptive Logics for Singular Fact Abduction</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Handbook of Model-Based Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In Press</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mol, Liesbeth</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Moktefi, A.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Moretti, A.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Schang, Fabian</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Formalism. The success(es) of a failure</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Let's be logical</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In Press</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College publications</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van De Putte, Frederik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Free Choice Permission in STIT</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logica Yearbook 2016</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year></dates><edition><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pavel Arazim and Tomáš Lávička</style></edition><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">289--303</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gervais, Raoul</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A framework for inter-level explanations: Outlines for a new explanatory pluralism.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">48</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1–9</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;According to explanatory pluralism, the appropriate explanatory level is determined by pragmatic factors, and there are no general exclusion or preference rules concerning higher- or lower-level explanations. While I agree with the latter claim, I will argue that the former is in need of revision. In particular, I will argue that by distinguishing cases of two explanations being descriptions of one underlying causal process, and two explanations being descriptions of two distinct causal processes, it becomes clear that the grain size of an explanation is in fact determined by the interplay of various pragmatic and non-pragmatic factors. Within these constraints, positive guidelines can be developed to direct us to the appropriate explanatory level. This gives us the outlines for a general framework for classifying various types of relations between explanations on different levels. After making a comparison between this new framework and standard explanatory pluralism, I end by suggesting some ways in which the framework could be further developed.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">van Eck, Dingmar</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Function ascription and explanation: elaborating an explanatory utility desideratum for ascriptions of technical functions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Erkenntnis</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">February</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">6</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">79</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1367–1389</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Current philosophical theorizing about technical functions is mainly focused on specifying conditions under which agents are justified in ascribing functions to technical artifacts. Yet, assessing the precise explanatory relevance of such function ascriptions is, by and large, a neglected topic in the philosophy of technical artifacts and technical functions. We assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions in the following three explanation-seeking contexts: (i) why was artifact x produced?, (ii) why does artifact x not have the expected capacity to $\phi$;?, (iii) how does artifact x realize its capacity to $\phi$;? We argue that while function ascriptions serve a mere heuristic role in the first context, they have substantial explanatory leverage in the second and third context. In addition, we assess the relevance of function ascriptions in the context of engineering redesign. Here, function ascriptions also play a relevant role: (iv) they enable normative statements of the sort that component b functions better than component a. We unpack these claims by considering philosophical theories of technical functions, in particular the ICE theory, and engineering work on function ascription and explanation. We close the paper by relating our analysis to current debates on the explanatory power of mechanistic vis-à-vis functional explanations.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Winter, Jan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kosolosky, Laszlo</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fraud in academic medical research: lessons from Flanders, Belgium</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The reasoner</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://thereasoner.org/</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;A scientific survey on fraud in academic medical research in Flanders , of which the results were recently published in popular science magazine Eos, has caused tumult in the Flemish academic community. The reason is that these results suggest that scientific fraud (which could indirectly cause ill health and death among patients) is not as rare as earlier estimates indicate . Malpractices are primarily attributed to the pressure to publish. In this piece , we elaborate on the content of the study and pave the way for reform.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>10</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Martens, Liesbeth</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A formal approach to vague expressions with indexicals</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Engineering of Natural Language Semantics 9 (LENLS 9-2012)</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37-51</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, we offer a formal approach to the scantily investigated problem of vague expressions with indexicals, in particular including the spatial indexical `here' and the temporal indexical `now'. We present two versions of an adaptive fuzzy logic extended with an indexical, formally expressed by a modifier as a function that applies to predicative formulas. In the first version, such an operator is applied to non-vague predicates. The modified formulas may have a fuzzy truth value and fit into a Sorites paradox. We use adaptive fuzzy logics as a reasoning tool to address such a paradox. The modifier enables us to offer an adequate explication of the dynamic reasoning process. In the second version, a different result is obtained for an indexical applied to a formula with a possibly vague predicate, where the resulting modified formula has a crisp value and does not add up to a Sorites paradox.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lycke, Hans</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A formal explication of the search for explanations: the adaptive logics approach to abductive reasoning</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic Journal of IGPL</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">497–516</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Most logicbased approaches characterize abduction as a kind of backwards deduction plus additional conditions, which means that a number of conditions is specified that enable one to decide whether or not a particular abductive inference is sound (one of those conditions may e.g. be that abductive consequences have to be compatible with the background theory). Despite the fact that these approaches succeed in specifying which formulas count as valid consequences of abductive inference steps, they do not explicate the way people actually reason by means of abductive inferences. This is most clearly shown by the absence of a decent proof theory. Instead, search procedures are provided that enable one to determine the right abductive consequences. However, these do not by far resemble human reasoning. In order to explicate abductive reasoning more realistically, an alternative approach will be provided in this article, namely, one that is based on the adaptive logics programme. Proof theoretically, this approach interprets the argumentation schema affirming the consequent (&lt;strong&gt;AC&lt;/strong&gt;: A ⊃ B, B ⊢ A) as a defeasible rule of inference. This comes down to the fact that the abductive consequences obtained by means of &lt;strong&gt;AC&lt;/strong&gt; are accepted only for as long as certain conditions are satis.ede.g. as long as their negation has not been derived from the background theory. In the end, only the unproblematic applications of &lt;strong&gt;AC&lt;/strong&gt; are retained, while the problematic ones are rejected. In this way, the adaptive logics approach to abduction succeeds to provide a more realistic explication of the way people reason by means of abductive inferences. Moreover, as multiple abduction processes will be characterized, this article may be considered as the first step in the direction of a general formal approach to abduction based on the adaptive logics programme.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Froeyman, Anton</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frank Ankersmit and Eelco Runia: the presence and the otherness of the past</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rethinking history</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">393–415</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper consists of two parts. In the first part, I give an in-depth comparison and analysis of the theories of Frank Ankersmit and Eelco Runia, in which I highlight their most important resemblances and differences. What both have in common is their notion of the presence of the past as a 'presence in absence'. They differ, however, with respect to the character of this past and the role representation plays in making it present. Second, I also argue that for both Ankersmit and Runia, the presence of the past is always the present of our past, which excludes the experience of the otherness of the past, and which opens both theories to the criticisms of being self-centered and nationalistic.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wieland, Jan Willem</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Filling a typical gap in a regress argument</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique &amp; Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">216</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">54</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">589–597</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In the following we fix a typical regress argument, locate a typical gap in the argument, and try to supply a number of gap-filling readings of its first premise.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dieks, Dennis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gonzalez, Wenceslao J.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hartmann, Stephan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Uebel, Thomas</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">93–108</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>10</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heeffer, Albrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Seroglou, Fanny</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Koulountzos, Vassilis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Siatras, Anastasios</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">From problem solving to the teaching of algebra: the genesis of the algebra textbook</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11th international IHPST and 6th Greek history, philosophy and science teaching joint conference, Proceedings</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Epikentro Publications</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">344-347</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9789604583256</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heeffer, Albrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heeffer, Albrecht</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Dyck, Maarten</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">From the second unknown to the symbolic equation</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in Early Modern Mathematics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">26</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">57–102</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-1-84890-017-2</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The symbolic equation slowly emerged during the course of the sixteenth century as a new mathematical concept as well as a mathematical object on which new operations were made possible. Where historians have of- ten pointed at Francois Viète as the father of symbolic algebra, we would like to emphasize the foundations on which Viète could base his &lt;em&gt;logistica speciosa.&lt;/em&gt; The period between Cardanos &lt;em&gt;Practica Arithmeticae&lt;/em&gt; of 1539 and Gosselins &lt;em&gt;De arte magna&lt;/em&gt; of 1577 has been crucial in providing the necessary build- ing blocks for the transformation of algebra from rules for problem solving to the study of equations. In this paper we argue that the so-called second unknown or the &lt;em&gt;Regula quantitates&lt;/em&gt; steered the development of an adequate symbolism to deal with multiple unknowns and aggregates of equations. Dur- ing this process the very concept of a symbolic equation emerged separate from previous notions of what we call co-equal polynomials.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ducheyne, Steffen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fundamental questions and some new answers on philosophical, contextual and scientific Whewell: some reflections on recent Whewell scholarship and the progress made therein</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Perspectives on Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/perspectives\_on\_science/v018/18.2.ducheyne.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">242–272</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lycke, Hans</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fitch-style natural deduction for modal paralogics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">207</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">193–218</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I will present a Fitch–style natural deduction proof theory for modal paralogics (modal logics with gaps and/or gluts for negation). Besides the standard classical subproofs, the presented proof theory also contains modal subproofs, which express what would follow from a hypothesis, in case it would be true in some arbitrary world.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ducheyne, Steffen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Flow of Influence: From Newton to Locke  and Back</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rivista di storia della filosofia</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">64</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">265–288</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this essay, the affinity between Locke's empiricism and Newton's natural philosophy is scrutinized. Parallels are distinguished from influences. I argue, pace G.A.J. Rogers, that Newton's doctrine of absolute space and time influenced Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding (first edition: 1689, though bearing the year 1690 on its cover) from the second edition onwards. I also show that Newton used Lockean terminology in his criticism of Cartesianism. It is further argued that Locke's endorsement of corpuscularianism is merely methodological, i.e. he accepts it as a scientifically useful and psychologically intelligible paradigm, but not as a realist explanation of rerum natura. Like Newton, Locke was reluctant to accept the corpuscular theory of light. However, his reasons for doing so were different from those of Newton. This essay is divided into three parts: in the first, the stage is set by looking at the fundamentals of Locke's epistemology; in the second, several correspondences between Locke's and Newton's thought are explored and two cases of influence are argued for; and in the third, several arguments are provided for interpreting Locke's corpuscularianism as methodological.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Makinson, David</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wansing, Heinrich</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Fuzzy Logic Approach to Non-Scalar Hedges</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Towards Mathematical Philosophy</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Trends in Logic</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">233-247</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2: 458508, 1973), George Lakoff proposes a fuzzy semantics for the non-scalar hedges &lt;em&gt;technically, strictly speaking, and loosely speaking&lt;/em&gt;. These hedges are able to modify the meaning of a predicate. However, Lakoffs proposal is problematic. For example, his semantics only contains interpretations for hedged predicates using semantic information provided by selection functions. What kind of information these functions should provide for non-hedged predicates remains unspecified. This paper presents a solution for this deficit and other problems by means of a generic first-order fuzzy logic &lt;strong&gt;FL&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;sub&gt;h&lt;/sub&gt; . A wide range of fuzzy logics can be used as a basis for &lt;strong&gt;FL&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;sub&gt;h&lt;/sub&gt; . Next to a fully specified semantics, this solution also incorporates a proof theory for reasoning with these hedges. &lt;strong&gt;FL&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;sub&gt;h&lt;/sub&gt; makes use of a special set of selection functions. These functions collect the kind of information a reasoner can retrieve from concepts in his or her memory when interpreting a (non-)hedged predicate. Despite this non-standard element, &lt;strong&gt;FL&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;sub&gt;h&lt;/sub&gt; remains a conservative modification of its underlying fuzzy logic.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heeffer, Albrecht</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Father Henri Bosmans (S.J.) A Belgian pioneer in the history of mathematics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">History and Pedagogy of Mathematics Newsletter</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">65</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">12–15</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mol, Liesbeth</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Schmidt, C. T. A.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Facing the Computer. Some techniques to understand technique.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Computers and Philosophy, an International Conference</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">May</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EOARD</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Formal Logic for Abductive Reasoning</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic Journal of the IGPL</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">14</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">221–236</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper presents and illustrates a formal logic for the abduction of singular hypotheses. The logic has a semantics and a dynamic proof theory that is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. The logic presupposes that, with respect to a specific application, the set of explananda and the set of possible explanantia are disjoint (but not necessarily exhaustive). Where an explanandum can be explained by different explanantia, the logic allows only for the abduction of their disjunction.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Forms of causal explanation</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Foundations of science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">437–454</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Functions of Intentional Explanations of Actions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Behavior and Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1–16</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper deals with the &quot;functions of intentional explanations&quot; of actions (IEAs), i.e., explanations that refer to intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) of the agent. IEAs can have different formats. We consider these different formats to be instruments that enable the explainer to capture different kinds of information. We pick out two specific formats, i.e. &quot;contrastive&quot; and &quot;descriptive&quot;, which will enable us to discuss the functions of IEAs. In many cases the explanation is contrastive, i.e. it makes use of one or more contrasts between real intentional states and ideal intentional states (ideal from the point of view of the explainer). In many other cases IEAs have a descriptive (covering-law) format. The aim of this paper is to analyze the functions the two kinds of explanations can have. We will show that certain functions are better served by one rather than the other format. This leads to pluralism with respect to formats. We argue that both formats are necessary and that their functions are complementary.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Delrieux, Claudio</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Legris, Javier</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Formal Approach to Problem Solving</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Computer Modeling of Scientific Reasoning</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bahia Blanca, Argentinia</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15–26</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vermeir, Timothy</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">From Wffs to Clauses: Transforming Wffs in Clauses Without Loss of Meaning</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper is the rst step into the research of inconsistency-adaptive logic programming. It will be shown here that a mapping can be dened for well formed formulas to logic programming clauses in a paraconsistent environment, and without loss of information. Furthermore, this mapping is a purely mechanical procedure that can be implemented with ease on a computer.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>6</ref-type><contributors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mortensen, Chris</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Priest, Graham</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Research Studies Press</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Baldock, UK</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Formal Analysis of Diagnosis and Diagnostic Reasoning</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">165-166</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">161–180</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Diagnostic reasoning may relate to an established fault in a system or in an individual.&lt;br /&gt; With respect to &lt;em&gt;systems&lt;/em&gt;, three types of diagnosis are distinguishable: non-explanatory, weak explanatory and strong explanatory. The latter are defined, illustrated and their respective functions are described. The reasoning process for the construction of non-explanatory diagnoses is analysed and we propose two adaptive logics that are adequate tools for modelling this kind of diagnostic reasoning. We also discuss (weak and strong) explanatory diagnostic reasoning and show that it can be divided in three stages. The modelling of each stage requires a different adaptive logic.&lt;br /&gt; With respect to &lt;em&gt;individuals&lt;/em&gt;, we show that non-explanatory diagnoses do not occur. The earlier findings for explanatory diagnostic reasoning may be adopted.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">van Benthem, Johan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Eemeren, F. H.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Grootendorst, R.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Veltman, Frank</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Functioning and teachings of adaptive logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Argumentation</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1996</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">North-Holland</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">241–254</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper concerns some formal systems, viz. adaptive logics, that display a specific flexibility in the meanings of logical terms. Both the flexibility that occurs within the systems and the question as to how we may arrive at such systems is discussed. Both, it is argued, are relevant for bridging the gap between logic and argumentation.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>