<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>34</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van De Putte, Frederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tamminga, Allard</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Duijf, Hein</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The best we can do (extended abstract, submitted to LOFT)</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Oudheusden, Michiel</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Beyond consensus? A reply to Alan Irwin</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY REVIEW AND REPLY COLLECTIVE</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">democracy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disclosure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">meta-consensus</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">public participation in science</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">scientific consensus</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">6</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">48–53</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wouters, Dietlinde</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bloody analogical reasoning</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">217–232</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper I will study some of William Harveys applications of analogies in the Prelectiones Anatomiae Universalis and the Exercitatio anatomica de motu cordis et sanguinis in animalibus. I will show that Harvey applied analogies in many different ways and that some contributed to the discovery of the characteristic action of the heart and pulse and even to the discovery of the blood circulation. The discovery process will be approached as a problem solving process as described in Batens contextual model. The focus on constraints allows to see Harvey both as a modern because of his extensive use of experimental results and as strongly influenced by an Aristotelian natural philosophy interpretation of anatomy and physiology as, for instance, propagated by Fabricius of Aquapendente.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wieland, Jan Willem</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato, by Katja Maria Vogt (review).</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mind</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">488</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">122</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1204–1207</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Claes, Tom</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bedoelingen en principes. Een onverwachte relatie</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Door Denken en Doen. Essays bij het Werk van Ronald Commers</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Academia Press</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gent</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">93–106</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Urbaniak, Rafal</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hämäri, K Severi</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Busting a myth about Leśniewski and definitions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">History and philosophy of logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">159–189</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;A theory of definitions which places the eliminability and conservativeness requirements on definitions is usually called the standard theory. We examine a persistent myth which credits this theory to Lesniewski, a Polish logician. After a brief survey of its origins, we show that the myth is highly dubious. First, no place in Lesniewski's published or unpublished work is known where the standard conditions are discussed. Second, Lesniewski's own logical theories allow for creative definitions. Third, Lesniewski's celebrated 'rules of definition' lay merely syntactical restrictions on the form of definitions: they do not provide definitions with such meta-theoretical requirements as eliminability or conservativeness. On the positive side, we point out that among the Polish logicians, in the 1920s and 1930s, a study of these meta-theoretical conditions is more readily found in the works of Lukasiewicz and Ajdukiewicz.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heeffer, Albrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pease, Alison</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Guhe, Markus</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Smaill, Alan</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The body in Renaissance arithmetic: from mnemonics to embodied cognition</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of the Thirty Sixth Annual Convention of the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour</style></publisher><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1902956931</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In Medieval and Renaissance arithmetic we find several instances of references to body parts or actions involving body parts. In this paper we will address the question on the historical functions of body parts in mathematics and discuss its relation to the currently prevailing practice of symbolic mathematics.12&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Urbaniak, Rafal</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bogus singular terms and substitution salva denotatione</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Reasoner</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">June</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">6</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4-5</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Froeyman, Anton</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Betekenisverschuiving in het causaliteitsbegrip van Ernst Cassirer</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tijdschrift voor filosofie</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">70</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">733–761</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Cassirers conception of causation has until now been treated largely on the basis of Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics. In this article, I argue that a characterisation of this sort can not be complete. There appear to be several apparent contradictions (of which I discuss three) when we compare the concept of causality in Determinism and Indeterminism with treatments of the concept in other works, especially those of mythical causation. We need a general view of Cassirers conception of causality to account for these contradictions. I offer such a view, which is partly universal (in as far as it refers to universals as time and space) and partly contextual (in as far as it refers, through the conception of the object, to principles that are specific to certain symbolic forms). Then, I discuss the differences and the resemblances between theoretical and mythical causation, and, within the theoretical world view, between the natural, cultural and biological sciences.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mol, Liesbeth</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Woods, Damien</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Neary, Turlough</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Seda, Tony</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the boundaries of solvability and unsolvability in tag systems. Theoretical and experimental results.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The complexity of simple programs</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cork University Press</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Several older and more recent results on the boundaries of solvability and unsolvability in tag systems are surveyed. Emphasis will be put on the significance of computer experiments in research on very small tag systems.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">van Benthem, Johan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Shier, Ju</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Veltman, Frank</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Belief Merging based on Adaptive Interaction</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Meeting of the Minds, proceedings of the workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-1-904987-48-2</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tomala, O</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Honzik, R</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On building abstract Terms in Typed Systems</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logica 2006 Yearbook</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Filosofia Publisher</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper offers some historical and conceptual remarks on the philosophical and logical procedures of abstraction, based on an account of the notions of concept and function. In order to provide a complete analyis, one should start by considering Platos theory of Ideas, which provides the first interpretation of abstract terms in the history of philosophy. The nature of the most general Forms, the related problem of the knowledge thereof, their connection to existing (concrete) objects, are the essential features of the Platonic theory of knowledge and of his metaphysics. The Platonic approach is grounded on the principle of conceptual priority of Ideas over their partecipations, the Forms existing separeted from all the particulars: the former are interpreted as standard particulars to which other particulars conform. Nonetheless, my investigation will start rather by Aristotle, who held first the relation of predication to be the basis for defining abstraction: from this I will try to consider some important ideas for the notion of abstraction in Type Systems.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Christiaens, Wim</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Basic Ontology and the Ontology of the Phenomenological Life World: A Proposal</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Foundations of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">metaphysics</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ontology</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">phenomenology</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">process ontology</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-004-5909-y</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">249-274</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The condition of explicit theoretically discursive cognitive performance, as it culminates in scientific activity, is, I claim, the life world. I contrast life world and scientific world and argue that the latter arises from the first and that contrary to the prevailing views the scientific world (actually, worlds, since the classical world is substantially different from the quantum world) finds its completion in the life world and not the other way around. In other words: the closure we used to search in a complete and comprehensive scientific description of all aspects of experience by referring it back to underlying atoms, genes and other scientific objects and the covering laws ruling them, should be sought in a reintegrating and occasionally dissolving of the abstract scientific model in the self-organizational fluidity and superposition-like indeterminateness and non-locality of the life world: We have to acknowledge the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon (Merleau-Ponty in his The Phenomenology of Perception).&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bilkova, M</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tomala, O</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Belief Revision in Constructive Type Theory</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logica 2005 Yearbook</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Filosofia Publisher</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Christiaens, Wim</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Biografie van Leo Apostel</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nationaal Biografisch Woordenboek</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23-34</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Basic Inductive Schema, Inductive Truisms, and the Research-Guiding Capacities of the Logic of Inductive Generalization</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">185–188</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">53–84</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The aim of this paper is threefold. First, the sometimes slightly messy application of the conditional rule RC of the logic of inductive general- ization is clariØed by reducing this rule to a so-called basic schema BS. Next, some common truisms about inductive generalization are shown to be mistaken, but are also shown to be valid in special cases. Finally, and most importantly, it is shown that applications of the adaptive logic of inductive generalization to sets of data, possibly in the presence of background knowledge, invokes certain empirical tests and certain theo- retically justiØed defeasible conjectures, which in a sensible way increase one's empirical and theoretical knowledge about a given domain.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Boekbespreking: &quot;Jan Albert van Laar. The Dialectic of Ambiguity. A Contribution to the Study of Argumentation&quot;.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tijdschrift voor Taalbeheersing</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">248–251</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bespreking van Jean Paul van Bendegem: Tot in der Eindigheid</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ethiek &amp; Maatschappij</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1998</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">128–130</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kurtonina, Natasha</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Rijke, Maarten</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bisimulations for Temporal Logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Logic, Language and Information</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">definability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">expressive power</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">modal and temporal logic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">model theory</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1997</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">6</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">403–425</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;We define bisimulations for temporal logic with Since and Until. This new notion is compared to existing notions of bisimulations, and then used to develop the basic model theory of temporal logic with Since and Until. Our results concern both invariance and definability. We conclude with a brief discussion of the wider applicability of our ideas.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Blocks. The clue to dynamic aspects of logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1995</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">150-151-152</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">38</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">285–328</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The present paper introduces a new approach to formal logic. The block approach is especially useful to grasp dynamic aspects of reasoning, including formal reasoning, that fall beyond the reach of the usual approaches. A block language, the block analysis of proofs, and semantic systems in terms of blocks are articulated. The approach is first applied to classical logic (including proof heuristics). It is used to solve two important problems for adaptive logics (that have a dynamic proof theory). Some further applications are discussed, including meaning change.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Appeared 1997</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A bridge between two-valued and many-valued semantic systems: n-tuple semantics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1982</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IEEE</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Los Angeles, 318–322</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bijna alle–veel–weinig</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Contactgroepen Humane en Politieke Wetenschappen</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1977</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NFWO</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">6–14</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record></records></xml>