<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Malinowski, Jacek</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pietruszczak, Andrzej</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Are there ontological explanations?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Essays in Logic and Ontology</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rodopi</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Amsterdam/New York</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">277–283</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9042021306</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;There is a huge philosophical literature on scientific explanation, and no one seriously denies that the sciences explain in one way or another. But what about ontology? I will argue that ontological laws and ontological theories can explain. And I will point at the differences between ontological explanations and their scientific counterparts.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Malinowski, Jacek</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pietruszczak, Andrzej</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Discussive Adaptive Logics: Handling Internal and External Inconsistencies</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Essays in Logic and Ontology</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rodopi</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Amsterdam/New York</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">211-223</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Malinowski, Jacek</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pietruszczak, Andrzej</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Narrowing Down Suspicion in Inconsistent Premise Sets</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Essays in Logic and Ontology.</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Science and the Humanities</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rodopi</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Amsterdam/New York</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">185–209</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Inconsistency-adaptive logics isolate the inconsistencies that are derivable from a premise set, and restrict the rules of Classical Logic only where inconsistencies are involved. From many inconsistent premise sets, disjunctions of contradictions are derivable no disjunct of which is itself derivable. Given such a disjunction, it is often justified to introduce new premises that state, with a certain degree of confidence, that some of the disjuncts are false. This is an important first step on the road to consistency: it narrows down suspicion in inconsistent premise sets and hence locates the real problems among the possible ones. In this paper I present two approaches for handling such new premises in the context of the original premises. The first approach may apparently be combined with all paraconsistent logics. The second approach does not have the same generality, but is decidedly more elegant.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Malinowski, Jacek</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pietruszczak, Andrzej</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A World of Experiences, an Adequate Language, and Self-Reference Revised</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Essays in Logic and Ontology</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rodopi</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">243–256</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The paper presents a new, intuitive formal language, L E , that fits in with a world view in which experiences are central entities. It is shown how classical logic and an &quot;objective making&quot; adaptive logic can be applied to formulas of L E . The latter logic sheds an interesting light on the creation of theories about &quot;the objective world&quot;. The paper also contains a small comment on sentences that are not translatable in L E . In the last section, I revise self-referring sentences by means of their translations in L E.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>