<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Malinowski, Jacek</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pietruszczak, Andrzej</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A World of Experiences, an Adequate Language, and Self-Reference Revised</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Essays in Logic and Ontology</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rodopi</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">243–256</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The paper presents a new, intuitive formal language, L E , that fits in with a world view in which experiences are central entities. It is shown how classical logic and an &quot;objective making&quot; adaptive logic can be applied to formulas of L E . The latter logic sheds an interesting light on the creation of theories about &quot;the objective world&quot;. The paper also contains a small comment on sentences that are not translatable in L E . In the last section, I revise self-referring sentences by means of their translations in L E.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wisniewski, Andzrej</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leszczynska, Dorota</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Socratic proofs and paraconsistency: a case study</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studia Logica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2-3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">80</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">431–466</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper develops a new proof method for two propositional paraconsistent logics: the propositional part of Batens' weak paraconsistent logic CLuN and Schütte's maximally paraconsistent logic Fv. Proofs are de.ned as certain sequences of questions. The method is grounded in Inferential Erotetic Logic.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Boekbespreking: &quot;Jan Albert van Laar. The Dialectic of Ambiguity. A Contribution to the Study of Argumentation&quot;.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tijdschrift voor Taalbeheersing</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">248–251</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logica en het Waardevolle in de Wereld. De Rol van Adaptieve Logica's bij de Constructie van Theorieën</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">May 12</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ghent University</style></publisher><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">phd</style></work-type><custom1><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Diderik Batens&lt;/p&gt;</style></custom1></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Change in individuals without a name. Contextual indicators &amp; the free change-adaptive logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Logical Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2003.011</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">213–230</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Proof theory and semantics of an adaptive logic that deals adequately with change in individuals with or without a name are presented. New logical constants are introduced, viz. indicators. Within a given context they function as names, predicates and quantifiers at the same time. The thus extended language (of classical logic) has a big expressive power and solvespartly  the (classical) non-logical presuppositions with respect to the existence of individuals. Nevertheless, from a purely logical point of view, the here pre - sented logic requires nothing but a very intuitive selection of classical models of the premises, viz. the minimally abnormal ones.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerkhove, Bart</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vagueness-Adaptive Logic: A Pragmatical Approach to Sorites Paradoxes</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studia Logica</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">adaptive logic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">construction of scientific theories</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">paraconsistent logic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">philosophical logic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">philosophy of language</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sorites paradox</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vagueness</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B%3ASTUD.0000009567.21578.0a</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">75</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">383-411</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper defends a pragmatical approach to vagueness. The vagueness-adaptive logic VAL is a good reconstruction of and an excellent, instrument for human reasoning processes in which vague predicates are involved. Apart from its proof-theory and semantics, a Sorites-treating model based on it is presented, disarming the paradox. The paper opens perspectives with respect to the construction of theories by means of vague predicates.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Carnielli, Walter A.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Coniglio, Marcelo E.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Loffredo D'Ottaviano, Itala M.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ontological causes of inconsistency and a change-adaptive, logical solution</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marcel Dekker</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">228</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">151–166</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">0824708059</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper reveals an implicit ontological assumption that is presupposed in common thought. This assumption results in the fact that people usually do not make any distinction between 'the object a' and 'the object a at a given moment'. This laziness causes many inconsistencies. Several attempts to solve these inconsistencies are studied, and the most natural one is elaborated, namely the one obtained by applying Classical Logic to an ontological correct domain. This solution has a drawback with respect to communication, which is solved by the change-adaptive logic CAL2. This non-monotonic, paraconsistent logic, belongs to the family of ambiguity-adaptive logics. It has the special characteristic that it solves inconsistencies by the introduction of more precise names for objects, more exactly names that refer to objects at a moment. The dynamics of the logic captures the change in objects. CAL2 has a nice proof theory, and an intuitive semantics. Interesting results and applications are commented upon, for instance those making use of the notion 'periods of invariance'. Of course, the philosophical background is discussed.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Preferences as inconsistency-resolvers: an Inconsistency-adaptive Tool</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Logical Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47–63</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The role of ambiguities in the construction of collective theories.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">173-175</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">44</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">189–214</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The paper presents a formal model for theory development, based on a very intuitive ambiguity-adaptive logic. Apart from its simplicity, the model has some interesting features. (i) It allows for the construction of theories that cannot rely on observational data. (ii) It allows to construct a theory starting from zero, and using a small set of predicates. (iii) The model establishes that there is no real difference between the construction of scientific theories and the development of everyday knowledge.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">HL2, an inconsistency-adaptive and inconsistency-resolving logic for general statements that might have exceptions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3-4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">317–338</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The present paper offers a new approach to non-monotonic logics and their reconstruction in terms of inconsistency-adaptive logics. By applying a special technique, universally quantified formulas are assigned instances that, given the paraconsistent framework, do not cause triviality even if they conflict with knowledge deriving from other sources. From the special instances, the usual instances may be derived conditionally, viz. provided they are not contradicted by statements derived with a higher preference ranking.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Minimizing Ambiguity and Paraconsistency.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">165-166</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39–160</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Ambiguity-adaptive logics offer a natural and rich formal solution to (possibly) inconsistent theories. Three views on ambiguities result in three different, intuitively correct ambiguity-adaptive logics with interesting applications. We present their semantics and proof theory, and illustrate that ambiguity-adaptive logics form an excellent alternative to paraconsistent logics that focus on the characteristics of the logical constants.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ambiguity-adaptive logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1997</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">159</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">261–280</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record></records></xml>