<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Le Roy, Frederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stalpaert, Christel</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aerts, Diederik</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">What is there beyond Mertonian and dollar green science? Exploring the contours of epistemic democracy</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Drunk on capitalism : an interdisciplinary reflection on market economy, art and science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35–48</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9789400720817</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The story is sometimes told as follows: Once science was a disinterested activity giving scientists the opportunity to freely solve the puzzle of nature to the benefit of all. Nowadays science seems more and more driven by the search for patents and dollars compelling scientists to follow the logic of capitalism and corporatization. Take-home lesson: science is for sale and we should do everything to reverse this evolution. In this contribution, I want to analyze the narrator’s assumptions implicit in this account of science. In particular, the rosy description of earlier disinterested forms of scientific research will be questioned, as well as the lack of alternatives to the dichotomy disinterested versus corporatized. I will argue that beyond the dichotomy an interest-driven science can be conceived framed within an epistemic democracy.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Vreese, Leen</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">D'Hooghe, Bart</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Disentangling Causal Pluralism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Worldviews, Science and Us. Studies of Analytical Metaphysics.</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">World Scientific Publishing Company</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">207–223</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">981-4295-81-7</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Causal pluralism is increasingly gaining interest as a promising alternative for monistic approaches toward causation. However, although the debate is scarcely out of the egg, the term ‘causal pluralism’ already covers diverse meanings. This creates confusion, and to remedy that confusion, it is necessary to discern different kinds of pluralistic approaches to causation and different possible positions within them. In this paper, I argue for a general distinction between conceptual causal pluralism, metaphysical causal pluralism and epistemological-methodological causal pluralism. I mainly focus on metaphysical approaches to causation and discern herein four possible positions: metaphysical causal constructivism, metaphysical causal monism, weak metaphysical causal pluralism, and strong metaphysical causal pluralism. Each of these positions are further related to their most obvious conceptual counterpart, specifically conceptual causal monism or conceptual causal pluralism.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aerts, Diederik</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">What About Interdisciplinarity Within Philosophy?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and Its Implications For Our Perspectives on the World</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">World Scientific Publishing Company</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10–25</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">D'Hooghe, Bart</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Why social emergence? Discussing the use of analytical metaphysics in social theory</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Worldviews, science and us : studies of analytical metaphysics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789814299053\_0010</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">World Scientific Publishing Company</style></publisher><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9789814295819</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Recently the concept of emergence has been used in social theory to understand and defend social causation and nonreductive individualism (cf., Refs. 1, 2 and 3). In this paper, I want to analyse what the contribution of analytical metaphysics, and, in particular, the concept of emergence is, or might be, to the discussion in social theory. Especially Keith Sawyer's use of emergence in his defence of social explanation will be scrutinized. Therefore, it will be important to distinguish ontological from epistemological emergence. Where Sawyer focuses on ontological emergence, I will argue that social explanation might better be defended by putting emphasis on pragmatic aspects of explanation and considering emergence as an epistemological category.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">D'Hooghe, Bart</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Introduction: Contemporary Analytic Metaphysics, Its Crisis and Challenge</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Worldviews, Science and Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics. A Selection of Topics From a Methodological Perspective</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">World Scientific Publishing Company</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4–9</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-981-4295-81-9</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mey, Tim</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Keinänen, Markku</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dispositions pace Armstrong.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Problems from Armstrong</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Acta Philosophica Fennica</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">84</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">127–154</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9789519264660</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van de Vijver, Gertrudis</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Een maat en veel gewichten. Repliek op de proefvlucht van Buekens</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">99</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">211–221</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Endorsing a pluralism between continental and analytic philosophy</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Global Spiral</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45–58</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Voss, Stephen</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Can intentional and functional explanations of actions coexist?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophical Antropology</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophical Society of Turkey</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">135–146</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9757748404</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Do functional explanations eclipse the intentionality of human actions? Put differently, do intentional and functional explanations of actions conflict with each other? In this paper, I want to argue that both sorts of explanation, if conceived in a proper way, are compatible instruments. First, I will make a distinction between three kinds of explanatory pluralism of actions: a pluralism of theories of actions, a pluralism of sorts of explanations of actions, and a pluralism of methods for the explanation of actions. Intentional and functional explanations are sorts, not theories or methods, of explanation. Next, I will briefly distinguish intentional and functional explanations: intentional explanations refer to the beliefs and desires of an agent, and functional explanations refer to the function of a motive of an action (etiological functions), or to the function of a result of an action (system functions). Finally, I discuss possible conflicts between both sorts of explanation. In cases where real conflicts between functional and intentional explanations do arise, this is due to the lack of sufficient information or the misinterpretation of information of one or both explanations. Hence, such conflicts are not conflicts between sorts of explanations&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Forms of causal explanation</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Foundations of science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">437–454</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Functions of Intentional Explanations of Actions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Behavior and Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1–16</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper deals with the &quot;functions of intentional explanations&quot; of actions (IEAs), i.e., explanations that refer to intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) of the agent. IEAs can have different formats. We consider these different formats to be instruments that enable the explainer to capture different kinds of information. We pick out two specific formats, i.e. &quot;contrastive&quot; and &quot;descriptive&quot;, which will enable us to discuss the functions of IEAs. In many cases the explanation is contrastive, i.e. it makes use of one or more contrasts between real intentional states and ideal intentional states (ideal from the point of view of the explainer). In many other cases IEAs have a descriptive (covering-law) format. The aim of this paper is to analyze the functions the two kinds of explanations can have. We will show that certain functions are better served by one rather than the other format. This leads to pluralism with respect to formats. We argue that both formats are necessary and that their functions are complementary.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cuypers, Stefaan</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Introduction: beyond Empiricism in the Social Explanation of Action</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophical Explorations</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">197–201</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Models of intentional explanation.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophical Explorations</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">233–247</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The controversy about intentional explanation of action concerns how these explanations work. What kind of model allows us to capture the dependency or relevance relation between the explanans, i.e. the beliefs and desires of the agent, and the explanandum, i.e. the action? In this paper, I argue that the causal mechanical model can do the job. Causal mechanical intentional explanations consist in a reference to the mechanisms of practical reasoning of the agent that motivated the agent to act, i.e. to a causally relevant set of beliefs and desires. Moreover, the causal mechanical model can provide in efficient and unproblematic applications, unlike action explanations using ceteris paribus laws or counterfactuals. The drawback of the latter models of explanation is their modal requirement: the explanans must mention or implies sufficient and/or necessary conditions for the explanandum. Such a requirement is too strong when it comes to intentional explanation of action.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Naar een pluralisme van verklaringen in mens- en natuurwetenschappen</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ethiek &amp; Maatschappij</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">60-69</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Een Pluralisme van Verklaringen van Acties</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">March 14</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ghent University</style></publisher><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">phd</style></work-type><custom1><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Erik Weber&lt;/p&gt;</style></custom1></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Clercq, Kristof</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Delrieux, Claudio</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Legris, Javier</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Procedure for Generating (Conditional) Answers in a Goal-Directed Way</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Computer modeling of scientific reasoning</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bahia Blanca, Argentinia</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">57–63</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9879281896</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Two evolutionary games : collective action and prisoner's dilema / Jakson Alves de Aquino – A formal approach to problem solving / Diderik Batens – Application of mathematics and underdetermination / Ota\unmatched{0301}vio Bueno – A framework for combining defeasible argumentation with labeled deduction / Carlos Iva\unmatched{0301}n Chesn\unmatched{0303}evar and Guillermo Ricardo Simari – A procedure for generating (conditional) answers in a goal-directed way / Kristof De Clerq and Rob Vanderbeken – Abductive inference in defeasible reasoning : a model for research programmes / Claudio Delrieux – Kepler's near discovery of the sine law : a quantitative computational model / Albrecht Heeffer – Default models of rationality / Silvia Lerner – Most inferences are defeasible / Jose\unmatched{0301} Carlos Loureiro Ralha and Ce\unmatched{0301}lia Ghedini Rahla – Reasoning through doing : epistemic mediators in scientific reasoning / Lorenzo Magnani – Do we need paraconsistency in commonsense reasoning? / Joke Meheus – Descartes, a methodical elimination of paradoxes for (de)-ontology building / Jean Sallantin ... [et al.] – Measuring coherence using LP-models / Carlos A. Oller – What are multi-agent systems trying to accomplish? Towards pragmatic game-theoretical agenda / Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen – Direct dynamic proofs for compatibility / Dagmar Provijn – Semantic computations of truth, based on associations already learned / Patrick Suppes and Jean-Yves Be\unmatched{0301}ziau – On the sense of eating strawberries, or, On the exclusivity implcature fo 'or' / Liza Verhoeven and Leon Horsten – A note on epistemology and logical afrificial intelligence / Gregory R. Wheeler and Lui\unmatched{0301}s Moniz Pereira.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dispositional Explanations of Behavior.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Behavior and Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">30</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43–59</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;If dispositions are conceived as properties of systems that refer to possiblecausal relations, dispositions can be used in singular causal explanations. By means of these dispositional explanations, we can explain behavior B of a system &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; by (i) referring toa situation of type S that triggered B, given that &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; has a disposition D to do B in S, or (ii) byreferring to a disposition D of &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; to do B in S, given that &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; is in a situation of type S.Dispositional explanations are adequate and indispensable explanations: they can explain behavior B without explicitly referring to the underlying causal basis in &lt;em&gt;x&lt;/em&gt; that constitutes adisposition to do B. Radical Behaviorist explanations are a sort of dispositionalexplanations, but the dispositional model is not restricted to these explanations. Thedispositional model is compatible with, or can be applied to, several research programs&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanderbeeken, Robrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Blasius, Jörg</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hox, J.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">de Leeuw, E.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Schmidt, P.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Pragmatic Approach to the Explanation of Actions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Social Science Methodology in the New Millenium</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Logic and Methodology</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leske &amp; Budrich</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Keulen</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record></records></xml>