<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A unified model of the division of cognitive labor.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophy of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">81</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">444–459</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Current theories of the division of cognitive labor are confined to the ``context of justification'', assuming exogenous theories. But new theories are made from the same labor that is used for developing existing theories, and if none of this labor is ever allocated to create new alternatives, then scientific progress is impossible. A unified model is proposed in which theories are no longer given but a function of the division of labor in the model itself. The interactions of individuals balancing the exploitation of existing theories and the exploration of new theories results in a robust cyclical pattern.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Problem of Kuhnian Rationality</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">86</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11-31</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;According to Thomas Kuhn (1962/1970), science is characterized by two levels, one within and one between paradigms. The problem of Kuhnian rationality concerns the choice between paradigms, for which no rational basis appears to exist because this choice is inevitably circular to some extent. This is the main reason why Kuhn's view is perceived to glorify irrationality. (ibid. 199) I present two interpretations of the problem of Kuhnian rationality, one based on concepts (the neo-positivist interpretation) and one based on values. I also describe two notions of rationality, optimizing and satisficing. Neither interpretation supports the notion of optimizing, but the values-interpretation supports satisficing, suggesting that if Kuhnian scientists are rational, as Kuhn insisted, they are satisficers. An agent-based model demonstrates that aggregating the behaviour of satisficing agents can account for Kuhn's view on the dynamics of scientific change.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The division of labour in science: the tradeoff between specialisation and diversity</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Economic Methodology</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://logica.ugent.be/rogier/jemfinal.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37–51</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Economics is a typical resource for social epistemology and the division of labour is acommon theme for economics. As such it should come as no surprise that the presentpaper turns to economics to formulate a view on the dynamics of scientific communities, with precursors such as Kitcher (1990), Goldman and Shaked (1991) andHull (1988). But although the approach is similar to theirs, the view defended isdifferent. M&amp;amp;\#228;ki (2005) points out that the lessons philosophers draw from economicscan go either way depending on the model chosen. Thus, the aims of this paper are (1)to illustrate this flexibility by proposing an alternative model which assumes increasingreturns to adoption in science rather than the decreasing returns present in theaforementioned contributions; and (2) to outline the implications of this view forscientific pluralism and institutional design.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How monist is heterodoxy?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cambridge Journal of Economics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/bep057</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">34</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">793–805</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Some heterodox economists, most notably Tony Lawson, have come under suspicion of not being truepluralists, but strategic pluralists: their advocacy of pluralism is thought to be merely instrumental to ahidden monist agenda. This paper does not aim to judge the accused but rather to assess the accusations;the focus is on clarifying the notion of pluralism itself. First a paradox is found to lie at the core of scientific pluralism. Different responses to this paradox can be traced to different views on pluralismfound in the literature. The resulting classification allows an analysis of the current controversy amongpluralists and provides an understanding of the different aspects of the debate.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Greiff, Matthias</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Increasing returns in science: a model of the dynamics of scientific activity</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic Journal of the IGPL</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">278-294</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Models in Science: Essays on Scientific Virtues, Scientific Pluralism and the Distribution of Labour in Science</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">April 19</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ghent University</style></publisher><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">phd</style></work-type><custom1><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Erik Weber and Jeroen Van Bouwel&lt;/p&gt;</style></custom1></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Greiff, Matthias</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Standards and the distribution of cognitive labour: A model of the dynamics of scientific activity</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic Journal of the IGPL</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzp058</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">278–294</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mainstream economics: searching where the light is</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/PKE0160-3477320109</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">32</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">137–150</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The starting point of this paper is the question of how to explain mainstream economics' great level of acceptance in the face of its poor empirical track record. An explanation is provided in terms of a combination of unification and, most importantly, inference to the best explanation. This paper asks whether the appeal of mainstream economics to inference to the best explanation is justified and as a consequence questions one of the main reasons for the dominance of mainstream economics today. The final section integrates the ideas from the previous sections into a general framework for explanatory pluralism.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Libert, Thierry</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marage, Pierre</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Paemel, Geert</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Trading off explanatory virtues</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The paper draws on Graham Allison’s case-study of the Cuban Missile Crisis in which three different accounts are constructed from three different explanatory models, each situated at a different level of analysis. First, it is shown that each model produces genuine explanations which could not have been arrived at from one of the other accounts. With this prima facie case for pluralism in hand, the indispensability of the different models is then accounted for by linking the relevance of each model to different explanatory contexts.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Garnett, Rob</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olsen, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Starr, Martha</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Why should I adopt pluralism?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Economic Pluralism</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Routledge</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;If the most perplexing thing in the world is a lack of theory, the second mostperplexing must be an abundance of it. This contribution clarifies the notion of pluralism byintroducing an often neglected but crucial distinction between different levels at whichpluralism can be situated. It intends to provide a framework for scholars dealing with thequestion how to manage the divergence of views they are confronted with.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mainstream economics: searching where the light is</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of the 10th Anniversary Conference of the Association of Heterodox Economics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">July</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anglia Ruskin University</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Loobuyck, Patrick</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanheeswijck, G.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Herck, W.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Naar een Pluralistisch Model van Onderzoeksfinanciering in de Humane Wetenschappen</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Welke Universiteit Willen We (Niet)?</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://logica.ugent.be/rogier/onderzoeksfinanciering.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Academia Press</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">205–216</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9789038211879</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Het nieuwe Financieringsmodel voor het Hoger Onderwijs wordt vaak bekritiseerd vanuit argumentendie teruggaan op de eigenheid van de humane wetenschappen. Dit artikel poogt deze eigenheid preciezer teomschrijven en brengt de gevolgen voor de relatie tussen onderzoek en het tijdschriftenlandschap in kaart. Opbasis daarvan wordt de doelmatigheid betwist van het huidige voorstel, dat de efficiëntie van onderzoek wilverhogen door publicaties te wegen op basis van de tijdschriften waarin ze worden gepubliceerd. Dit betekentgeenszins dat een efficiëntere humane wetenschap onmogelijk is, alleen moet dat gebeuren op een manierwaarop haar pluralistische natuur niet wordt miskend. Hoe een dergelijk beleid er kan uitzien wordt daaromuitgewerkt in een aanzet naar een pluralististisch model van onderzoeksfinanciering in de humanewetenschappen.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A pragmatist approach to the plurality of explanations in international relations theory</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">6th Pan-European conference on international relations, Proceedings</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/De%20Langhe-SGIR%20Rogier%20De%20Langhe%20-%20Erik%20Weber%20-%20Jeroen%20Van%20Bouwel.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;One of the main problems scientists –physicists and political scientists alike- face, is the problem of the plurality of explanations. Graham Allison’s classic study of the Cuban Missile Crisis is an excellent example of problem-focused research and an intriguing instance of this problem in International Relations Theory. He leaves us with three versions of the events, which raised more questions than Allison could apparently answer: instructions for concerted action or discrimination between his ‘conceptual models’ remain very sketchy. This paper aims to show that replacing Allison’s use of Hempel’s (then fashionable but now rather outdated) covering-law model of explanation with a pragmatist account of explanation offers a way to break the deadlock Allison was faced with. In particular, we will show that a specification of the epistemic interests of the explainer enables us to narrow down the number of available explanations.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Is there no alternative?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ethiek en Maatschappij</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://logica.ugent.be/rogier/alternative.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">101–111</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Graham Allisons modellen voor de analyse van internationale betrekkingen: een pluralistische kritiek</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ethiek &amp; Maatschappij</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">64–77</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;A call for epistemic pluralism is credible only when showing enough pluralism itself. Graham Allisons three conceptual models made such a call, but do his models differ enough? Based on a fundamental theoretical analysis, disentangling the ontological and methodological aspects of Allisons models, I conclude they do not. Subsequently, arguing that additional diversity is necessary and not an impossible endeavour, I construct a fourth model based on Alexander Wendts Social Theory of International Politics. This model is fundamentally different from Allisons models, and in combination with them a more convincing case for epistemic pluralism.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>