<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerkhove, Bart</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">François, Karen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ducheyne, Steffen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Allo, Patrick</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kennissystemen selectief wieden</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Laat ons niet ernstig blijven. Huldeboek voor Jean Paul Van Bendegem</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Academia Press</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gent, België</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">227–244</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-94-014-5589-3</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Allo, Patrick</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerkhove, Bart</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Consistency of Peano Arithmetic. A Defeasible Perspective</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modestly Radical or Radically Modest. Festschrift for Jean Paul Van Bendegem on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11–59</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper proposes to replace \sys{PA}, Peano Arithmetic, by a theory \sys{APA} defined in terms of (i)&amp;nbsp;a set of axioms that is classically equivalent to the Peano axioms and (ii)&amp;nbsp;a defeasible logic that minimizes inconsistency, viz.\ an inconsistency-adaptive logic. If \sys{PA} is consistent, its set of theorems coincides with the set of \sys{APA}-theorems. If \sys{PA} is inconsistent, \sys{APA} is non-trivial and has the following remarkable property: there is a unique non-standard number that is its own successor and every `desirable' \sys{PA}-theorem is retained if restricted to the other numbers. The restriction can be expressed in the language of arithmetic. And there is much more.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gervais, Raoul</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerkhove, Bart</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Libert, Thierry</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanpaemel, Geert</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marage, Pierre</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pragmatic approaches to explanation applied to the cognitive sciences: two types of explanation-seeking questions compared</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">131–137</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Beirlaen, Mathieu</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerkhove, Bart</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Libert, Thierry</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanpaemel, Geert</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marage, Pierre</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Towards More Conflict-Tolerant Deontic Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Brussel</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-8</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In &lt;em&gt;Ethical Consistency&lt;/em&gt;, Bernard Williams vindicated the possibility of moral conflicts; he proposed to consistently allow for the presence of such conflicts within the logic of &lt;em&gt;ought&lt;/em&gt;. In determining the nature of moral conflict, Williams stressed its contingency. In this paper, Williams characterization of moral conflict is defended. However, Williams solution for consistently allowing for such conflicts within the logic of &lt;em&gt;ought&lt;/em&gt; is shown to be too crude. Whereas Williams rejects &lt;em&gt;all&lt;/em&gt; applications of the agglomeration rule in the logic of &lt;em&gt;ought&lt;/em&gt;, it is shown that a more sophisticated approach is needed. An alternative solution is presented in which the application of the agglomeration rule is made conditional upon the principle that&quot; &lt;em&gt;ought&lt;/em&gt;implies &lt;em&gt;can&lt;/em&gt;.&quot;&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heeffer, Albrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">François, Karen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Löwe, Benedikt</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Müller, Thomas</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerkhove, Bart</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the curious historical coincidence of algebra and double-entry bookkeeping</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Foundations of the formal sciences VII : bringing together philosophy and sociology of science</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studies in Logic</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/logic/?00021</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">32</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">109–130</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9781848900493</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kosolosky, Laszlo</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerkhove, Bart</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Libert, Thierry</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanpaemel, Geert</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marage, Pierre</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The intended window of epistemic opportunity: a comment on Miriam Solomon</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I argue that Miriam Solomon fails to show that medical consensus conferences, as organised by the National Institute of Health (NIH), miss the intended window of epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007: 170), and thus typically take place after the experts have reached consensus. This is done, on the one hand, by differentiating between, what I intend to call, ‘academic’ and ‘non-academic consensus’, and, on the other hand, by analyzing the arguments and argumentation style Solomon uses to make her claim explicit. At the very least, the overall argument suggests that her statement is inadequately supported, if not that the opposite claim is true. In this manner, I intend to bring additional insight into the notion of ‘consensus’ when applied in scientific practice. Any decision as to change the NIH consensus development program should take these actual achievements into account.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mol, Liesbeth</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">François, Karen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Löwe, Benedikt</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Müller, Thomas</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerkhove, Bart</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Looking for busy beavers. A socio-philosophical study of a computer-assisted proof</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Foundations of the Formal Sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">61–90</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&quot;Young man, in mathematics you don't understand things, you just get used to them&quot;&lt;/em&gt; John von Neumann&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Winter, Jan</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerkhove, Bart</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Libert, Thierry</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanpaemel, Geert</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marage, Pierre</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Distorted Research Agenda in the Health Sciences and James Robert Browns Policy Proposal.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://logica.ugent.be/centrum/preprints/De_Winter_(2012)_-_Brown.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heeffer, Albrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerkhove, Bart</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the Nature and Origin of Algebraic Symbolism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New Perspectives on Mathematical Practices. Essays in Philosophy and History of Mathematics.</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.worldscibooks.com/etextbook/6810/6810\_chap01.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">World Scientific Publishing</style></publisher><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-981-281-222-3</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerkhove, Bart</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanackere, Guido</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vagueness-Adaptive Logic: A Pragmatical Approach to Sorites Paradoxes</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studia Logica</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">adaptive logic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">construction of scientific theories</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">paraconsistent logic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">philosophical logic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">philosophy of language</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sorites paradox</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vagueness</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B%3ASTUD.0000009567.21578.0a</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">75</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">383-411</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper defends a pragmatical approach to vagueness. The vagueness-adaptive logic VAL is a good reconstruction of and an excellent, instrument for human reasoning processes in which vague predicates are involved. Apart from its proof-theory and semantics, a Sorites-treating model based on it is presented, disarming the paradox. The paper opens perspectives with respect to the construction of theories by means of vague predicates.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>