<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gabbay, Dov M.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Straßer, Christian</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Reactive standard deontic logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Logic and Computation</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">117–157</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;We introduce a reactive variant of &lt;strong&gt;SDL&lt;/strong&gt; (standard deontic logic): &lt;strong&gt;SDLR1&lt;/strong&gt; (reactive standard deontic logic). Given a Kripkean view on the semantics of &lt;strong&gt;SDL&lt;/strong&gt; in terms of directed graphs where arrows → represent the accessibility relation between worlds, reactive models add two elements: arrows → are labelled as active or inactive, and double arrows &amp;amp;8608; connect arrows, e.g. (x&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt; → x&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;) &amp;amp;\#8608; (x&lt;sub&gt;3&lt;/sub&gt; → x&lt;sub&gt;4&lt;/sub&gt;). The idea is that passing through x&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt; → x&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt; activates a switch represented by &amp;amp;8608; that inverts the label of x&lt;sub&gt;3&lt;/sub&gt; → x&lt;sub&gt;4&lt;/sub&gt; and hence activates respectively deactivates this arrow. This allows to introduce two modalities: &amp;amp;\#9633; is the usual &lt;strong&gt;KD&lt;/strong&gt;-modality of &lt;strong&gt;SDL&lt;/strong&gt; and operates on the Kripkean graph where all labels and double arrows are ignored, while &amp;amp;\#8709; takes them into account. We demonstrate that RSDL1 allows for an intuitive interpretation of ought. The logic can handle contrary-to-duty cases such as several instantiations of the Chisholm set in a paradox-free way by means of using double arrows and annotations to block and give access to ideal worlds.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rahman, Shahid</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Symons, John</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gabbay, Dov M.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Need for Adaptive Logics in Epistemology</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">459–485</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;After it is argued that philosophers of science have lost their interest in logic because they applied the wrong type of logics, examples are given of the forms of dynamic reasoning that are central for philosophy of science and epistemology. Adaptive logics are presented as a means to understand and explicate those forms of reasoning. All members of a specific (large) set of adaptive logics are proved to have a number of properties that warrant their formal decency and their suitability with respect to understanding and explicating dynamic forms of reasoning. Most of the properties extend to other adaptive logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>