<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verhoeven, Liza</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The relevance of a relevantly assertable disjunction for material implication</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Philosophical Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">36</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">339–366</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper Grice's requirements for assertability are imposed on the disjunction of Classical Logic. Defining material implication in terms of negation and disjunction supplemented by assertability conditions, results in the disappearance of the most important paradoxes of material implication. The resulting consequence relation displays a very strong resemblance to Schurz's conclusion-relevant consequence relation&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verhoeven, Liza</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Disjunctie. Adaptief-Logische Formalisering van een aantal Griceaanse Implicaturen</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">September 22</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ghent University</style></publisher><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">phd</style></work-type><custom1><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Diderik Batens&lt;/p&gt;</style></custom1></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verhoeven, Liza</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Horsten, Leon</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the Exclusivity Implicature of `Or' or on the Meaning of Eating Strawberries</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studia Logica</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adaptive Logics</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">exclusivity implicature</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11225-005-2767-8</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">81</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19-24</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper is a contribution to the program of constructing formal representations of pragmatic aspects of human reasoning. We propose a formalization within the framework of Adaptive Logics of the exclusivity implicature governing the connective or.Keywords: exclusivity implicature, Adaptive Logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Clercq, Kristof</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verhoeven, Liza</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sieving Out Relevant and Efficient Questions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">185–188</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">189–216</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Wisniewksis erotetic logic provides us with two slightly different semantic explications of the intuitive concept of a question arises from a set of declarative premises. Unfortunately, Wisniewskis erotetic concepts suffer from the drawback that they allow for the raising of irrelevant and inefficient questions. The aim of this paper is to show that raising such questions can be avoided by changing the underlying logic. Several closely related logical approaches which enable us to eliminate irrelevant and inefficient questions, are presented.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verhoeven, Liza</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Changing one's position in discussions - Some adaptive approaches</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Logical Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11/12</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">277–297</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper contains different approaches to solve the problem how to construct the ultimate position out of ones interventions in a discussion after possibly one or more position changes. In all approaches it is the aim to come as close as possible to human reasoning. Therefore all logics are adaptive logics. The first logic is an extension of an adaptive translation into S5 of the Rescher-Manor mechanisms. The second one is a dynamic proof theory based on a technique using indices. In the end a satisfactory solution is given by a dynamic proof theory expressing the idea of prioritized compatibility, i.e. compatibility step by step&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verhoeven, Liza</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proof Theories for Some Prioritized Consequence Relations</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">183–184</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">46</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">325–344</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Handling a possibly inconsistent prioritized belief base can be done in terms of consistent subsets. Humans do not compute consistent subsets, they just start reasoning and when confronted with incon- sistencies in the course of their reasoning, they may adjust their interpretation of the information. In logics this behaviour corresponds to the mechanisms of dynamic proof theories. The aim of this paper is to transform known consequence relations for inconsistent prioritized belief bases in terms of consistent subsets, into dynamic proof theories that are a more faithful representation of human reasoning processes.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verhoeven, Liza</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Some Adaptive Logics for Diagnosis</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Logical Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11/12</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39–65</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;A logic of diagnosis proceeds in terms of a set of premises and one or more (prioritized) sets of expectancies. In this paper we generalize the logics of diagnosis from \cite{EDa:diag} and present some alternatives. The former operate on the premises and expectancies themselves, the latter on their consequences.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verhoeven, Liza</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Dyck, Maarten</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ampliative Adaptive Logics and the Foundation of Logic-Based Approaches to Abduction</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logical and Computational Aspects of Model-Based Reasoning</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer Academic</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39–71</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, we propose a reconstruction of logic-based approaches to abductive reasoning in terms of ampliative adaptive logics. The advantages of this reconstruction are important: the resulting logics have a proper theory (that leads to justified conclusions even for undecidable fragments), they nicely integrate deductive and abductive steps, and they are much closer to natural reasoning than the existing systems.&lt;br /&gt; We present two new adaptive logics for abduction, &lt;strong&gt;CP1&lt;/strong&gt; and &lt;strong&gt;CP2&lt;/strong&gt;. &lt;strong&gt;CP1&lt;/strong&gt; enables one to generate explanations for novel facts from a consistent theory. &lt;strong&gt;CP2&lt;/strong&gt; moreover enables one to abduce explanatory hypotheses for novel facts and for anomalous facts from a possibly inconsistent theory. We illustrate both logics with some examples from the history of the sciences (the discovery of Uranus and of Neptune), and present some alternatives to &lt;strong&gt;CP1&lt;/strong&gt; and &lt;strong&gt;CP2&lt;/strong&gt; that are better suited for non-creative forms of abductive reasoning and for practical reasoning.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verhoeven, Liza</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Explanatory Proofs in Mathematics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">179–180</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">299–307</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verhoeven, Liza</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">All premises are equal, but some are more equal than others.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">173-175</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">44</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">165–188</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper proposes two adaptive approaches to inconsistent prioritized belief bases. Both approaches rely on a selection mechanism, that is not applied to the premises as they stand, but to the consequence sets of the belief levels. One is based on classical compatibility, the other on the modal logic T of Feys. For both approaches the two main strategies of inconsistency adaptive logics are formulated: the reliability strategy and the minimal abnormality strategy. All four systems are compared and found useful.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>