<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wouters, Dietlinde</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bloody analogical reasoning</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">217–232</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper I will study some of William Harveys applications of analogies in the Prelectiones Anatomiae Universalis and the Exercitatio anatomica de motu cordis et sanguinis in animalibus. I will show that Harvey applied analogies in many different ways and that some contributed to the discovery of the characteristic action of the heart and pulse and even to the discovery of the blood circulation. The discovery process will be approached as a problem solving process as described in Batens contextual model. The focus on constraints allows to see Harvey both as a modern because of his extensive use of experimental results and as strongly influenced by an Aristotelian natural philosophy interpretation of anatomy and physiology as, for instance, propagated by Fabricius of Aquapendente.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The generation of abductive explanations from inconsistent theories</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic Journal of the IGPL</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">400–416</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this article I will show how the goal-directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the 'inconsistency-adaptive' logic CLuN(r)from Batens (2005, J. Appl. Logic, 3, 221-250) called pCLuN(r) allows for generating sensible abductive explanations from finite inconsistent theories. Before this is shown, I give a more general account on how goal-directed proof procedures contribute to the study of abduction as backward reasoning. Between these two parts, I describe the goal-directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the 'inconsistency-adaptive' logic CLuNr from Batens (2005, J. Appl. Logic, 3, 221-250).&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mey, Tim</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Speybroeck, Linda</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Braeckman, Johan</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">William Harvey en de ontdekking van de bloedsomloop.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fascinerend Leven. Markante Figuren en Ideeën uit de Geschiedenis van de Biologie.</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nieuwezijds</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Amsterdam</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In print&lt;/p&gt;</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Carnielli, Walter A.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Coniglio, Marcelo E.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Loffredo D'Ottaviano, Itala M.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Strategies: what's in a name?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Many Sides of Logic</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studies in Logic</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">287–306</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9781904987789</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I will show that Hintikkas notion of strategy can refer to proof-heuristic reasoning as well as to methodological reasoning forms. Stating this distinction allows for a better understanding of the notion and for an easier way to tackle the problem of formalization. Contrary to Hintikkas opinion, heuristic reasoning can be implemented in formal proofs by means of goal-directed proof procedures. Methodological reasoning forms on the other hand can be formally represented by means of adaptive logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Abduction through Semantic Tableaux versus Abduction through Goal-Directed Proofs</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Theoria</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">60</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22/3</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">295–304</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, we present a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Alisedas approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Alisedas algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goal-directed procedure solves the problems we encountered in Alisedas algorithms.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Adaptive Characterization of Signed Systems for Paraconsistent Reasoning</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper we characterize the six (basic) signed systems from \cite{B&amp;amp;S:sspr} in terms of adaptive logics. We prove the characterization correct and show that it has a number of advantages.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Prospectieve Dynamiek. Filosofische en Technische Onderbouwing van Doelgerichte Bewijzen en Bewijsheuristieken</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">March 24</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ghent University</style></publisher><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">phd</style></work-type><custom1><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Diderik Batens&lt;/p&gt;</style></custom1></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Direct Dynamic Proofs for Classical Compatibility</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">185–188</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">305–317</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, we present a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Alisedas approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Alisedas algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goal-directed procedure solves the problems we encountered in Alisedas algorithms.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Delrieux, Claudio</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Legris, Javier</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Direct dynamic proofs for compatibility.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Computer modeling of scientific reasoning</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bahia Blanca, Argentinia</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">179–187</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">987-9281-89-6</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verhoeven, Liza</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Some Adaptive Logics for Diagnosis</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Logical Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11/12</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39–65</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;A logic of diagnosis proceeds in terms of a set of premises and one or more (prioritized) sets of expectancies. In this paper we generalize the logics of diagnosis from \cite{EDa:diag} and present some alternatives. The former operate on the premises and expectancies themselves, the latter on their consequences.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verhoeven, Liza</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Dyck, Maarten</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ampliative Adaptive Logics and the Foundation of Logic-Based Approaches to Abduction</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logical and Computational Aspects of Model-Based Reasoning</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer Academic</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39–71</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, we propose a reconstruction of logic-based approaches to abductive reasoning in terms of ampliative adaptive logics. The advantages of this reconstruction are important: the resulting logics have a proper theory (that leads to justified conclusions even for undecidable fragments), they nicely integrate deductive and abductive steps, and they are much closer to natural reasoning than the existing systems.&lt;br /&gt; We present two new adaptive logics for abduction, &lt;strong&gt;CP1&lt;/strong&gt; and &lt;strong&gt;CP2&lt;/strong&gt;. &lt;strong&gt;CP1&lt;/strong&gt; enables one to generate explanations for novel facts from a consistent theory. &lt;strong&gt;CP2&lt;/strong&gt; moreover enables one to abduce explanatory hypotheses for novel facts and for anomalous facts from a possibly inconsistent theory. We illustrate both logics with some examples from the history of the sciences (the discovery of Uranus and of Neptune), and present some alternatives to &lt;strong&gt;CP1&lt;/strong&gt; and &lt;strong&gt;CP2&lt;/strong&gt; that are better suited for non-creative forms of abductive reasoning and for practical reasoning.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Is er een diepe kloof tussen de heuristiek en de inferentieregels van een bewijstheorie? Een poging tot integratie.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Handelingen van de 24ste Nederlands-Vlaamse Filosofiedag: Filosofie en Empirie</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Universiteit Amsterdam</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In dit artikel wens ik in te gaan tegen het diepe onderscheid dat Hintikka voorstelt tussen de definitory -en strategic rules van een bewijstheorie. Ik doe dit door een integratie voor te stellen tussen de inferentieregels en de heuristiek van het formeel systeem &lt;strong&gt;Pc&lt;/strong&gt; uit dat toelaat doelgerichte en efficifiente bewijzen te maken.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Blockeel, H.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Denecker, M.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How to obtain elegant Fitch-style proofs from Goal directed ones.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of the Fourtheenth Belgium-Netherlands Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2002</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pushing the Search Paths in the Proofs. A Study in Proof Heuristics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">173-175</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">44</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">113–134</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Introducing techniques deriving from dynamic proofs in proofs for propositional classical logic is shown to lead to a proof format that enables one to push search paths into the proofs themselves. The resulting goal directed proof format is shown to provide a decision method for &lt;em&gt;A&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;, ..., &lt;em&gt;A&lt;sub&gt;n&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/em&gt; &lt;img src=&quot;vdash.gif&quot; alt=&quot;vdash&quot; /&gt; &lt;em&gt;B&lt;/em&gt; and a positive test for &lt;img src=&quot;ggamma.gif&quot; alt=&quot;Gamma&quot; /&gt; &lt;img src=&quot;vdash.gif&quot; alt=&quot;vdash&quot; /&gt; &lt;em&gt;A&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Formal Analysis of Diagnosis and Diagnostic Reasoning</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">165-166</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">161–180</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Diagnostic reasoning may relate to an established fault in a system or in an individual.&lt;br /&gt; With respect to &lt;em&gt;systems&lt;/em&gt;, three types of diagnosis are distinguishable: non-explanatory, weak explanatory and strong explanatory. The latter are defined, illustrated and their respective functions are described. The reasoning process for the construction of non-explanatory diagnoses is analysed and we propose two adaptive logics that are adequate tools for modelling this kind of diagnostic reasoning. We also discuss (weak and strong) explanatory diagnostic reasoning and show that it can be divided in three stages. The modelling of each stage requires a different adaptive logic.&lt;br /&gt; With respect to &lt;em&gt;individuals&lt;/em&gt;, we show that non-explanatory diagnoses do not occur. The earlier findings for explanatory diagnostic reasoning may be adopted.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>