<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adaptive Fregean Set Theory</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studia Logica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">108</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">903–939 (e-published 10 NOV 2019)</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper defines provably non-trivial theories that characterize Frege's notion of a set, taking into account that the notion is inconsistent. By choosing an adaptive underlying logic, consistent sets behave classically notwithstanding the presence of inconsistent sets. Some of the theories have a full-blown presumably consistent set theory &lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt; as a subtheory, provided &lt;em&gt;T&lt;/em&gt; is indeed consistent. An unexpected feature is the presence of classical negation within the language.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Published online: 10 November 2019</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Devising the Set of Abnormalities for a Given Defeasible Rule</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logicheskie Issledovaniya / Logical Investigations</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://logicalinvestigations.ru/article/view/557/561?lang=en</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1 [To the memory of Prof.\ Alexander Karpenko]</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">26</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9–35</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Devising adaptive logics usually starts with a set of abnormalities and a deductive logic. Where the adaptive logic is ampliative, the deductive logic is the lower limit logic, the rules of which are unconditionally valid. Where the adaptive logic is corrective, the deductive logic is the upper limit logic, the rules of which are valid in case the premises do not require any abnormalities to be true. In some cases, the idea for devising an adaptive logic does not relate to a set of abnormalities, but to one or more defeasible rules, and perhaps also to one of the deductive logics. Defeasible rules are not universally valid, but are valid in `normal situations' or for unproblematic parts of premise set.&amp;nbsp; Where the idea is such, the set of abnormalities has to be delineated in view of the rules. The way in which this task may be tackled is by no means obvious and is the main topic studied in the present paper. The outcome is an extremely simple and transparent recipe. It is shown that, except for very special cases, the recipe leads to an adequate result.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://logicalinvestigations.ru/article/view/557/561?lang=en</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Başkent, Can</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ferguson, Thomas Macaulay</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Looting Liars Masking Models</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">139--164</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper does not raise objections but spells out problems that I consider at present unsolved within Priest's view on logic. In light of the state of scientific and other theories (§2) and in light of the character of natural languages (§3), Priest's central arguments do not seem convincing. Next, I offer some six independent obstacles for defining consistency, identifying models and describing the semantics and metatheory of &lt;strong&gt;LP&lt;/strong&gt; (§4).&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Urbaniak, Rafal</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hansson, Sven Ove</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hendricks, Vincent F.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Induction</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Handbook of Formal Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">induction</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">logic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">probability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-3-319-77433-6</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerkhove, Bart</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">François, Karen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ducheyne, Steffen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Allo, Patrick</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kennissystemen selectief wieden</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Laat ons niet ernstig blijven. Huldeboek voor Jean Paul Van Bendegem</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Academia Press</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gent, België</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">227–244</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-94-014-5589-3</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rafał Urbaniak</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gillman Payette</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Abduction Logics Illustrating Pitfalls Of Defeasible Methods</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Applications of formal philosophy: the road less travelled</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic argumentation &amp; reasoning</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Berlin</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">14</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">169–193</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-3-319-58507-9,331958507X,978-3-319-58505-5</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the one hand this paper offers an introduction to adaptive logics, focussing on properties that are imposed upon adaptive logics by the fact that they explicate defeasible reasoning. On the other hand new adaptive logics of abduction are presented and employed to illustrate those properties. These logics were developed in view of the criticism to existing adaptive logics of abduction.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rik Pinxten</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jean Swings</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Paradoxen in de vrijmetselarij en de relatie met waarden</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kappen aan de ruwe steen</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Academic and Scientific Publishers</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Brussel</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">319–336</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pluralism In Scientific Problem Solving. Why Inconsistency Is No Big Deal</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">32</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">149–177</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verdée, Peter</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nice Embedding in Classical Logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studia Logica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47-78</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;It is shown that a set of semi-recursive logics, including many fragments of &lt;strong&gt;CL&lt;/strong&gt; (Classical Logic), can be embedded within &lt;strong&gt;CL&lt;/strong&gt; in an interesting way. A logic belongs&lt;br /&gt;to the set iff it has a certain type of semantics, called nice semantics. The set includes&lt;br /&gt;many logics presented in the literature. The embedding reveals structural properties of the embedded logic. The embedding turns finite premise sets into finite premise sets. The partial decision methods for &lt;strong&gt;CL&lt;/strong&gt; that are goal directed with respect to &lt;strong&gt;CL&lt;/strong&gt; are turned into partial decision methods that are goal directed with respect to the embedded logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spoiled for Choice?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Logic and Computation</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">26</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">65-95</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The transition from a theory that turned out trivial to a consistent replacement need not proceed in terms of inconsistencies, which are negation gluts. Logics that tolerate gluts or gaps (or both) with respect to any logical symbol may serve as the lower limit for adaptive logics that assign a minimally abnormal consequence set to a given premise set. The same obtains for logics that tolerate a combination of kinds of gluts and gaps. This result runs counter to the obsession with inconsistency that classical logicians and paraconsistent logicians share.&lt;br&gt; All such basic logics will be systematically reviewed, some variants will be outlined, and the claim will be argued for. While those logics tolerate gluts and gaps with respect to logical symbols, ambiguity logic tolerates ambiguities in non-logical symbols. Moreover, forms of tolerance may be combined, with zero logic as an extreme.\İn the baffling plethora of corrective adaptive logics (roads from trivial theories to consistent replacements), adaptive zero logic turns out theoretically interesting as well as practically useful. On the one hand all meaning becomes contingent, depending on the premise set. On the other hand, precisely adaptive zero logic provides one with an excellent analyzing instrument. For example it enables one to figure out which corrective adaptive logics lead, for a specific trivial theory, to a suitable and interesting minimally abnormal consequence set.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Béziau, Jean-Yves</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chakraborty, Mihir</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dutta, Soma</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Some Adaptive Contributions to Logics of Formal Inconsistency</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">309 -333</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Some insights were gained from the study of inconsistency-adaptive logics. The aim of the present paper is to put some of these insight to work for the study of logics of formal inconsistency. The focus of attention are application contexts of the aforementioned logics and their theoretical properties in as far as they are relevant for applications. As the questions discussed are difficult but important, a serious attempt was made to make the paper concise but transparent.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Béziau, Jean-Yves</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chakraborty, Mihir</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dutta, Soma</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tutorial on Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper contains a concise introduction to a few central features of inconsistency-adaptive logics. The focus is on the aim of the program, on logics that may be useful with respect to applications, and on insights that are central for judging the importance of the research goals and the adequacy of results. Given the nature of adaptive logics, the paper may be read as a peculiar introduction to defeasible reasoning.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Koslow, Arnold</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Buchsbaum, Arthur</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Two, Many, And Differently Many</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Road to Universal Logic.  Festschrift for the 50th Birthday of Jean-Yves Béziau</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Birkhäuser</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Basel</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">II</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">213–242</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper is a modest contribution to a universal logic approach to many-valued semantic systems. The main focus is on the relation between such systems and two-valued ones. The matter is discussed for usual many-valued semantic systems. These turn out to exist for more logics than expected. A new type of many-valued semantics is devised and its use illustrated. Truth-functionality has a rather central place in the discussion, which leads to philosophical conclusions.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adaptive Logics as a Necessary Tool for Relative Rationality. Including a Section on Logical Pluralism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Reasoning and Rationality</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-25</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I show that adaptive logics are required by my epistemological stand. While doing so, I defy the reader to cope with the problems I am able to cope with.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; The last section of the paper contains a defense of a specific form of logical pluralism. Although this section is an integral part of the paper, it may be read separately.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Allo, Patrick</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerkhove, Bart</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Consistency of Peano Arithmetic. A Defeasible Perspective</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modestly Radical or Radically Modest. Festschrift for Jean Paul Van Bendegem on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11–59</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper proposes to replace \sys{PA}, Peano Arithmetic, by a theory \sys{APA} defined in terms of (i)&amp;nbsp;a set of axioms that is classically equivalent to the Peano axioms and (ii)&amp;nbsp;a defeasible logic that minimizes inconsistency, viz.\ an inconsistency-adaptive logic. If \sys{PA} is consistent, its set of theorems coincides with the set of \sys{APA}-theorems. If \sys{PA} is inconsistent, \sys{APA} is non-trivial and has the following remarkable property: there is a unique non-standard number that is its own successor and every `desirable' \sys{PA}-theorem is retained if restricted to the other numbers. The restriction can be expressed in the language of arithmetic. And there is much more.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Propositional Logic Extended With A Pedagogically Useful Relevant Implication</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Logical Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">245–276</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;First and foremost, this paper concerns the combination of classical propositional logic with a relevant implication. The proposed combination is simple and transparent from a proof theoretic point of view and at the same time extremely useful for relating formal logic to natural language sentences. A specific system will be presented and studied, also from a semantic point of view. The last sections of the paper contain more general considerations on combining classical propositional logic with a relevant logic that has all classical theorems as theorems.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Claes, Tom</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bedoelingen en principes. Een onverwachte relatie</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Door Denken en Doen. Essays bij het Werk van Ronald Commers</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Academia Press</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gent</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">93–106</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">It might have been Classical Logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">218</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">241–279</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, a propositional logic Q is presented. This logic is more attractive than classical propositional logic P for explicating actual proofs. Moreover, while Q and P assign the same consequence set to consistent premise sets, Q assigns a sensible and non-trivial consequence set to in- consistent premise sets.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logics for Qualitative Inductive Generalization</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studia Logica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">97</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">61–80</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The paper contains a survey of (mainly unpublished) adaptive logics of inductive generalization. These defeasible logics are precise formulations of certain methods.\\ Some attention is also paid to ways of handling background knowledge, introducing mere conjectures, and the research guiding capabilities of the logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Waar stoppen?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">102</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">196–198</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Carnielli, Walter A.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Coniglio, Marcelo E.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Loffredo D'Ottaviano, Itala M.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adaptive Cn Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Many Sides of Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">London</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">27–45</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper solves an old problem: to devise decent inconsistency-adaptive logics that have the \C{n} logics as their lower limit. Two kinds of logics are presented. Those of the first kind offer a maximally consistent interpretation of the premise set in as far as this is possible in view of logical considerations. At the same time, they indicate at which points further choices may be made on extra-logical grounds. The logics of the second kind allow one to introduce those choices in a defeasible way and handle them.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dégremont, Cédric</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Keiff, Laurent</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rückert, Helge</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Towards a Dialogic Interpretation of Dynamic Proofs</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dialogues, Logics and Other Strange Things. Essays in Honour of Shahid Rahman</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">London</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">27–51</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The main result presented in this paper concerns a dialogic or game-theoretical interpretation of dynamic proofs. Dynamic proofs in themselves do not form a demonstration of the derivability of their last formula from a given premise set. Apart from the proof, such a demonstration requires a specific metalevel argument. In a natural and appealing form, the metalevel argument is phrased in terms of the existence of a winning strategy for the proponent.\par The aforementioned point is presented in terms of an approach that is in a sense Hilbertian and anti-Tarskian: the characterization of logical inference in terms of types of proofs, rather than in terms of properties of the consequence relation.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Straßer, Christian</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verdée, Peter</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the Transparency of Defeasible Logics: Equivalent Premise Sets, Equivalence of Their Extensions, and Maximality of the Lower Limit</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">207</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">281–304</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;For Tarski logics, there are simple criteria that enable one to conclude that two premise sets are equivalent. We shall show that the very same criteria hold for adaptive logics, which is a major advantage in comparison to other approaches to defeasible reasoning forms.&lt;br /&gt; A related property of Tarski logics is that the extensions of equivalent premise sets with the same set of formulas are equivalent premise sets. This does not hold for adaptive logics. However a very similar criterion does.&lt;br /&gt; We also shall show that every monotonic logic weaker than an adaptive logic is weaker than the lower limit logic of the adaptive logic or identical to it. This highlights the role of the lower limit for settling the adaptive equivalence of extensions of equivalent premise sets.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Clercq, Kristof</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verdée, Peter</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yes Fellows, Most Human Reasoning is Complex</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Synthese</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9268-4</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">166</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">113–131</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper answers the philosophical contentions defended in Horsten and Welch (2007, Synthese, 158, 41-60). It contains a description of the standard format of adaptive logics, analyses the notion of dynamic proof required by those logics, discusses the means to turn such proofs into demonstrations, and argues that, notwithstanding their formal complexity, adaptive logics are important because they explicate an abundance of reasoning forms that occur frequently, both in scientific contexts and in common sense contexts.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Priest, Graham</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Graham Priest and Diderik Batens Interview Each Other</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Reasoner</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2–4</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Almeder, Robert</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On Possibilities and Thought Experiments</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rescher Studies. A Collection of Essays on the Philosophical Work of Nicholas Rescher</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ontos Verlag</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frankfurt</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29–57</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper concerns two related recent books by Nicholas Rescher, &lt;em&gt;Imagining Irreality&lt;/em&gt; on possibilities and &lt;em&gt;What If?&lt;/em&gt; on thought experiments. Apart from an expository part, the present contribution consist on the one hand of some proposed elaborations, especially of two technical points, and on the other hand of some discussion concerning points where I am in doubt about Rescher's precise stand and of some suggestions for further research.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Psillos, Stathis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Curd, Martin</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Role of Logic in Philosophy of Science</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Routledge</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">London, New York</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47–57</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pombo, Olga</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gerner, Alexander</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Content Guidance in Formal Problem Solving Processes</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Abduction and the Process of Scientific Discovery</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centro de Filosofia das Ciências da U. de Lisboa</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lisboa</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">121–156</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, a formal framework to problem-solving processes is presented. The framework is not complete. Nevertheless, even its present sophistication allows one to see that it is promising.\par The framework demonstrably allows one to understand scientific change as content-guided. It will be argued that a formal framework is required in order to make definite and precise statements about the content-guided aspects of scientific problem solving.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Universal Logic Approach to Adaptive Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logica Universalis</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">221-242</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, adaptive logics are studied from the viewpoint of universal logic (in the sense of the study of common structures of logics). The common structure of a large set of adaptive logics is described. It is shown that this structure determines the proof theory as well as the semantics of the adaptive logics, and moreover that most properties of the logics can be proved by relying solely on the structure, viz. without invoking any specific properties of the logics themselves.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Adaptive Characterization of Signed Systems for Paraconsistent Reasoning</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper we characterize the six (basic) signed systems from \cite{B&amp;amp;S:sspr} in terms of adaptive logics. We prove the characterization correct and show that it has a number of advantages.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Magnani, Lorenzo</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Diagrammatic Proof Search Procedure as Part of a Formal Approach to Problem Solving</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Model Based Reasoning in Science and Engineering. Cognitive Science, Epistemology, Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">King's College Publications</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">265–284</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper aims at describing a goal-directed and diagrammatic method for proof search. The method (and one of the logics obtained by it) is particularly interesting in the context of formal problem solving. A typical property is that it consists of attempts to justify so-called bottom boxes by means of premise elements (diagrammatic elements obtained from premises) and logical elements. Premises are not preprocessed, whence most premises lead to a variety of premise elements.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Formal Logic for Abductive Reasoning</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic Journal of the IGPL</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">14</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">221–236</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper presents and illustrates a formal logic for the abduction of singular hypotheses. The logic has a semantics and a dynamic proof theory that is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. The logic presupposes that, with respect to a specific application, the set of explananda and the set of possible explanantia are disjoint (but not necessarily exhaustive). Where an explanandum can be explained by different explanantia, the logic allows only for the abduction of their disjunction.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On a Logic of Induction</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Philosophy of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IV</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3–32</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I present a simple and straightforward logic of induction: a consequence relation characterized by a proof theory and a semantics. This system will be called &lt;strong&gt;LI&lt;/strong&gt;. The premises will be restricted to, on the one hand, a set of empirical data and, on the other hand, a set of background generalizations. Among the consequences will be generalizations as well as singular statements, some of which may serve as predictions and explanations.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">(Corrected version of \cite{D:induct1}.)</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Malinowski, Jacek</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pietruszczak, Andrzej</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Narrowing Down Suspicion in Inconsistent Premise Sets</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Essays in Logic and Ontology.</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Science and the Humanities</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rodopi</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Amsterdam/New York</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">185–209</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Inconsistency-adaptive logics isolate the inconsistencies that are derivable from a premise set, and restrict the rules of Classical Logic only where inconsistencies are involved. From many inconsistent premise sets, disjunctions of contradictions are derivable no disjunct of which is itself derivable. Given such a disjunction, it is often justified to introduce new premises that state, with a certain degree of confidence, that some of the disjuncts are false. This is an important first step on the road to consistency: it narrows down suspicion in inconsistent premise sets and hence locates the real problems among the possible ones. In this paper I present two approaches for handling such new premises in the context of the original premises. The first approach may apparently be combined with all paraconsistent logics. The second approach does not have the same generality, but is decidedly more elegant.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Procedural Criterion for Final Derivability in Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Applied Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">221–250</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper concerns a (prospective) goal directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the inconsistency-adaptive logic &lt;strong&gt;ACLuN1&lt;/strong&gt;. At the propositional level, the procedure forms an algorithm for final derivability. If extended to the predicative level, it provides a \emph{criterion} for final derivability. This is essential in view of the absence of a positive test. The procedure may be generalized to all flat adaptive logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Theory of the Process of Explanation Generalized to Include the Inconsistent Case</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Synthese</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">143</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">63–88</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper proposes a generalization of the theory of the process of explanation to include consistent as well as inconsistent situations. The generalization is strong, for example in the sense that, if the background theory and the initial conditions are consistent, it leads to precisely the same results as the theory from the lead paper \cite{H&amp;amp;H:tpe}. The paper presupposes (and refers to arguments for the view that) inconsistencies constitute problems and that scientists try to resolve them.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">doi:10.1007/s11229-005-3114-3</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Basic Inductive Schema, Inductive Truisms, and the Research-Guiding Capacities of the Logic of Inductive Generalization</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">185–188</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">53–84</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The aim of this paper is threefold. First, the sometimes slightly messy application of the conditional rule RC of the logic of inductive general- ization is clariØed by reducing this rule to a so-called basic schema BS. Next, some common truisms about inductive generalization are shown to be mistaken, but are also shown to be valid in special cases. Finally, and most importantly, it is shown that applications of the adaptive logic of inductive generalization to sets of data, possibly in the presence of background knowledge, invokes certain empirical tests and certain theo- retically justiØed defeasible conjectures, which in a sensible way increase one's empirical and theoretical knowledge about a given domain.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rahman, Shahid</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Symons, John</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gabbay, Dov M.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Need for Adaptive Logics in Epistemology</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">459–485</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;After it is argued that philosophers of science have lost their interest in logic because they applied the wrong type of logics, examples are given of the forms of dynamic reasoning that are central for philosophy of science and epistemology. Adaptive logics are presented as a means to understand and explicate those forms of reasoning. All members of a specific (large) set of adaptive logics are proved to have a number of properties that warrant their formal decency and their suitability with respect to understanding and explicating dynamic forms of reasoning. Most of the properties extend to other adaptive logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Clercq, Kristof</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Rich Paraconsistent Extension of Full Positive Logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">185–188</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">227–257</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In the present paper we devise and study the most natural predicative extension of Schütte's maximally paraconsistent logic. With some of its large fragments, this logic, \sys{CLuNs}, forms the most popular family of paraconsistent logics. Devising the system involves some entanglements, and the system itself raises several interesting questions. As the system and fragments were studied by other authors, we restrict our attention to results that we have not seen in press.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Appeared 2005</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adaptieve Logica's. Een precieze benadering van vertrouwde maar door logici verwaarloosde redeneervormen</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">95</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">174–189</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Criteria Causing Inconsistencies. General Gluts as Opposed to Negation Gluts</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Logical Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11/12</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5–37</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper studies the question: how should one handle inconsistencies that derive from the inadequacy of the criteria by which one approaches the world. I compare the approaches underlying several inconsistency-adaptive logics. I consider the Rescher–Manor consequence relations as well as adaptive logics defined from &lt;strong&gt;CLuN&lt;/strong&gt;, &lt;strong&gt;CLuNs&lt;/strong&gt;, &lt;strong&gt;LP&lt;/strong&gt;, &lt;strong&gt;AN&lt;/strong&gt;, and &lt;strong&gt;AL&lt;/strong&gt;. The adaptive systems defined from &lt;strong&gt;CLuN&lt;/strong&gt; appear to be superior to the others. They &lt;em&gt;isolate&lt;/em&gt; inconsistencies rather than spreading them, and at the same time allow for genuine deductive steps from inconsistent and mutually inconsistent premises.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Nevertheless, the systems based on &lt;strong&gt;CLuN&lt;/strong&gt; introduce an asymmetry between negated and non-negated formulas that seems hard to justify. To clarify and understand the source of the problem, the epistemological presuppositions of &lt;strong&gt;CLuN&lt;/strong&gt;, viz. inadequate criteria, are investigated. This leads to a new type of paraconsistent logic that involves gluts with respect to all other logical constants. The larger part of the paper is devoted to this logic, to the adaptive logics defined from it, and to the study of the properties of these systems.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; While this resulting logics are sensible and display interesting features, the search for variants of the justification leads to an unexpected justification for &lt;strong&gt;CLuN&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Delrieux, Claudio</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Legris, Javier</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Formal Approach to Problem Solving</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Computer Modeling of Scientific Reasoning</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bahia Blanca, Argentinia</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15–26</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Paraconsistent Proof Procedure Based on Classical Logic</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Apparently Ex Falso Quodlibet (or Explosion) cannot be isolated within CL (Classical Logic); if Explosion has to go, then so have other inference rules, for example either Addition or Disjunctive Syllogism. This cer- tainly holds according to the standard abstract view on logic. However, as I shall show, it does not hold if a logic is defined by a procedure-a set of instructions to obtain a proof (if there is one) of a given conclusion from a given premise set. In this paper I present a procedure pCL¡ that defines a logic CL¡|a function assigning a consequence set to any premise set. Anything deriv- able by CL from a consistent premise set ¡ is derivable from ¡ by CL¡. If ¡ is (CL-)inconsistent, pCL¡ enables one to demonstrate this (by de- riving a contradiction from ¡). The logic CL¡ validates applications of Disjunctive Syllogism as well as applications of Addition. Nevertheless, this logic is paraconsistent as well as (in a specific sense) relevant. pCL¡ derives from an intuitively attractive proof search procedure. A characteristic semantics for CL¡ will be presented and the central prop- erties of the logic will be mentioned. CL¡ shows that (and clarifies how) adherents of CL may obtain non-trivial consequence sets for inconsistent theories.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verhoeven, Liza</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Some Adaptive Logics for Diagnosis</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Logical Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11/12</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39–65</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;A logic of diagnosis proceeds in terms of a set of premises and one or more (prioritized) sets of expectancies. In this paper we generalize the logics of diagnosis from \cite{EDa:diag} and present some alternatives. The former operate on the premises and expectancies themselves, the latter on their consequences.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Strengthening of the Rescher–Manor Consequence Relations</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">183–184</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">46</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">289–313</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The flat Rescher–Manor consequence relations–-the Free, Strong, Weak, C-Based, and Argued consequence relation–-are defined in terms of the classical consequences of the maximal consistent subsets of (possibly) inconsistent sets of premises. If the premises are inconsistent, the Free, Strong and C-Based consequence sets are consistent and the Argued consequence set avoids explicit inconsistencies (such as &lt;em&gt;A&lt;/em&gt; and &amp;nbsp;&lt;em&gt;A&lt;/em&gt;).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; The five consequence relations may be applied to discussive situations as intended by Jaskowski–-the comparison with Jaskowski's &lt;strong&gt;D2&lt;/strong&gt; is instructive. The method followed by Joke Meheus to extend &lt;strong&gt;D2&lt;/strong&gt; to an adaptive logic, may also be applied to the Rescher–Manor consequence relations. It leads to an extension of the Free, Strong, Weak, and C-Based consequence relations. The extended consequence sets are consistent and closed under Classical Logic. Applying the method to the Argued consequence relation leads to a different consequence relation, not an extension. Neither the Argued consequence relation nor its extension appear very interesting in the present application context.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vermeir, Timothy</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Direct Dynamic Proofs For the Rescher–Manor Consequence Relations: The Flat Case</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">12</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">63–84</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;It was shown in \cite{D:unific} that the flat Rescher–Manor consequence relations–-the Free, Strong, Argued, C-Based, and Weak consequence relation–-are all characterized by special applications of inconsistency-adaptive logics defined from the paraconsistent logic &lt;strong&gt;CLuN&lt;/strong&gt;. As as result, these consequence relations are provided with a dynamic proof theory. In the present paper we show that the detour via an inconsistency-adaptive logic is not necessary. We present a &lt;em&gt;direct&lt;/em&gt; dynamic proof theory, formulated in the language of Classical Logic, and prove its adequacy.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In Defence of a Programme for Handling Inconsistencies</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistency in Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">129–150</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper states and defends the philosophical programme underlying the Ghent approach to adaptive logics. Two central arguments are epistemic in nature, one logical. The underlying claim is that even people with rather classical views should see adaptive logics as the only sensible way to handle the inconsistencies that regularly arise in human knowledge, including scientific theories.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dekker, Hendrik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Villadsen, Jorgen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Waragai, Toshiharu</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On a Partial Decision Method for Dynamic Proofs</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">PCL 2002. Paraconsistent Computational Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.LO/0207090</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Roskilde University</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">95</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91–108</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper concerns a goal directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the adaptive logic ACLuN1. At the propositional level, it forms an algorithm for final derivability. If extended to the predicative level, it provides a criterion for final derivability. This is essential in view of the absence of a positive test. The procedure may be generalized to all flat adaptive logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Also available as cs.LO/0207090 at \texttt{http://arxiv.org/archive/cs/intro.html}&lt;/p&gt;</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Some Computational Aspects of Inconsistency-Adaptive logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CLE e-Prints</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15 pp.</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper concerns a goal directed proof procedure for the propo- sitional fragment of the adaptive logic ACLuN1. The procedure forms an algorithm for final derivability and may easily be generalized for the propositional fragment of all at adaptive logics. The aim is to articulate a procedure that, if extended to the predicative level, provides criteria for final derivability.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Carnielli, Walter A.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Coniglio, Marcelo E.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Loffredo D'Ottaviano, Itala M.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On some Remarkable Relations between Paraconsistent Logics, Modal Logics, and Ambiguity Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marcel Dekker</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New York</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">275–293</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper concerns some connections between paraconsistent logics, modal logics (mainly &lt;strong&gt;S5&lt;/strong&gt;), and Ambiguity Logic &lt;strong&gt;AL&lt;/strong&gt; (Classical Logic applied to a language in which all letters are indexed and in which quantifiers over such indices are present). &lt;strong&gt;S5&lt;/strong&gt; may be defined from &lt;strong&gt;AL&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Three kinds of connections are illustrated. First, a paraconsistent logic &lt;strong&gt;A&lt;/strong&gt; is presented that has the same expressive power as &lt;strong&gt;S5&lt;/strong&gt;. Next, I consider the definition of paraconsistent logics from &lt;strong&gt;S5&lt;/strong&gt; and &lt;strong&gt;AL&lt;/strong&gt;. Such definition is shown to work for some logics, for example Priest's &lt;strong&gt;LP&lt;/strong&gt;. Other paraconsistent logics appear to withstand such definition, typically those that contain a detachable material implication. Finally, I show that some paraconsistent logics and inconsistency-adaptive logics serve exactly the same purpose as some modal logics and ampliative adaptive logics based on &lt;strong&gt;S5&lt;/strong&gt;. However, they serve this purpose along very different roads and the logics cannot be defined from one another.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; The paper intends to open lines of research rather than pursuing them to the end. It also contains a poor person's semantics for &lt;strong&gt;S5&lt;/strong&gt; as well as a description of the simple but useful and powerful &lt;strong&gt;AL&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aspects of the Dynamics of Discussions and Logics Handling Them</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Although we are all familiar with discussions, spelling out their dynamics in a precise way involves many tough logical problems. This paper reports on a set of logical tools that are useful in this respect. Some concern the arguments produced in a discussion, possibly as a result of interventions of different participants, and the many forms of explicit and implicit agreement that are required to understand what is going on. Others concern the changing positions of participants. Nearly all of the tools are adaptive logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Haesaert, Lieven</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On Classical Adaptive Logics of Induction</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">173-175</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">44</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">255–290</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper concerns the inference of inductive generalizations and of predictions derived from them. It improves on the adaptive logic of induction from \emph{On a Logic of Induction} (Batens, Logic and Philosophy of Science, IV, 1, 2006, pp. 3-32) by presenting logics that are formulated strictly according to the usual adaptive standards. It moreover extends that paper with respect to background knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; We present logics that handle inductive generalizations as well as logics that handle prioritized background knowledge of three kinds: background generalizations, pragmatic background generalizations (the instances of which may be invoked even after the generalizations are falsified), and background theories. All logics may be combined into a single system.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Dynamic Characterization of the Pure Logic of Relevant Implication</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Philosophical Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">30</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">267-280</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper spells out a dynamic proof format for the pure logic of relevant implication. (A proof is dynamic if a formula derived at some stage need not be derived at a later stage.) The paper illustrates three interesting points. (i)&amp;nbsp;A set of properties that characterizes an inference relation on the (very natural) dynamic proof interpretation, need not characterize the same inference relation (or even any inference relation) on the usual set-theoretical interpretation. (ii)&amp;nbsp;A proof format may display an internal dynamics (defeasible conclusions) in the absence of an external dynamics (non-monotonicity). (iii)&amp;nbsp;A monotonic logic may have a non-monotonic characterization.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Keywords: dynamic proofs, relevant implication, non-monotonicity.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A General Characterization of Adaptive Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">173-175</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">44</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45–68</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper contains a unified characterization of adaptive logics. The general structure is presented in the simplest possible guise, both for flat and prioritized adaptive logics. The latter are presented as a special case of combined adaptive logics. The aim of the paper is to provide the general framework underlying several other papers in this volume and to prepare the unified metatheory of adaptive logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Appeared 2003</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kiikeri, Mika</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ylikoski, Petri</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the Logic and Pragmatics of the Process of Explanation</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Explanatory Connections. Electronic Essays Dedicated to Matti Sintonen</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/kfil/matti/</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">University of Helsinki</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, we present mainly two logical systems that clarify pragmatic aspects of the process of explanation. The first concerns a proof theory that leads to the derivation of possible initial conditions from an \emph{explanandum} and a given theory. The second logic concerns the derivation of questions in view of the verification of some possible initial condition, or of one out of several possible initial conditions. It is essential that the latter derivation proceeds in terms of all available knowledge, and not in terms of the explaining theory. It is shown that the second logic provides useful information for explicating further pragmatic aspects of the process of explanation. Several extensions of the logics are argued to be both useful and rather easy to obtain.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;22&amp;nbsp;pp.&lt;/p&gt;</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Over de zin van het leven en de zingevende functie van wereldbeelden</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mores</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">226</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41–63</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pushing the Search Paths in the Proofs. A Study in Proof Heuristics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">173-175</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">44</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">113–134</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Introducing techniques deriving from dynamic proofs in proofs for propositional classical logic is shown to lead to a proof format that enables one to push search paths into the proofs themselves. The resulting goal directed proof format is shown to provide a decision method for &lt;em&gt;A&lt;/em&gt;&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;, ..., &lt;em&gt;A&lt;sub&gt;n&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;/em&gt; &lt;img src=&quot;vdash.gif&quot; alt=&quot;vdash&quot; /&gt; &lt;em&gt;B&lt;/em&gt; and a positive test for &lt;img src=&quot;ggamma.gif&quot; alt=&quot;Gamma&quot; /&gt; &lt;img src=&quot;vdash.gif&quot; alt=&quot;vdash&quot; /&gt; &lt;em&gt;A&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Shortcuts and Dynamic Marking in the Tableau Method for Adaptive logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studia Logica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">69</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">221–248</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Adaptive logics typically pertain to reasoning procedures for which there is no positive test. In \cite{DJ:tabl1}, we presented a tableau method for two inconsistency-adaptive logics. In the present paper, we first describe these methods (without repeating the meta-theoretic proofs). Next, we present several ways to increase the efficiency of the methods. This culminates in a dynamic marking procedure that indicates which branches have to be extended first, and thus guides one towards a decision–-the conclusion follows or does not follow–-in a very economical way.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Universally Abnormality-Adaptive Logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logical Investigations</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Moscow, ``NAUKA''</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">256–265</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The present paper presents a logic that allows for the abnormal behaviour of any logical constant and for the ambiguous behaviour of any non-logical constant, but nevertheless offers an interpretation of the premises that is as normal as possible.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Appeared 2002</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Adaptive Logic of Compatibility</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studia Logica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">66</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">327–348</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper describes the adaptive logic of compatibility and its dynamic proof theory. The results derive from insights in inconsistency-adaptive logic, but are themselves very simple and philosophically unobjectionable. In the absence of a positive test, dynamic proof theories lead, in the long run, to correct results and, in the short run, sometimes to final decisions but always to sensible estimates. The paper contains a new and natural kind of semantics for &lt;strong&gt;S5&lt;/strong&gt; from which it follows that a specific subset of the standard worlds-models is characteristic for &lt;strong&gt;S5&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Keywords: compatibility, adaptive logic, ampliative reasoning, &lt;strong&gt;S5&lt;/strong&gt;-semantics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the epistemological justification of pluralism and tolerance</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ghent</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">65</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33–54</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Appeared 2002</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mortensen, Chris</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Priest, Graham</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Extremely Rich Paraconsistent Logic and the Adaptive Logic Based on It</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Research Studies Press</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Baldock, UK</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">189–201</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>6</ref-type><contributors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mortensen, Chris</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Priest, Graham</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Research Studies Press</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Baldock, UK</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Minimally abnormal models in some adaptive logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Synthese</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">125</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5–18</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In an adaptive logic &lt;strong&gt;APL&lt;/strong&gt;, based on a (monotonic) non-standard logic &lt;strong&gt;PL&lt;/strong&gt;, the consequences of &lt;img src=&quot;ggamma.gif&quot; alt=&quot;Gamma&quot; /&gt; can be defined in terms of a selection of the &lt;strong&gt;PL&lt;/strong&gt;-models of &lt;img src=&quot;ggamma.gif&quot; alt=&quot;Gamma&quot; /&gt;. An important property of the adaptive logics &lt;strong&gt;ACLuN1&lt;/strong&gt;, &lt;strong&gt;ACLuN2&lt;/strong&gt;, &lt;strong&gt;ACLuNs1&lt;/strong&gt;, and &lt;strong&gt;ACLuNs2&lt;/strong&gt; logics is proved: whenever a model is not selected, this is justified in terms of a selected model (Strong Reassurance). The property fails for Priest's &lt;strong&gt;LP&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;sup&gt;m&lt;/sup&gt; because of its way of measuring the degree of abnormality of a model is incoherent–-correcting this delivers the property.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Grillet, Eric</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Beets, François</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rich inconsistency-adaptive logics. The clash between heuristic efficiency and realistic reconstruction</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique en perspective. Mélanges offerts à Paul Gochet</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Éditions OUSIA</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Brussels</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">513–543</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mortensen, Chris</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Priest, Graham</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Survey of Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Research Studies Press</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Baldock, UK</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">49–73</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper offers a systematic review of some central philosophical and technical results on adaptive logics. Quite a few of the results are still in print or forthcoming.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dyckhoff, Roy</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Tableau Method for Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Automated Reasoning with Analytic Tableaux and Related Methods</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1847</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">127–142</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;We present a tableau method for inconsistency-adaptive logics and illustrate it in terms of the two best studied systems. The method is new in that adaptive logics require a more complex structure of the tableaus and of some rules and conditions. As there is no positive test for derivability in inconsistency-adaptive logics, the tableau method is important for providing criteria for derivability.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Towards the Unification of Inconsistency Handling Mechanisms</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Logical Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5–31</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;It is shown that the (flat) consequence relations defined from the Rescher-Manor Mechanism (that is: in terms of maximal consistent subsets of the premises) are all inconsistency-adaptive logics combined with a specific interpretation schema for the premises. Each of the adaptive logics is obtained by applying a suitable adaptive strategy to the paraconsistent logic &lt;strong&gt;CLuN&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; This result provides all those consequence relations with a (dynamic) proof theory and with a static (as well as a dynamic) semantics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Appeared 2002</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Contextual Problem Solving and Adaptive Logics In Creative Processes</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">64</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7–31</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Creativity is commonly seen as beyond the scope of rationality. In the present paper, it is argued that available insights in epistemology and available results in logic enable us to incorporate creativity within an independently sensible view on human rationality.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Appeared 2001</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Clercq, Kristof</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kurtonina, Natasha</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Embedding and Interpolation for Some Paralogics. The Propositional Case</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Reports on Mathematical Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29–44</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;We consider the very weak paracomplete and paraconsistent logics that are obtained by a straightforward weakening of Classical Logic, as well as some of their maximal extensions that are a fragment of Classical Logic. We prove (for the propositional case) that these logics may be faithfully embedded in Classical Logic (as well as in each other), and that the interpolation theorem obtains for them.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Orłowska, Ewa</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic at Work. Essays Dedicated to the Memory of Helena Rasiowa</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Physica Verlag (Springer)</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heidelberg, New York</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">445–472</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;After a general description of adaptive logics and their intended applications, I study the proof theory and semantics of two closely related predicative inconsistency-adaptive logics, &lt;strong&gt;ACLuN1&lt;/strong&gt; and &lt;strong&gt;ACLuN2&lt;/strong&gt;. To this end, I first describe their monotonic basis: the paraconsistent logic &lt;strong&gt;CLuN&lt;/strong&gt; obtained by dropping the consistency requirement from classical logic. The propositional fragments of these inconsistency-adaptive logics have been studied elsewhere. The predicative versions involve several interesting difficulties that lead to new results.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Linguistic and Ontological Measures for Comparing the Inconsistent Parts of Models</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">165-166</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5–33</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Adaptive logics depend essentially on measures for the degree of abnormality of models. The linguistic approach to such measures compares the sets of abnormal, &lt;em&gt;e.g.&lt;/em&gt;, inconsistent wffs verified by the models. The ontological approach compares models in terms of `structural' properties that do not depend on the way in which the language is interpreted in the model.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; While the linguistic approach has not been questioned up to now, present proposals for an ontological approach are affected by several weaknesses. The present paper argues for the attractiveness of an ontological approach and elaborates on the challenge to adequately define it. The final outcome is rather negative: the only sensible definition attained leads to a logic that does not seem to have any suitable application contexts.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Appeared 2002</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Paraconsistency and its Relation to Worldviews</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Foundations of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">259–283</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The paper highlights the import of the paraconsistent movement, list some motivations for its origin, and distinguishes some stands with respect to paraconsistency. It then discusses some sources of inconsistency that are specific for worldviews, and the import of the paraconsistent turn for the worldviews enterprise.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerckhove, Christian</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Radicaal Atheïsme</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wat met God?</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Humanistisch Vrijzinnige Dienst</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Antwerpen</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">129–162</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Zero Logic Adding Up to Classical Logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logical Studies</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The present paper presents a logic that allows for the abnormal behaviour of any logical constant and for the ambiguous behaviour of any non-logical constant, but nevertheless offers an interpretation of the premises that is as normal as possible. If the premises have classical models, the logic assigns them the same consequence set as Classical Logic.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; The semantics of the logic is presented, the dynamic proof theory is hinted at, and some comments are added on the philosophical significance of the result.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">(Electronic Journal: {\small\texttt{http://www.logic.ru/LogStud/02/LS2.html}})</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De zin van Leo Apostels atheïstische religiositeit. Een kennistheoretisch commentaar. Woord vooraf</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Atheïstische Spiritualiteit</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1998</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">VUB-Pers</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Brussel</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9–21</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dynamic Semantics Applied to Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logical Investigations</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1998</style></year></dates><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Moscow, ``NAUKA''</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">74–85</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Dynamic Semantics for Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bulletin of the Section of Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1998</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">27</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15–18</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Kerckhove, Christian</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Grondslagen van het vrijzinnig humanisme. Een kennistheoretisch pleidooi</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Grondslagen Vrijzinnig Humanisme</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1997</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Humanistisch Vrijzinnige Dienst</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Antwerpen</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">75–104</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistencies and Beyond. A Logical-Philosophical Discussion</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Revue Internationale de Philosophie</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1997</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">200</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">259–273</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The paper starts off by epistemological arguments for the need of paraconsistent logics. Next it is argued that some contexts require that one allows for other abnormalities, next to or instead of inconsistencies. The feasibility of such moves is defended in terms of a contextual epistemology. Finally, adaptive logics are defended as means to interpret theories `as normally as possible', even if they contain some abnormalities.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Over het (vermeende) conflict tussen godsgeloof en de wetenschappen</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mores</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1997</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">401–415</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Antropinè Gnosè. Mia Ekklèsè gia mia Chrèsimè Ortologikotèta</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1996</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Crete University Press</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Athens/Eracleion</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Greek translation of &quot;Menselijke Kennis&quot; (Diderik Batens, Garant, 1992).&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Een ontroerend intens streven naar kennis, naar beleving en naar de eenheid van beide</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leo Apostel. Tien filosofen getuigen</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1996</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hadewijch</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Antwerpen/Baarn</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">135–157</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">van Benthem, Johan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Eemeren, F. H.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Grootendorst, R.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Veltman, Frank</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Functioning and teachings of adaptive logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Argumentation</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1996</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">North-Holland</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">241–254</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper concerns some formal systems, viz. adaptive logics, that display a specific flexibility in the meanings of logical terms. Both the flexibility that occurs within the systems and the question as to how we may arrive at such systems is discussed. Both, it is argued, are relevant for bridging the gap between logic and argumentation.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Douven, Igor</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Horsten, Leon</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In-world realism vs. reflective realism.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Realism in the Sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1996</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Universitaire Pers</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leuven</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35–53</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>6</ref-type><contributors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leo Apostel. Tien filosofen getuigen</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leo Apostel. Tien filosofen getuigen</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1996</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hadewijch</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Antwerpen/Baarn</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ook het oneindige is ons werk</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leo Apostel. Tien filosofen getuigen</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1996</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hadewijch</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Antwerpen/Baarn</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">119–134</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Steering Problem Solving Between Cliff Incoherence and Cliff Solitude</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1996</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">58</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">153–187</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Starting from Nickles' constraint-inclusion model, we present five challenges that any rational problem solving model should meet, but that seem to lead to an inextricable riddle. We then introduce the contextual model and show, step by step, that it meets all the challenges and resolves the riddle. This results in a strong argument for the concept of rationality that underlies the model.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Appeared 1998</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Blocks. The clue to dynamic aspects of logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1995</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">150-151-152</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">38</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">285–328</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The present paper introduces a new approach to formal logic. The block approach is especially useful to grasp dynamic aspects of reasoning, including formal reasoning, that fall beyond the reach of the usual approaches. A block language, the block analysis of proofs, and semantic systems in terms of blocks are articulated. The approach is first applied to classical logic (including proof heuristics). It is used to solve two important problems for adaptive logics (that have a dynamic proof theory). Some further applications are discussed, including meaning change.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Appeared 1997</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kornelis, Gustaaf</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adaptieve logica’s: een aanzet om elkaar te begrijpen</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. Acta 16de Nederlands-Vlaamse Filosofiedag</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1994</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">VUB-Pers</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13–19</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verbeure, Frans</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Apostel, Leo</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Determinisme en indeterminisme</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verwijdering of ontmoeting?</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1994</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pelckmans</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">183–202</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics and the Foundation of Non-Monotonic Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1994</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">145</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">57–94</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper contains the reconstruction of (what I shall call) mixed non-monotonic logics as a combination of a deductive and a preferential component. The first leads from the premises to a possibly inconsistent consequence set; the second weeds out the inconsistencies. Among the candidates for the deductive component inconsistency-adaptive logics prove most suitable. The ensuing preferential component is formulated in terms of models and is itself split into two parts: (i) a transparent, purely logical procedure leads from a set of inconsistent models to a set of associated consistent models and (ii) the choice between the latter relies on the preferences. The real fight between mixed non-monotonic logics should concentrate on this last aspect. 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