<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Straßer, Christian</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aleks Knoks</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deontic Reasoning on the Basis of Consistency Considerations</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Submitted</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Deonticconflictsposeanimportantchallengetodeonticlogicians. The standard account standard deontic logic, &lt;strong&gt;SDL&lt;/strong&gt; is not apt for addressing this challenge since it trivializes con flicts. Two main stratagems for gaining conflict-tolerance have been proposed: to weaken &lt;strong&gt;SDL&lt;/strong&gt; in various ways, and to contextualize the reign of &lt;strong&gt;SDL&lt;/strong&gt; to consistent subsets of the premise set. The latter began with the work of van Fraassen and has been further developed by Horty. In this paper we characterize this second approach in general terms. We also study three basic ways to contextualize SDL and supplement each of these with a dynamic proof theory in the framework of adaptive logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van De Putte, Frederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Beirlaen, Mathieu</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adaptive Deontic Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Handbook of Deontic Logic and Normative Systems</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In Press</style></year></dates><edition><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></edition><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></volume><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Beirlaen, Mathieu</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van De Putte, Frederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Straßer, Christian</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Non-Adjunctive Deontic Logics That Validate Aggregation as Much as Possible</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Applied Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In Press</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van De Putte, Frederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Beirlaen, Mathieu</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adaptive Deontic Logics: A Survey</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/ifcolog00032.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">6</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">523-608</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">523</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>10</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van De Putte, Frederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frijters, Stef</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Condoravdi, Cleo</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nair, Shyam</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pigozzi, Gabriella</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How to take heroin (if at all). A new approach to detachment in deontic logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: 14th International Conference</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">London</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">317-335</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">submitted</style></work-type></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Straßer, Christian</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verdée, Peter</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Which Style of Reasoning to Choose in the Face of Conflicting Information?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Logic and Computation</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">26</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">361--380</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In the context of non-monotonic reasoning different kinds of consequence relations are defined for reasoning from (possibly) inconsistent information. Examples are consequence relations that are characterized in terms of maximal consistent subsets of the premise set. The &lt;em&gt;strong consequences&lt;/em&gt; are those formulas that follow by Classical Logic from every maximal consistent subset. The &lt;em&gt;weak consequences&lt;/em&gt; follow from some maximal consistent subset. The &lt;em&gt;free consequences&lt;/em&gt; follow from the set of formulas that belong to every maximal consistent subset. In this paper the question is discussed which of these consequence relations should be applied in which reasoning context. First the concerns that are expressed in the literature with respect to the usefulness of the weak consequences are addressed. Then it is argued that making weak inferences is sensible for some application contexts, provided one has a (dynamic) proof theory for the corresponding consequence relation. Such a dynamic proof theory is what adaptive logics offer. Finally, all this is illustrated by means of a very simple adaptive logic reconstruction of the free, strong, and weak consequences&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wouters, Dietlinde</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bloody analogical reasoning</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">217–232</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper I will study some of William Harveys applications of analogies in the Prelectiones Anatomiae Universalis and the Exercitatio anatomica de motu cordis et sanguinis in animalibus. I will show that Harvey applied analogies in many different ways and that some contributed to the discovery of the characteristic action of the heart and pulse and even to the discovery of the blood circulation. The discovery process will be approached as a problem solving process as described in Batens contextual model. The focus on constraints allows to see Harvey both as a modern because of his extensive use of experimental results and as strongly influenced by an Aristotelian natural philosophy interpretation of anatomy and physiology as, for instance, propagated by Fabricius of Aquapendente.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heeffer, Albrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wouters, Dietlinde</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Data-driven induction in scientific discovery: a critical assessment based on Kepler's discoveries</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, reasoning, and rationality</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">59–76</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9789401790109</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Motivated by the renewed interest in knowledge discovery from data (KDD) by the artificial intelligence community, this paper provides a critical assessment of the model of data-driven induction for scientific discovery. The most influential research program using this model is developed by the BACON team. Two of the main claims by this research program, the descriptive and constructive power of data-driven induction, are evaluated by means of two historical cases studies: the discovery of the sine law of refraction in optics and Kepler’s third law of planetary motion. I will provide evidence that the data used by the BACON program–-despite the claims being made–-does not correspond with the historical data available to Kepler and his contemporaries. Secondly, it is shown that for the two cases the method by which the general law was arrived at did not involve data-driven induction. Finally, the value of the data-driven induction as a general model for scientific discovery is being questioned.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gervais, Raoul</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wouters, Dietlinde</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Explaining capacities: Assessing the explanatory power of models in the cognitive sciences</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45-57</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wieland, Jan Willem</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wouters, Dietlinde</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Internalism Does Entail Scepticism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Argumentation &amp; Reasoning</style></tertiary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Internalism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Knowledge</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Regress</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rule</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Scepticism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer Netherlands</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">247-260</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-94-017-9010-9</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Let Internalism be the view that our inferences are justified depending on whether we have knowledge of the logical rules on which they are based, and Scepticism the view that none of our inferences are justified. Boghossian has shown that Internalism entails Scepticism, and Philie has attempted to block the entailment by invoking an assumption on rationality. In this contribution, I enforce the entailment claim and argue that Philies solution misses the target: Internalism does entail Scepticism.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Beirlaen, Mathieu</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Straßer, Christian</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Philosophical Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">285–315</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic \sys{DP}$^r$, a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts. On the other hand, \sys{DP}$^r$ still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (\sys{SDL}). \sys{DP}$^r$ interprets a given premise set as normally as possible with respect to \sys{SDL}. Whereas some \sys{SDL}-rules are verified unconditionally by \sys{DP}$^r$, others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of \sys{DP}$^r$&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Straßer, Christian</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Beirlaen, Mathieu</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tolerating Deontic Conflicts by Adaptively Restricting Inheritance</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">219</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">477-506</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In order to deal with the possibility of deontic conflicts Lou Goble developed a group of logics &lt;strong&gt;DPM&lt;/strong&gt; that are characterized by a restriction of the inheritance principle. While they approximate the deductive power of standard deontic logic, they do so only if the user adds certain statements to the premises. By adaptively strengthening the &lt;strong&gt;DPM&lt;/strong&gt; logics, this paper presents logics that overcome this shortcoming. Furthermore, they are capable of modeling the dynamic and defeasible aspect of our normative reasoning by their dynamic proof theory. This way they enable us to have a better insight in the relations between obligations and thus to localize deontic conflicts.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dieks, Dennis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gonzalez, Wenceslao J.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hartmann, Stephan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Uebel, Thomas</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">93–108</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Beirlaen, Mathieu</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van De Putte, Frederik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Governatori, Guido</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sartor, Giovanni</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Avoiding Deontic Explosion by Contextually Restricting Aggregation</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2010)</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, we present an adaptive logic for deontic conflicts, called \sys{P2.1}$^r$, that is based on Goble's logic \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e$–-a bimodal extension of Goble's logic \sys{P} that invalidates aggregation for all \emph{prima facie} obligations. The logic \sys{P2.1}$^r$ has several advantages with respect to \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e$. For consistent sets of obligations it yields the same results as Standard Deontic Logic and for inconsistent sets of obligations, it validates aggregation ``as much as possible''. It thus leads to a richer consequence set than \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e$. The logic \sys{P2.1}$^r$ avoids Goble's criticisms against other non-adjunctive systems of deontic logic. Moreover, it can handle all the `toy examples' from the literature as well as more complex ones.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Clercq, Kristof</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Carnielli, Walter A.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Coniglio, Marcelo E.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Loffredo D'Ottaviano, Itala M.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Goal-Directed Tableaux</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Many Sides of Logic</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studies in Logic</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">London</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">241–256</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper contains a new format for analytic tableaux, called goal-directed tableaux. Their main interest lies in the fact that the search for a closed tableau proceeds in a highly constrained way. The goal-directed tableaux do not form a complete decision method for propositional classical logic (because they do not sustain Ex Falso Quodlibet). For consistent sets of premises, however, they lead to the same results as the usual analytic tableaux for classical logic.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Clercq, Kristof</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verdée, Peter</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yes Fellows, Most Human Reasoning is Complex</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Synthese</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9268-4</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">166</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">113–131</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper answers the philosophical contentions defended in Horsten and Welch (2007, Synthese, 158, 41-60). It contains a description of the standard format of adaptive logics, analyses the notion of dynamic proof required by those logics, discusses the means to turn such proofs into demonstrations, and argues that, notwithstanding their formal complexity, adaptive logics are important because they explicate an abundance of reasoning forms that occur frequently, both in scientific contexts and in common sense contexts.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adaptive arbitration by variant counting on commutative bases with weights</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fusion 2008: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Information Fusion</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IEEE</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper a new logical arbitration protocol for fusion of inconsistent information is designed. It defines a selection of models of a premise set in a multi-modal logic that uses the standard format of adaptive logics. The selected models are obtained by a counting procedure on the derivable data conflicting among the various sources. Peculiar of this approach is the definition of weights for commutative bases, in terms of the distinction between partially and fully supported information. The results obtained are compared to standard arbitration protocols and they extend previous work on the adaptive majority protocol.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Majority Merging by Adaptive Counting</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Synthese (KRA Serie)</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">165</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">203–223</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The present paper introduces a belief merging procedure by majority using the standard format of Adaptive Logics. The core structure of the logic ADM(c) (Adaptive Doxastic Merging by Counting) consists in the formulation of the conflicts arising from the belief bases of the agents involved in the procedure. A strategy is then defined both semantically and proof-theoretically which selects the consistent contents answering to a majority principle. The results obtained are proven to be equivalent to a standard majority operator for bases with partial support.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">van Benthem, Johan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pacuit, Eric</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Quasi-merging and Pure-arbitration on Information for the family of Adaptive Logics ADM</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of the Workshop on Logic and Intelligent Interaction</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The present paper introduces two new information merging protocols for the family of adaptive logics &lt;strong&gt;ADM&lt;/strong&gt;, for which majority merging has been defined in [19]. The new adaptive operators re ect the negotiation processes of quasi-merging and pure arbitration, known from the Integrity Constraints framework introduced in [13]. The &lt;em&gt;Adaptive Variant Counting&lt;/em&gt; selection provides a result equivalent to the &lt;em&gt;GMax&lt;/em&gt; family of merging operators: it selects a collective model for a multi-set of belief bases based on the number of disagreements verified by the various models according to a leximax function. The &lt;em&gt;Adaptive Minimax Counting&lt;/em&gt; selection is a quasi-merging operator which applies a minimax function and it obtains a larger spectrum of possibilities than the previous selection: it simulates the behaviour of the &lt;em&gt;Max&lt;/em&gt; family of operators from the Integrity Con- straints framework, avoiding some of its counterintuitive results.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Abduction through Semantic Tableaux versus Abduction through Goal-Directed Proofs</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Theoria</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">60</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22/3</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">295–304</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, we present a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Alisedas approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Alisedas algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goal-directed procedure solves the problems we encountered in Alisedas algorithms.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pombo, Olga</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gerner, Alexander</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adaptive Logics for Abduction and the Explication of Explanation-Seeking Processes</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Abduction and the Process of Scientific Discovery</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centro de Filosofia das Ciências da U. de Lisboa</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lisboa</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">97–119</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I illustrate the main characteristics of abductive reasoning processes by means of an example from the history of the sciences. The example is taken from the history of chemistry and concerns a very small episode from Lavoisiers struggle with the air obtained from mercury oxide. Eventually, this struggle would lead to the discovery of oxygen. I also show that Lavoisiers reasoning process can be explicated by means of a particular formal logic, namely the adaptive logic LAr. An important property of LAr is that it not only nicely integrates deductive and abductive steps, but that it moreover has a decent proof theory. This proof theory is dynamic, but warrants that the conclusions derived at a given stage are justified in view of the insight in the premises at that stage. Another advantage of the presented logic is that, as compared to other existing systems for abductive reasoning, it is very close to natural reasoning.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Adaptive Characterization of Signed Systems for Paraconsistent Reasoning</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper we characterize the six (basic) signed systems from \cite{B&amp;amp;S:sspr} in terms of adaptive logics. We prove the characterization correct and show that it has a number of advantages.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Adaptive Logic Based on Jaśkowski's Approach to Paraconsistency</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Philosophical Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">539–567</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I present the modal adaptive logic AJ &lt;sup&gt;r&lt;/sup&gt; (based on &lt;strong&gt;S5&lt;/strong&gt;) as well as the discussive logic D&lt;sup&gt;r&lt;/sup&gt;2 that is defined from it. D&lt;sup&gt;r&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt; is a (non-monotonic) alternative for Jaskowskis paraconsistent system D 2 . Like D 2 , D&lt;sup&gt;r&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt; validates all single-premise rules of Classical Logic. However, for formulas that behave consistently, D&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt; moreover validates all multiple-premise rules of Classical Logic. Importantly, and unlike in the case of D&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt; , this does not require the introduction of discussive connectives. It is argued that this has clear advantages with respect to one of the main application contexts of discussive logics, namely the interpretation of discussions.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Malinowski, Jacek</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pietruszczak, Andrzej</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Discussive Adaptive Logics: Handling Internal and External Inconsistencies</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Essays in Logic and Ontology</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rodopi</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Amsterdam/New York</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">211-223</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Formal Logic for Abductive Reasoning</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic Journal of the IGPL</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">14</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">221–236</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper presents and illustrates a formal logic for the abduction of singular hypotheses. The logic has a semantics and a dynamic proof theory that is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. The logic presupposes that, with respect to a specific application, the set of explananda and the set of possible explanantia are disjoint (but not necessarily exhaustive). Where an explanandum can be explained by different explanantia, the logic allows only for the abduction of their disjunction.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Festa, Roberto</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aliseda, Atocha</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Peijnenburg, Jeanne</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Empirical Progress and Ampliative Adaptive Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation. Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers. Vol. 1</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rodopi</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Amsterdam/New York</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">83</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">193–217</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stadler, Friedrich</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adaptive Logics and the Integration of Induction and Deduction</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Induction and Deduction in the Sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">93–120</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Direct Dynamic Proofs for Classical Compatibility</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">185–188</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">305–317</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, we present a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Alisedas approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Alisedas algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goal-directed procedure solves the problems we encountered in Alisedas algorithms.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Delrieux, Claudio</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Legris, Javier</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Do We Need Paraconsistency in Commonsense Reasoning?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Computer Modeling of Scientific Reasoning</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Universidad Nacional del Sur. EDIUNS</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bahia Blanca, Argentina</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">135–146</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistencies and the Dynamics of Science</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Logical Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11/12</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">129–148</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Paraconsistent Compatibility</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">183–184</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">46</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">251–287</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I present two adaptive logics for paraconsistent com-patibility. The consequence relation defined by these logics leads from a (possibly inconsistent) set of premises to all the sentences that are com-patible with them. Their proof theory is dynamic, but is proven sound and complete with respect to a static semantics. For the consistent case, both logics lead to exactly the same results as the logics for classical com-patibility that were presented in [11]. It is shown that paraconsistent compatibility cannot be defined with respect to a monotonic paraconsistent logic, but only with respect to an inconsistency-adaptive logic. The paper contains modal versions of two well-studied inconsistency-adaptive logics. These modal versions form the basis for the logics for paraconsistent compatibility, but are also interesting with respect to other applications.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verhoeven, Liza</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Some Adaptive Logics for Diagnosis</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Logical Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11/12</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39–65</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;A logic of diagnosis proceeds in terms of a set of premises and one or more (prioritized) sets of expectancies. In this paper we generalize the logics of diagnosis from \cite{EDa:diag} and present some alternatives. The former operate on the premises and expectancies themselves, the latter on their consequences.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Carnielli, Walter A.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Coniglio, Marcelo E.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Loffredo D'Ottaviano, Itala M.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Adaptive Logic for Pragmatic Truth</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marcel Dekker</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New York</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">167–185</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper presents the new adaptive logic APT. APT has the peculiar property that it enables one to interpret a (possibly inconsistent) theory Gamma 'as pragmatically as possible'. The aim is to capture the idea of a partial structure (in the sense of da Costa and associates) that adequately models a (possibly inconsistent) set of beliefs Gamma. What this comes to is that APT localizes the 'consistent core' of Gamma, and that it delivers all sentences that are compatible with this core. For the core itself, APT is just as rich as Classical Logic. APT is defined from a modal adaptive logic APV that is based itself on two other adaptive logics. I present the semantics of all three systems, as well as their dynamic proof theory. The dynamic proof theory for APV is unusual (even within the adaptive logic programme) in that it incorporates two different kinds of dynamics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verhoeven, Liza</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Dyck, Maarten</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Provijn, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ampliative Adaptive Logics and the Foundation of Logic-Based Approaches to Abduction</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logical and Computational Aspects of Model-Based Reasoning</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer Academic</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39–71</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, we propose a reconstruction of logic-based approaches to abductive reasoning in terms of ampliative adaptive logics. The advantages of this reconstruction are important: the resulting logics have a proper theory (that leads to justified conclusions even for undecidable fragments), they nicely integrate deductive and abductive steps, and they are much closer to natural reasoning than the existing systems.&lt;br /&gt; We present two new adaptive logics for abduction, &lt;strong&gt;CP1&lt;/strong&gt; and &lt;strong&gt;CP2&lt;/strong&gt;. &lt;strong&gt;CP1&lt;/strong&gt; enables one to generate explanations for novel facts from a consistent theory. &lt;strong&gt;CP2&lt;/strong&gt; moreover enables one to abduce explanatory hypotheses for novel facts and for anomalous facts from a possibly inconsistent theory. We illustrate both logics with some examples from the history of the sciences (the discovery of Uranus and of Neptune), and present some alternatives to &lt;strong&gt;CP1&lt;/strong&gt; and &lt;strong&gt;CP2&lt;/strong&gt; that are better suited for non-creative forms of abductive reasoning and for practical reasoning.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In Defence of a Programme for Handling Inconsistencies</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistency in Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">129–150</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper states and defends the philosophical programme underlying the Ghent approach to adaptive logics. Two central arguments are epistemic in nature, one logical. The underlying claim is that even people with rather classical views should see adaptive logics as the only sensible way to handle the inconsistencies that regularly arise in human knowledge, including scientific theories.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Krach, Helghe</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanpaemel, Geert</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marage, Pierre</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistencies in Scientific Discovery. Clausius's Remarkable Derivation of Carnot's Theorem</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">History of Modern Physics. Acta of the XXth International Congress of History of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Brepols</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Turnhout (Belgium)</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">143–154</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistencies in the history of mathematics: the case of infinitesimals.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistency in Science</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Origins</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_3</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer Academic</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43–57</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-4020-0630-6</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper I will not confine myself exclusively to historical considerations. Both philosophical and technical matters will be raised, all with the purpose of trying to understand (better) what Newton, Leibniz and the many precursors (might have) meant when they talked about infinitesimals. The technical part will consist of an analysis why apparently infinitesimals have resisted so well to be formally expressed. The philosophical part, actually the most important part of this paper, concerns a discussion that has been going on for some decennia now. After the Kuhnian revolution in philosophy of science, notwithstanding Kuhns own suggestion that mathematics is something quite special, the question was nevertheless asked how mathematics develops. Are there revolutions in mathematics? If so, what do we have to think of? If not, why do they not occur? Is mathematics the so often claimed totally free creation of the human spirit? As usual, there is a continuum of positions, but let me sketch briefly the two extremes: the completists (as I call them) on the one hand, and the contingents (as I call them as well) on the other hand.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Clercq, Kristof</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Why the logic of explanation is inconsistency-adaptive.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistency in science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">165–184</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-4020-0630-6</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adaptive logics for question evocation</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">173-175</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">44</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">135–164</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I present two adaptive logics for Wisniewki's notion of question evocation. The first is based on an erotetic extension of Classical Logic, the second on an erotetic extension of S5. For both logics, I present the semantics and the dynamic proof theory. The latter is especially important in view of the fact that question evocation is a non-monotonic relation for which there is no positive test. Thanks to its dynamical character, the proof theory moreover solves the logical omniscience problem to which Wisniewski's static definition of question evocation leads.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kiikeri, Mika</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ylikoski, Petri</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the Logic and Pragmatics of the Process of Explanation</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Explanatory Connections. Electronic Essays Dedicated to Matti Sintonen</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/kfil/matti/</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">University of Helsinki</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, we present mainly two logical systems that clarify pragmatic aspects of the process of explanation. The first concerns a proof theory that leads to the derivation of possible initial conditions from an \emph{explanandum} and a given theory. The second logic concerns the derivation of questions in view of the verification of some possible initial condition, or of one out of several possible initial conditions. It is essential that the latter derivation proceeds in terms of all available knowledge, and not in terms of the explaining theory. It is shown that the second logic provides useful information for explicating further pragmatic aspects of the process of explanation. Several extensions of the logics are argued to be both useful and rather easy to obtain.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;22&amp;nbsp;pp.&lt;/p&gt;</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Shortcuts and Dynamic Marking in the Tableau Method for Adaptive logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studia Logica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">69</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">221–248</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Adaptive logics typically pertain to reasoning procedures for which there is no positive test. In \cite{DJ:tabl1}, we presented a tableau method for two inconsistency-adaptive logics. In the present paper, we first describe these methods (without repeating the meta-theoretic proofs). Next, we present several ways to increase the efficiency of the methods. This culminates in a dynamic marking procedure that indicates which branches have to be extended first, and thus guides one towards a decision–-the conclusion follows or does not follow–-in a very economical way.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the Acceptance of Problem Solutions Derived from Inconsistent Constraints</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Logical Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33–46</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I discuss the main difficulties one encounters when solving problems with inconsistent constraints. I argue that in order to meet these difficulties we need an inconsistency-adaptive logic that enables one to derive as many (interesting) consequences as possible, but that at the same time allows one to determine which consequences can be &lt;em&gt;accepted&lt;/em&gt;. I show that the inconsistency-adaptive logic &lt;strong&gt;ANA&lt;/strong&gt; satisfies these requirements.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Adaptive Logic of Compatibility</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studia Logica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">66</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">327–348</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper describes the adaptive logic of compatibility and its dynamic proof theory. The results derive from insights in inconsistency-adaptive logic, but are themselves very simple and philosophically unobjectionable. In the absence of a positive test, dynamic proof theories lead, in the long run, to correct results and, in the short run, sometimes to final decisions but always to sensible estimates. The paper contains a new and natural kind of semantics for &lt;strong&gt;S5&lt;/strong&gt; from which it follows that a specific subset of the standard worlds-models is characteristic for &lt;strong&gt;S5&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Keywords: compatibility, adaptive logic, ampliative reasoning, &lt;strong&gt;S5&lt;/strong&gt;-semantics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hallyn, Fernand</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Analogical Reasoning in Creative Problem Solving Processes: Logico-Philosophical Perspectives</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Metaphor and Analogy in the Sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17–34</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mortensen, Chris</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Priest, Graham</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Extremely Rich Paraconsistent Logic and the Adaptive Logic Based on It</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Research Studies Press</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Baldock, UK</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">189–201</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dyckhoff, Roy</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Tableau Method for Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Automated Reasoning with Analytic Tableaux and Related Methods</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1847</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">127–142</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;We present a tableau method for inconsistency-adaptive logics and illustrate it in terms of the two best studied systems. The method is new in that adaptive logics require a more complex structure of the tableaus and of some rules and conditions. As there is no positive test for derivability in inconsistency-adaptive logics, the tableau method is important for providing criteria for derivability.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Clausius' discovery of the first two laws of thermodynamics. A paradigm of reasoning from inconsistencies</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">63</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">89–117</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deductive and Ampliative Adaptive Logics as Tools in the Study of Creativity</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Foundations of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">325–336</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I argue that logic has an important role to play in the methodological study of creativity. I also argue, however, that only special kinds of logic enable one to understand the reasoning involved in creative processes. I show that deductive and ampliative adaptive logics are appropriate tools in this respect.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The early positivists' approach to scientific discovery</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">64</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">81–108</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In the early eighties, philosophers of science came to the conviction that discovery and creativity form an integral part of scientific rationality. Ever since, the &quot;positivists&quot; (logical positivists and their immediate forerunners) have been criticised for their (alleged) neglect of these topics. It is the aim of this paper to show that the positivists' approach to scientific discovery is not only much richer than is commonly recognized, but that they even defended an important thesis which some of the 'friends of discovery' seem to have forgotten. Contrary to what is generally accepted, I shall also show that there is no reason at all why the positivists should have ignored discovery.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Erotetic arguments from inconsistent premises</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">165-166</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">49–80</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The aim of this paper is to generalize two basic concepts of Wisniewski's theory of questions, namely question evocation and question generation, to the inconsistent case. For both concepts, I shall present three alternative definitions. Each of these is based on a prioritized adaptive logic. I shall show that, for the consistent case, each of the alternative definitions leads to the same results as the original ones, and that, for inconsistent case, no other changes are introduced than those required for the sensible handling of inconsistencies. I shall also show that, in the generalized case, a new kind of question evocation can be defined (here called stong evocation). I shall demonstrate that if a question is strongly evoked by some inconsistent set of premmises, then each of its direct answers provides guidance on how the inconsistencies should be resolved.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Magnani, Lorenzo</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nersessian, Nancy</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Thagard, Paul</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Model-Based Reasoning in Creative Processes</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer/Plenum</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">199–217</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Combining a contextual approach to problem solving with results on some recently developed (non-standard) logics, I present in this paper a general frame for the methodological study of model-based reasoning in creative processes. I argue that model-based reasoning does not require that we turn away from logic. I also argue, however, that in order to better understand and evaluate creative processes that involve model-based reasoning, and in order to formulate guidelines for them, we urgently need to extend the existing variety of logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Over het (vermeende) conflict tussen godsgeloof en de wetenschappen</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mores</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1997</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">401–415</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wetenschappelijke ontdekking en creativiteit. Een poging tot theorievorming op basis van een conceptuele, methodologische en logische studie</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1997</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">March 12</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Universiteit Gent (Belgium)</style></publisher><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">phd</style></work-type><custom1><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Diderik Batens&lt;/p&gt;</style></custom1></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Douven, Igor</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Horsten, Leon</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In-world realism vs. reflective realism.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Realism in the Sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1996</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Universitaire Pers</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leuven</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35–53</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Steering Problem Solving Between Cliff Incoherence and Cliff Solitude</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1996</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">58</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">153–187</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Starting from Nickles' constraint-inclusion model, we present five challenges that any rational problem solving model should meet, but that seem to lead to an inextricable riddle. We then introduce the contextual model and show, step by step, that it meets all the challenges and resolves the riddle. This results in a strong argument for the concept of rationality that underlies the model.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Appeared 1998</style></notes></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nieuwe perspectieven voor het begrijpen en bevorderen van creativiteit</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mores</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1995</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">40</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">164–178</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kornelis, Gustaaf</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Elk wetenschapper zijn onderzoeksprogramma?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. Acta 16de Nederlands-Vlaamse Filosofiedag</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1994</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">VUB-Pers</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">61–67</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adaptive Logic in Scientific Discovery: the Case of Clausius</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logique et Analyse</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1993</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">143-144</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">36</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">359–389</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">van Dooren, Wim</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hoff, Tineke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De rationaliteit van persoonlijke inperkingen</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aktueel Filosoferen</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1993</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eburon</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33–38</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Halleux, Robert</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bernés, Anne-Cathérine</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ontdekking en creativiteit in wetenschap en muziek</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nieuwe tendenzen in de geschiedenis en de filosofie van de wetenschappen</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1993</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nationaal Comité voor Logica, Geschiedenis en Filosofie van de Wetenschappen</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41–52</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Raymaekers, Bart</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Recente ontwikkelingen in onze opvatting over creativiteit</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gehelen en fragmenten. De vele gezichten van de filosofie</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1993</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Universitaire Pers</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">259–261</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Raymaekers, Bart</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aspecten van ontdekking en creativiteit</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gehelen en Fragmenten. De vele gezichten van de filosofie</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1992</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leuven, September</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Universitaire Pers</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">59</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record></records></xml>