<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>34</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van De Putte, Frederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tamminga, Allard</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Duijf, Hein</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The best we can do (extended abstract, submitted to LOFT)</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van De Putte, Frederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tamminga, Allard</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Duijf, Hein</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Doing Without Nature</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI)</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9-11/7/2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">VI</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sapporro</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Taddeo, Mariarosaria</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A modal type theory for formalizing trusted communications</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Applied Logic</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">92–114</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper introduces a multi-modal polymorphic type theory to model epistemic processes characterized by trust, defined as a second-order relation affecting the communication process between sources and a receiver. In this language, a set of senders is expressed by a modal prioritized context, whereas the receiver is formulated in terms of a contextually derived modal judgement. Introduction and elimination rules for modalities are based on the polymorphism of terms in the language. This leads to a multi-modal non-homogeneous version of a type theory, in which we show the embedding of the modal operators into standard group knowledge operators.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>10</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Beirlaen, Mathieu</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Straßer, Christian</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leite, Joao</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Torroni, Paolo</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Agotnes, Thomas</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Boella, Guido</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">van der Torre, Leon</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A paraconsistent multi-agent framework for dealing with normative conflicts</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">12th International Workshop on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems (CLIMA XII)</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22359-4</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">312-329</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9783642223587</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In a multi-agent deontic setting, normative conflicts can take a variety of different logical forms. In this paper, we present a very general characterization of such conflicts, including both intra- and inter-agent normative conflicts, conflicts between groups of agents, conflicts between obligations and permissions, and conflicts between contradictory norms. In order to account for the consistent possibility of this wide variety of conflict-types, we present a paraconsistent deontic logic, i.e. a logic that invalidates the classical principle of non-contradiction. Next, we strengthen this logic within the adaptive logics framework for defeasible reasoning. The resulting inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic interprets a given set of norms 'as consistently as possible'.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Straßer, Christian</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tanaka, Koji</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Berto, Francesco</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mares, Edwin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Paoli, Francesco</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An adaptive logic framework for conditional obligations and deontic dilemmas</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and logical philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">95–128</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Šešelja, Dunja</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Torres, Juan Manuel</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How to Identify Scientifc Revolutions?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On Kuhn's Philosophy and its Legacy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CFCUL</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lisbon</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">251–282</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-989-8247-12-4</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Conceptualizing scientific revolutions by means of explicating their causes, their underlying structure and implications has been an important part of Kuhn's philosophy of science and belongs to its legacy. In this paper we show that such “explanatory concepts” of revolutions should be distinguished from a concept based on the identification criteria of scientific revolutions. The aim of this paper is to offer such a concept, and to show that it can be fruitfully used for a further elaboration of the explanatory conceptions of revolutions. On the one hand, our concept can be used to test the preciseness and accuracy of these conceptions, by examining to what extent their criteria fit revolutions as they are defined by our concept. On the other hand, our concept can serve as the basis on which these conceptions can be further specified. We will present four different explanatory concepts of revolutions – Kuhn's, Thagard's, Chen's and Barker's, and Laudan's – and point to the ways in which each of them can be further specified in view of our concept.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lycke, Hans</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tanaka, Koji</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Berto, Francesco</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mares, Edwin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Paoli, Francesco</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistency-adaptive modal logics: on how to cope with modal inconsistency</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic and Logical Philosophy</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.logika.umk.pl/llp/pi.html</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">31–61</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I will characterize a new class of inconsistency–adaptive logics, namely inconsistency–adaptive modal logics. These logics cope with inconsistencies in a modal context. More specifically, when faced with inconsistencies, inconsistency–adaptive modal logics avoid explosion, but still allow the derivation of sufficient consequences to adequately explicate the intended part of human reasoning.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Christiaens, Wim</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tatham, Anne-Marie</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bonnecase, Denis</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">La métamorphose graçe au cinèma.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">La métamorphose: définition, formes et thèmes</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gérard Monfort Editeur</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heeffer, Albrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rahman, Shahid</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Street, Tony</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tahiri, Hassan</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A conceptual analysis of early arabic algebra</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The unity of science in the arabic tradition : science, logic, epistemology and their interactions</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/1854/11276</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer Academic Publishers</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">89–128</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-1-4020-8404-1</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Arabic algebra derives its epistemic value not from proofs but from correctly performing calculations using coequal polynomials. This idea of mathematics as calculation had an important influence on the epistemological status of European mathematics until the seventeenth century. We analyze the basic concepts of early Arabic algebra such as the unknown and the equation and their subsequent changes within the Italian abacus tradition. We demonstrate that the use of these concepts has been problematic in several aspects. Early Arabic algebra reveals anomalies which can be attributed to the diversity of influences in which the al-jabr practice flourished. We argue that the concept of a symbolic equation as it emerges in algebra textbooks around 1550 is fundamentally different from the equation as known in Arabic algebra.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heeffer, Albrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tzanakis, C.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Negative numbers as an epistemic difficult concept. Some lessons from history.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">History and Pedagogy of Mathematics. Satellite Meeting of International Congress on Mathematical Education 11, 14 - 18 July 2008.</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centro Cultural del México Contemporanéo</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Historical studies on the development of mathematical concepts will serve mathematics teachers to relate their students difficulties in understanding to conceptual problems in the history of mathematics. We argue that one popular tool for teaching about numbers, the number line, may not be fit for early teaching of operations involving negative numbers. Our arguments are drawn from the many discussions on negative numbers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from philosophers and mathematicians as Arnauld, Leibniz, Wallis, Euler and dAlembert. Not only the division by negative numbers poses problems for the number line, but also the very idea of quantities smaller than nothing has been challenged. Drawing lessons from the history of mathematics we argue for the introduction of negative numbers in education within the context of symbolic operations.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tomala, O</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Honzik, R</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On building abstract Terms in Typed Systems</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logica 2006 Yearbook</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Filosofia Publisher</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper offers some historical and conceptual remarks on the philosophical and logical procedures of abstraction, based on an account of the notions of concept and function. In order to provide a complete analyis, one should start by considering Platos theory of Ideas, which provides the first interpretation of abstract terms in the history of philosophy. The nature of the most general Forms, the related problem of the knowledge thereof, their connection to existing (concrete) objects, are the essential features of the Platonic theory of knowledge and of his metaphysics. The Platonic approach is grounded on the principle of conceptual priority of Ideas over their partecipations, the Forms existing separeted from all the particulars: the former are interpreted as standard particulars to which other particulars conform. Nonetheless, my investigation will start rather by Aristotle, who held first the relation of predication to be the basis for defining abstraction: from this I will try to consider some important ideas for the notion of abstraction in Type Systems.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bilkova, M</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tomala, O</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Belief Revision in Constructive Type Theory</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logica 2005 Yearbook</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Filosofia Publisher</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Magnani, Lorenzo</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nersessian, Nancy</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Thagard, Paul</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Model-Based Reasoning in Creative Processes</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer/Plenum</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">199–217</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Combining a contextual approach to problem solving with results on some recently developed (non-standard) logics, I present in this paper a general frame for the methodological study of model-based reasoning in creative processes. I argue that model-based reasoning does not require that we turn away from logic. I also argue, however, that in order to better understand and evaluate creative processes that involve model-based reasoning, and in order to formulate guidelines for them, we urgently need to extend the existing variety of logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anapolitanos, Dionysios</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Baltas, Aristides</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tsinorema, Stavroula</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">What, if anything, is an experiment in mathematics?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophy and the Many Faces of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1998</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rowman &amp; Littlefield</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">172–182</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Berghs, H.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Thys, W.</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Een pleidooi voor lokale consistentie</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Congresbundel Filosofiedag Antwerpen 1988</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1989</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eburon</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41–46</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record></records></xml>