<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Faroldi, Federico L. G.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Soria Ruiz, Andrés</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Scale Structure of Moral Adjectives</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studia Semiotyczne</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">31</style></volume><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">161</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>10</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Straßer, Christian</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Arieli, Ofer</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Parsons, Simon</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Oren, Nir</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Reed, Chris</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cerutti, Federico</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dynamic Derivations for Sequent-Based Deductive Argumentation</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">COMMA 2014</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Computational Models of Argument</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">89–100</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;We introduce a general approach for representing and reasoning with argumentation-based systems. In our framework arguments are represented by Gentzen-style sequents, attacks (conflicts) between arguments are represented by sequent elimination rules, and deductions are made by dynamic proof systems. This framework accommodates different languages and logics in which arguments may be represented, supports a variety of attack relations, and tolerates dynamic changes in the argumentation setting by revising derivations of assertions in light of new information.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Reydon, Thomas</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Boon, Mieke</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Houkes, Wybo</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vermaas, Pieter</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The ICE-theory of technical functions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Metascience</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23–44</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heeffer, Albrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rommevaux, Sabine</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spiesser, Maryvonne</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Massa Esteve, Maria Rosa</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The rule of quantity by Chuquet and de la Roche and its influence on German Cossic algebra</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pluralité de l'algèbre à la Renaissance</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Honoré Champion</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">127–147</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9782745323989</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The importance of &lt;em&gt;Larismethique&lt;/em&gt; of de La Roche, published in 1520, has been seriously underestimated. One reason for the neglect is related to the inscrutable way he is referred to. Buteo and Wallis called him Stephanus à Rupe de Lyon. Other obscure references, such as Gosselin calling him Villafrancus Gallus have been overlooked by many commentators. His influence can be determined in several works that do not credit him but use problems or definitions from the &lt;em&gt;Larismethique&lt;/em&gt;. However, most damaging for its historical assessment was Aristide Marre?s misrepresentation of the &lt;em&gt;Larismethique&lt;/em&gt; as a grave case of plagiarism. Marre discovered that the printed work of 1520 by Estienne de la Roche contained large fragments that were literally copied from Chuquet?s manuscript of the Triparty. Especially on the &lt;em&gt;Appendice&lt;/em&gt;, which contains the solution to a large number of problems, Marre writes repeatedly that it is a literal copy of Chuquet. However, he fails to mention that the structure of the text of de la Roche, his solution methods and symbolism differs significantly from Chuquet. De la Roche introduces several improvements, especially with regards to the use of the second unknown. We provide an in-depth comparison of some problems solved by the so-called &lt;em&gt;regle de la quantite&lt;/em&gt; by Chuquet with those of de la Roche. We further report on the surprising finding that Christoff Rudolff's solution to linear problems by means of the second unknown in his &lt;em&gt;Behend vnnd Hubsch Rechnung&lt;/em&gt; of 1525 depends on Chuquet and de la Roche. As it is generally considered that algebra was introduced in Germany through Italy this provides a new light on the transmission of algebraic knowledge from France to the rest of Europe.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rahman, Shahid</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marion, Mathieu</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Type-Theoretical Dynamics. Exploring Belief Revision in a Constructive Framework</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The realism-antirealism debate in the age of alternative logics</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">191–212</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In the present paper a dynamics for type theory is introduced. The formalization provides epistemic explanations for the basic notions of belief state and belief set by referring to assertion conditions for type-theoretical judgements; it interprets expectations in terms of default assumptions for such a structure and it adapts the usual revision operations and the analogous of the Ramsey test. The model, restricted to operations of revision, merging and information preference, provides a constructive type-theoretical approach to epistemic dynamics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leuridan, Bert</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">McKay Illari, Phyllis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russo, Federica</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Williamson, Jon</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The IARC and mechanistic evidence</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Causality in the Sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Oxford University Press</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91–109</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9780199574131</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is an organization which seeks to identify the causes of human cancer. For each agent, such as betel quid or Human Papillomaviruses, they review the available evidence deriving from epidemiological studies, animal experiments and information about mechanisms (and other data). The evidence of the different groups is combined such that an overall assessment of the carcinogenicity of the agent in question is obtained. In this paper, we critically review IARC's carcinogenicity evaluations. First we show that serious objections can be raised against their criteria and procedures - more specifically regarding the role of mechanistic knowledge in establishing causal claims. Our arguments are based on the problems of confounders, of the assessment of the temporal stability of carcinogenic relations, viz. How we should treat the carcinogenicity evaluations that were based on the current procedures. After showing that this question is important we argue that an overall dismissal of the current evaluations would be too radical. Instead, we argue in favour of a stepwise re-evaluation of the current findings.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ferreira, F</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Guerra, H</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mayordomo, E</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rasga, J</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Constructive contextual modal judgments for reasoning from open assumptions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of the Computability in Europe 2010 Conference</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centre for Applied Mathematics and Information Technology, Department of Mathematics, University of Azores</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Dependent type theories using a structural notion of context are largely explored in their applications to programming languages, but less investigated for knowledge representation purposes. In particular, types with modalities are already used for distributed and staged computation. This paper introduces a type system extended with judgmental modalities internalizing epistemically different modes of correctness to explore a calculus of provability from refutable assumptions.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rahman, Shahid</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Epistemic Modalities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Acts of Knowledge: History, Philosophy and Logic</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tributes</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">207–232</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-1-904987-92-5</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;I present an analysis of the notion of epistemic modalities, based on an appropriate interpretation of two basic constructivist issues: verification and epistemic agency. Starting from an historical analysis of conditions for judgments, I analyze first the reading of necessity with respect to apodictic judgements, and then that of possibility with respect to hypothetical judgement. The analysis results in a formal treatment of rules for judgemental modal operators, whose aim is to preserve epistemic states corresponding to verified and unverified assumptions in contexts. In the conclusion, further tracks of research are indicated for designing a semantic framework and defining multi-agents systems.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ducheyne, Steffen</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rusu, Iulian</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Isaac Newton's 'Of The Church' Manuscript Description and Analysis of Bodmer Ms. in Geneva</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European journal of science and theology</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.ejst.tuiasi.ro/issue.html</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25–35</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this essay, a manuscript description and analysis of Isaac Newton's manuscript 'Of the Church' (Bodmer Ms., Fondation Martin Bodmer, Geneva, Switzerland) is provided.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Urbaniak, Rafal</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rostalska, Agnieszka</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Libert, Thierry</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marage, Pierre</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vanpaemel, Geert</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modal Logic and Philosophy. A case study.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Brussel</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">79-83</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dégremont, Cédric</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Keiff, Laurent</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rückert, Helge</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Towards a Dialogic Interpretation of Dynamic Proofs</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dialogues, Logics and Other Strange Things. Essays in Honour of Shahid Rahman</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">London</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">27–51</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The main result presented in this paper concerns a dialogic or game-theoretical interpretation of dynamic proofs. Dynamic proofs in themselves do not form a demonstration of the derivability of their last formula from a given premise set. Apart from the proof, such a demonstration requires a specific metalevel argument. In a natural and appealing form, the metalevel argument is phrased in terms of the existence of a winning strategy for the proponent.\par The aforementioned point is presented in terms of an approach that is in a sense Hilbertian and anti-Tarskian: the characterization of logical inference in terms of types of proofs, rather than in terms of properties of the consequence relation.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heeffer, Albrecht</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rahman, Shahid</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Street, Tony</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tahiri, Hassan</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A conceptual analysis of early arabic algebra</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The unity of science in the arabic tradition : science, logic, epistemology and their interactions</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/1854/11276</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer Academic Publishers</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">89–128</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-1-4020-8404-1</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Arabic algebra derives its epistemic value not from proofs but from correctly performing calculations using coequal polynomials. This idea of mathematics as calculation had an important influence on the epistemological status of European mathematics until the seventeenth century. We analyze the basic concepts of early Arabic algebra such as the unknown and the equation and their subsequent changes within the Italian abacus tradition. We demonstrate that the use of these concepts has been problematic in several aspects. Early Arabic algebra reveals anomalies which can be attributed to the diversity of influences in which the al-jabr practice flourished. We argue that the concept of a symbolic equation as it emerges in algebra textbooks around 1550 is fundamentally different from the equation as known in Arabic algebra.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russo, Federica</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Williamson, Jon</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Conceptual tools for causal analysis in the social sciences.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Causality and probability in the sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">London</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">197–213</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1904987354</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leuridan, Bert</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russo, Federica</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Williamson, Jon</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Galton's blinding glasses: modern statistics hiding causal structure in early theories of inheritance.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Causality and probability in the sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">243–262</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-904987-35-4</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rahman, Shahid</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Symons, John</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gabbay, Dov M.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bendegem, Jean Paul</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Need for Adaptive Logics in Epistemology</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">459–485</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;After it is argued that philosophers of science have lost their interest in logic because they applied the wrong type of logics, examples are given of the forms of dynamic reasoning that are central for philosophy of science and epistemology. Adaptive logics are presented as a means to understand and explicate those forms of reasoning. All members of a specific (large) set of adaptive logics are proved to have a number of properties that warrant their formal decency and their suitability with respect to understanding and explicating dynamic forms of reasoning. Most of the properties extend to other adaptive logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rojsczak, A</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cachro, J</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kurczewski, G</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Explaining laws by reduction</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">140201645X</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Scientific explanations have been intensively studied by philosophers of science during the last five decades. Explanations of laws did not receive as much attention as explanations of particular facts. In this article, I present a model for one type of explanations of laws: reductions of laws to phenomena at a micro-level. Examples of such reductions can be found in the natural sciences (the ideal gas law is probably the most famous example here) and in the social sciences (e.g., reduction of macroeconomic laws to the behaviour of individual economic agents).&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Raymaekers, Bart</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Het construeren van wetenschappelijke verklaringen</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gehelen en fragmenten. De vele gezichten van de filosofie</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1993</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Universitaire Pers</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">261-265</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Raymaekers, Bart</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Onze huidige kijk op ontdekking en creativiteit vereist een `contextuele' kennistheoretische aanpak</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gehelen en fragmenten. 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