<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>10</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Straßer, Christian</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Arieli, Ofer</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Parsons, Simon</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Oren, Nir</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Reed, Chris</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cerutti, Federico</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dynamic Derivations for Sequent-Based Deductive Argumentation</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">COMMA 2014</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Computational Models of Argument</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">89–100</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;We introduce a general approach for representing and reasoning with argumentation-based systems. In our framework arguments are represented by Gentzen-style sequents, attacks (conflicts) between arguments are represented by sequent elimination rules, and deductions are made by dynamic proof systems. This framework accommodates different languages and logics in which arguments may be represented, supports a variety of attack relations, and tolerates dynamic changes in the argumentation setting by revising derivations of assertions in light of new information.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>10</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lefevere, Merel</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Regt, Henk</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Okasha, Samir</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hartmann, Stephan</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The role of unification in explanations of facts</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EPSA Philosophy of Science 2009</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Amsterdam</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">403-413</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9789400724037</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of facts. Our aim is to analyse the role of unification in explanations of this kind. We discuss five positions with respect to this role, argue for two of them and refute the three others.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Garnett, Rob</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olsen, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Starr, Martha</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Why should I adopt pluralism?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Economic Pluralism</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Routledge</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;If the most perplexing thing in the world is a lack of theory, the second mostperplexing must be an abundance of it. This contribution clarifies the notion of pluralism byintroducing an often neglected but crucial distinction between different levels at whichpluralism can be situated. It intends to provide a framework for scholars dealing with thequestion how to manage the divergence of views they are confronted with.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Orłowska, Ewa</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic at Work. Essays Dedicated to the Memory of Helena Rasiowa</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Physica Verlag (Springer)</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heidelberg, New York</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">445–472</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;After a general description of adaptive logics and their intended applications, I study the proof theory and semantics of two closely related predicative inconsistency-adaptive logics, &lt;strong&gt;ACLuN1&lt;/strong&gt; and &lt;strong&gt;ACLuN2&lt;/strong&gt;. To this end, I first describe their monotonic basis: the paraconsistent logic &lt;strong&gt;CLuN&lt;/strong&gt; obtained by dropping the consistency requirement from classical logic. The propositional fragments of these inconsistency-adaptive logics have been studied elsewhere. The predicative versions involve several interesting difficulties that lead to new results.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>