<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>10</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van De Putte, Frederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frijters, Stef</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Condoravdi, Cleo</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nair, Shyam</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pigozzi, Gabriella</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How to take heroin (if at all). A new approach to detachment in deontic logic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: 14th International Conference</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">College Publications</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">London</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">317-335</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">submitted</style></work-type></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aerts, Diederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Broekaert, Jan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">D'Hooghe, Bart</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Note, Nicole</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Can economics become a purely experimental science? A comparative study</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Worldviews, science and us : bridging knowledge and its implications for our perspectives on the world</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.worldscibooks.com/general/8341.html</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">World Scientific Publishing Company</style></publisher><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9789814383073</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The role of experiments in economics is increasing. This paper deals with a philosophical question that is raised by this evolution: can economics become a purely experimental science? I answer this question by comparing economics with a branch of biomedical science.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ducheyne, Steffen</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aerts, Diederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Broekaert, Jan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">D'Hooghe, Bart</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Note, Nicole</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">History and Philosophy of Science: From Peaceful Coexistence to Golden Age of Interdisciplinarity?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">World Scientific Publishing Company</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Singapore</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">26-36</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Vreese, Leen</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aerts, Diederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Broekaert, Jan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">D'Hooghe, Bart</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Note, Nicole</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Interdisciplinary Focus on the Concept of Causation: What philosophy can learn from psychology</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">World Scientific Publishing Company</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Singapore</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55-71</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In philosophy of science, it is still a mainstream practice to search for the `truth' about fundamental scientific concepts in isolation, blind to knowledge achieved in other domains of science. I focus on the topic of causation. I argue that it is worthwhile for philosophy of science to leave its metaphysical tower in order to pick up knowledge from other domains where empirical research on causal reasoning is carried out, such as psychology. I will demonstrate what the psychologist Peter White's theory, on the origin and development of causal reasoning, can impart to philosophy of causation. It concerns different but interre- lated subjects with respect to the philosophy of causation: conceptual pluralism, a core causal concept of causation, the analysis of \what cau- sation is&quot;, epistemological pluralism, causation as a secondary quality and weak causal realism. The divide between metaphysical and epis- temological approaches to causation|and hence between philosophy and psychology|may be much smaller than is often presupposed. Keywords: philosophy of causation, developmental psychology, causal pluralism, interdisciplinarity&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Christiaens, Wim</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aerts, Diederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Broekaert, Jan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">D'Hooghe, Bart</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Note, Nicole</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Metaphysics and Cinema</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">World Scientific Publishing Company</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Singapore</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">118-141</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lycke, Hans</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nakakoji, Kumiyo</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Murakami, Yohei</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">McCready, Eric</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Adaptive Logic for the Formal Explication of Scalar Implicatures</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAI-isAI 2009 Workshops</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14888-0\_20</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer Verlag</style></publisher><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-3-642-14887-3</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Hearers get at the intended meaning of uncooperative utterances (i.e. utterances that conflict with the prescriptions laid down by the Gricean maxims) by pragmatically deriving sentences that reconcile these utterances with the maxims. Such pragmatic derivations are made according to pragmatic rules called implicatures. As they are pragmatic in nature, the conclusions drawn by applying implicatures remain uncertain. In other words, they may have to be withdrawn in view of further information. Because of this last feature, Levinson argued that implicatures should be formally modeled as non–monotonic or default rules of inference. In this paper, I will do exactly this: by relying on the Adaptive Logics Programme, I will provide a formal explication of implicatures as default inference rules. More specifically, I will do so for a particular kind of implicatures, viz scalar implicatures.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Primiero, Giuseppe</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jespersen, Bjørn</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nakakoji, Kumiyo</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Murakami, Yohei</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">McCready, Eric</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Two type-theoretical approaches to privative modification</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAI-isAI 2009 Workshops</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer Verlag</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Berlin, Heidelberg</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">239–258</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4-915905-37-3 C3004</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper we apply two kinds of procedural semantics to the problem of privative modification. We do this for three reasons. The first reason is to launch a tough test case to gauge the degree of substantial agreement between a constructivist and a realist interpretation of a procedural semantics; the second is to extend Martin-Lof's Type Theory to privative modification, which is characteristic of natural language; the third reason is to sketch a positive characterization of privation.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Mol, Liesbeth</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Woods, Damien</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Neary, Turlough</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Seda, Tony</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the boundaries of solvability and unsolvability in tag systems. Theoretical and experimental results.</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The complexity of simple programs</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cork University Press</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Several older and more recent results on the boundaries of solvability and unsolvability in tag systems are surveyed. Emphasis will be put on the significance of computer experiments in research on very small tag systems.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">D'Hanis, Isabel</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Magnani, Lorenzo</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nersessian, Nancy</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pizzi, Claudio</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A logical approach to the analysis of metaphors</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logical and Computational Aspects of Model-Based Reasoning</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2002</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer Academic</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21–37</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1402007124</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I will present an adaptive logic that grasps the way we analyze metaphors. Metaphors are powerful tools to generate new scientific ideas. Therefore, it is important to have a good theory on what metaphors are and how they function. The first question we have to answer when we want to develop such a theory is obviously ˝what metaphors are˝. Philosophy of language can offer some interesting ideas but most views do not allow for a cognitive function of metaphors. One of the sparse views that does allow for it is interactionism. The basic version, however, has some serious shortcomings that need solving when we want to use this theory. First of all the terminology is too vague. Furthermore, the description of the reasoning process we use when we analyze a metaphor, only works for very simple examples. The logic I will present, ALM, is based on a broadened version of this view. A logical approach of metaphors allows us to gain a profound insight in the way we analyze metaphors. The analysis of metaphors is a dynamical reasoning process. When we want to capture this process in a logical system, we need a logic that is capable of grasping that specific type of dynamics. An adaptive logic seems to be the best choice. Therefore, I shall present an adaptive logic that grasps the analysis of metaphors.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Magnani, Lorenzo</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nersessian, Nancy</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Thagard, Paul</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Model-Based Reasoning in Creative Processes</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kluwer/Plenum</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">199–217</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Combining a contextual approach to problem solving with results on some recently developed (non-standard) logics, I present in this paper a general frame for the methodological study of model-based reasoning in creative processes. I argue that model-based reasoning does not require that we turn away from logic. I also argue, however, that in order to better understand and evaluate creative processes that involve model-based reasoning, and in order to formulate guidelines for them, we urgently need to extend the existing variety of logics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Priest, Graham</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Routley, Richard</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Norman, Jean</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dynamic Dialectical Logics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Paraconsistent Logic. Essays on the Inconsistent</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1989</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophica Verlag</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">187–217</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record></records></xml>