<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Straßer, Christian</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Šešelja, Dunja</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wieland, Jan Willem</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ippoliti, Emiliano</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Withstanding Tensions: Scientific Disagreement and Epistemic Tolerance</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heuristic Reasoning</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics</style></tertiary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">113–146</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Many philosophers of science consider scientific disagreementto be a major promoter of scientific progress. However, we lack an ac-count of the epistemically and heuristically appropriate response scien-tists should have towards opposing positions in peer disagreements. Eventhough some scientific pluralists have advocated a notion of tolerance,the implications of this notion for ones epistemic stance and, more gen-erally, for the scientific practice have been insuficiently explicated in theliterature. In this paper we explicate a characteristic tension in whichdisagreeing scientists are situated and on this basis we propose a notionof epistemic tolerance.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leuridan, Bert</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">McKay Illari, Phyllis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russo, Federica</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Williamson, Jon</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The IARC and mechanistic evidence</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Causality in the Sciences</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Oxford University Press</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91–109</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9780199574131</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is an organization which seeks to identify the causes of human cancer. For each agent, such as betel quid or Human Papillomaviruses, they review the available evidence deriving from epidemiological studies, animal experiments and information about mechanisms (and other data). The evidence of the different groups is combined such that an overall assessment of the carcinogenicity of the agent in question is obtained. In this paper, we critically review IARC's carcinogenicity evaluations. First we show that serious objections can be raised against their criteria and procedures - more specifically regarding the role of mechanistic knowledge in establishing causal claims. Our arguments are based on the problems of confounders, of the assessment of the temporal stability of carcinogenic relations, viz. How we should treat the carcinogenicity evaluations that were based on the current procedures. After showing that this question is important we argue that an overall dismissal of the current evaluations would be too radical. Instead, we argue in favour of a stepwise re-evaluation of the current findings.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>