<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adaptive Logics as a Necessary Tool for Relative Rationality. Including a Section on Logical Pluralism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Reasoning and Rationality</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dordrecht</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-25</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I show that adaptive logics are required by my epistemological stand. While doing so, I defy the reader to cope with the problems I am able to cope with.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; The last section of the paper contains a defense of a specific form of logical pluralism. Although this section is an integral part of the paper, it may be read separately.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>