<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wieland, Jan Willem</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Sceptic's Tools: Circularity and Infinite Regress</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophical Papers</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">40</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">359–369</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Important sceptical arguments by Sextus Empiricus, David Hume and Paul Boghossian (concerning disputes, induction, and relativism respectively) are based on circularities and infinite regresses. Yet, philosophers' practice does not keep circularities and infinite regresses clearly apart. In this metaphilosophical paper I show how circularity and infinite regress arguments can be made explicit, and shed light on two powerful tools of the sceptic.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>