<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wieland, Jan Willem</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rules regresses</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">AGPC 2010 Proceedings</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.illc.uva.nl/agpc/agpc10/</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ghent University, Department of Philosophy and moral sciences</style></publisher><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">79–92</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Is the content of our thoughts determined by norms such as 'if I know that p, then I ought to believe that p'? Gluer and Wikforss (2009) set forth a regress argument for a negative answer. The aim of this paper is to clarify and evaluate this argument. In the first part I show how it (just like an argument from Wittgenstein 1953) can be taken as an instance of an argument schema. In the second part, I evaluate the relevant premises in some detail, and argue that the dialectical situation is slightly more complicated than a 'dilemma of regress and idleness', as Gluer and Wikforss have dubbed it.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>