<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wieland, Jan Willem</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Regress Argument Reconstruction</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Argumentation</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Argument</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Charity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Infinite regress</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Interpretation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Reconstruction</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">26</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">489-503</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;If an argument can be reconstructed in at least two different ways, then which reconstruction is to be preferred? In this paper I address this problem of argument reconstruction in terms of Ryles infinite regress argument against the view that knowledge-how requires knowledge-that. First, I demonstrate that Ryles initial statement of the argument does not fix its reconstruction as it admits two, structurally different reconstructions. On the basis of this case and infinite regress arguments generally, I defend a revisionary take on argument reconstruction: argument reconstruction is mainly to be ruled by charity (viz. by general criteria which arguments have to fulfil in order to be good arguments) rather than interpretation.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>