<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wieland, Jan Willem</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">What Carrolls tortoise actually proves</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ethical theory and moral practice</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">983–997</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Rationality requires us to have certain propositional attitudes (beliefs, intentions, etc.) given certain other attitudes that we have. Carrolls Tortoise repeatedly shows up in this discussion. Following up on Brunero (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:557569, 2005), I ask what Carroll-style considerations actually prove. This paper rejects two existing suggestions, and defends a third.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>