<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wieland, Jan Willem</style></author></authors><secondary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wouters, Dietlinde</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Meheus, Joke</style></author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Internalism Does Entail Scepticism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality</style></secondary-title><tertiary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logic, Argumentation &amp; Reasoning</style></tertiary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Internalism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Knowledge</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Regress</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rule</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Scepticism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer Netherlands</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">247-260</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-94-017-9010-9</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Let Internalism be the view that our inferences are justified depending on whether we have knowledge of the logical rules on which they are based, and Scepticism the view that none of our inferences are justified. Boghossian has shown that Internalism entails Scepticism, and Philie has attempted to block the entailment by invoking an assumption on rationality. In this contribution, I enforce the entailment claim and argue that Philies solution misses the target: Internalism does entail Scepticism.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>