<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Bouwel, Jeroen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Causation, unification and the adequacy of explanations of facts</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Theoria</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">24</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">301–320</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. Wesley Salmon, for instance, distinguished two types of explanation: causal explanations (which provide insight in the causes of the fact we want to explain) and unification explanations (which fit the explanandum into a unified world view). The pluralism which Salmon and others have defended is compatible with several positions about the exact relation between these two types of explanations. We distinguish four such positions, and argue in favour of one of them. We also compare our results with the views of some authors who have recently written on this subject.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>