<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Weber, Erik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Two problems for the contextual theory of scienitfic understanding</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Reasoner</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">6</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">60–62</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper I argue that the contextual theory of scientific understanding as developed by Henk De Regt and Dennis Dieks (2005: A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding, &lt;em&gt;Synthese&lt;/em&gt; 144, 137170) and further developed by Henk De Regt (2009: The Epistemic Value of Understanding, &lt;em&gt;Philosophy of Science&lt;/em&gt; 76: 585597) is not contextual in one crucial respect: the meaning of understanding. I also argue that its scope needs to be restricted: it cannot be a theory of scientific understanding in general.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>