<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van Dyck, Maarten</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The paradox of conceptual novelty and Galileo's use of experiments</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophy of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://dx.doi.org/1854/10928</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">72</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">864–875</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Starting with a discussion of what I call Koyrés paradox of conceptual novelty, I introduce the ideas of Damerow et al. on the establishment of classical mechanics in Galileos work. I then argue that although their view on the nature of Galileos conceptual innovation is convincing, it misses an essential element: Galileos use of the experiments described in the first day of the Two New Sciences. I describe these experiments and analyze their function. Central to my analysis is the idea that Galileos pendulum experiments serve to secure the reference of his theoretical models in actually occurring cases of free fall. In this way, Galileos experiments constitute an essential part of the meaning of the new concepts of classical mechanics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>