<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Van De Putte, Frederik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verdée, Peter</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Dynamics of Relevance: Adaptive Belief Revision</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Synthese</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">May</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">187</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-42</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper presents eight (previously unpublished) adaptive logics for belief revision, each of which define a belief revision operation in the sense of the AGM framework. All these revision operations are shown to satisfy the six basic AGM postulates for belief revision, and Parikhs axiom of Relevance. Using one of these logics as an example, we show how their proof theory gives a more dynamic flavor to belief revision than existing approaches. It is argued that this turns belief revision (that obeys Relevance) into a more natural undertaking, where analytic steps are performed only as soon as they turn out to be necessary in order to uphold certain beliefs.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>