<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Froeyman, Anton</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Vreese, Leen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Unravelling the methodology of causal pluralism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophica</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">81</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">73–89</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper we try to bring some clarification in the recent debate on causal pluralism. Our first aim is to clarify what it means to have a pluralistic theory of causation and to articulate the criteria by means of which a certain theory of causation can or cannot qua lify as a pluralistic theory of causation. We also show that there is currently no theory on the market which meets these criteria, and therefore no full-blown pluralistic theory of causation exists. Because of this, we offer a general strategy by means of which pluralistic theories of causation can be developed.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>