<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Froeyman, Anton</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anticipation and the constitution of time in the philosophy of Ernst Cassirer</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Casys: International journal of computing anticipatory systems</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I will argue with Ernst Cassirer that anticipation plays an essential part in the constitution of time from a transcendental perspective. Time is, as any transcendental concept, seen as basically relational and subjective and only in a derivative way objective and indifferent to us. This entails that memory is prior to history, and anticipation is prior to prediction. In this paper, I will give some examples in order to argue for this point. Furthermore, I will also argue, again with Cassirer and against Henri Bergson, that time should be seen as a functional unity, and not as a collection of three different things-in-themselves (past, present and future).&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>