<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Drouet, Isabelle</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Propensities and conditional probabilities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">International Journal of Approximate Reasoning</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">52</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">153–165</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The present paper deals with the objection that Paul Humphreys raised against the propensity interpretation of probability  &quot;Humphreys' paradox&quot;. An update on existing solutions is oered, and it is concluded that none of them is completely satisfactory in view of Humphreys' 2004 rejoinder. Positively, an original solution is formulated and discussed.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>