<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De Langhe, Rogier</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Graham Allisons modellen voor de analyse van internationale betrekkingen: een pluralistische kritiek</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ethiek &amp; Maatschappij</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">64–77</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;A call for epistemic pluralism is credible only when showing enough pluralism itself. Graham Allisons three conceptual models made such a call, but do his models differ enough? Based on a fundamental theoretical analysis, disentangling the ontological and methodological aspects of Allisons models, I conclude they do not. Subsequently, arguing that additional diversity is necessary and not an impossible endeavour, I construct a fourth model based on Alexander Wendts Social Theory of International Politics. This model is fundamentally different from Allisons models, and in combination with them a more convincing case for epistemic pluralism.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>