<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Batens, Diderik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Theory of the Process of Explanation Generalized to Include the Inconsistent Case</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Synthese</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">143</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">63–88</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper proposes a generalization of the theory of the process of explanation to include consistent as well as inconsistent situations. The generalization is strong, for example in the sense that, if the background theory and the initial conditions are consistent, it leads to precisely the same results as the theory from the lead paper \cite{H&amp;amp;H:tpe}. The paper presupposes (and refers to arguments for the view that) inconsistencies constitute problems and that scientists try to resolve them.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">doi:10.1007/s11229-005-3114-3</style></notes></record></records></xml>