%0 Generic %D 2014 %T Pluralists about pluralism? Different versions of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry %A Van Bouwel, Jeroen %E Galavotti, Maria Carla %E Dieks, Dennis %E Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. %E Hartmann, Stephan %E Uebel, Thomas %E Weber, Marcel %X

In this contribution, I comment on Raffaella Campaner’s defense of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry (in this volume). In her paper, Campaner focuses primarily on explanatory pluralism in contrast to explanatory reductionism. Furthermore, she distinguishes between pluralists who consider pluralism to be a temporary state on the one hand and pluralists who consider it to be a persisting state on the other hand. I suggest that it would be helpful to distinguish more than those two versions of pluralism – different understandings of explanatory pluralism both within philosophy of science and psychiatry – namely moderate/temporary pluralism, anything goes pluralism, isolationist pluralism, integrative pluralism and interactive pluralism. Next, I discuss the pros and cons of these different understandings of explanatory pluralism. Finally, I raise the question of how to implement or operationalize explanatory pluralism in scientific practice; how to structure the “genuine dialogue” or shape “the pluralistic attitude” Campaner is referring to. As tentative answers, I explore a question-based framework for explanatory pluralism as well as social-epistemological procedures for interaction among competing approaches and explanations.

%B New directions in the philosophy of science %I Springer %P 104–119 %@ 9783319043814 %G eng %R 10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_8 %0 Generic %D 2014 %T The Proof Is in the Process: A Preamble for a Philosophy of Computer-Assisted Mathematics %A De Mol, Liesbeth %E Galavotti, Maria Carla %E Dieks, Dennis %E Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. %E Hartmann, Stephan %E Uebel, Thomas %E Weber, Marcel %X

According to some well-known mathematicians well-versed in computer-assisted mathematics (CaM), “Computers are changing the way we are doing mathematics”. To what extent this is really true is still an open question. Indeed, even though some philosophers of math have taken up the challenge to think about CaM, it is unclear in what sense exactly a machine (can) affect(s) the so-called “queen of the sciences”. In fact, some have concluded that issues raised by the use of the computer in mathematics are not specific to the use of the computer per se. However, such findings seem precarious since a systematic study of computer-assisted mathematics is still lacking. In this paper I argue that in order to understand the impact of CaM, it is necessary to take more seriously the computer itself and how it is actually used in the process of doing mathematics. Within such an approach, one searches for characteristics that are specific to the use of the computer in mathematics. I will focus on a feature that is beyond any doubt inherently connected to the use of computing machinery, viz. mathematician-computer interactions. I will show how such interactions are fundamentally different from the usual interactions between mathematicians and non-human aids (a piece of paper, a blackboard etc) and how such interactions determine at least two more characteristics of CaM, viz. the significance of time and processes and the steady process of internalization of mathematical tools and knowledge into the machine. I will restrict myself to the use of the computer within so-called experimental mathematics since this is the main object of CaM within the philosophical literature.

%B New Directions in the Philosophy of Science %S The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective %I Springer %V 5 %P 15–33 %G eng %R 10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_2 %0 Conference Proceedings %B EPSA Philosophy of Science 2009 %D 2012 %T The role of unification in explanations of facts %A Weber, Erik %A Van Bouwel, Jeroen %A Lefevere, Merel %E De Regt, Henk %E Okasha, Samir %E Hartmann, Stephan %X

In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of facts. Our aim is to analyse the role of unification in explanations of this kind. We discuss five positions with respect to this role, argue for two of them and refute the three others.

%B EPSA Philosophy of Science 2009 %I Springer %C Amsterdam %P 403-413 %@ 9789400724037 %G eng %R http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4\_33 %0 Generic %D 2011 %T A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses %A Meheus, Joke %E Dieks, Dennis %E Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. %E Hartmann, Stephan %E Uebel, Thomas %E Weber, Erik %B Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation %I Springer %C Dordrecht %P 93–108 %G eng