TY - JOUR T1 - On the interpretation of early Italian bartering problems Y1 - Submitted A1 - Heeffer, Albrecht ER - TY - Generic T1 - Induction Y1 - 2018 A1 - Urbaniak, Rafal A1 - Batens, Diderik ED - Hansson, Sven Ove ED - Hendricks, Vincent F. KW - induction KW - logic KW - probability JA - Handbook of Formal Philosophy PB - Springer SN - 978-3-319-77433-6 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Internalism Does Entail Scepticism Y1 - 2014 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem ED - Weber, Erik ED - Wouters, Dietlinde ED - Meheus, Joke KW - Internalism KW - Knowledge KW - Regress KW - Rule KW - Scepticism AB -

Let Internalism be the view that our inferences are justified depending on whether we have knowledge of the logical rules on which they are based, and Scepticism the view that none of our inferences are justified. Boghossian has shown that Internalism entails Scepticism, and Philie has attempted to block the entailment by invoking an assumption on rationality. In this contribution, I enforce the entailment claim and argue that Philie’s solution misses the target: Internalism does entail Scepticism.

JA - Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality T3 - Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning PB - Springer Netherlands VL - 5 SP - 247-260 SN - 978-94-017-9010-9 ER - TY - Generic T1 - 'I began with the desire to speak with the dead': de ethiek als 'eerste filosofie' van de geschiedschrijving Y1 - 2013 A1 - Froeyman, Anton PB - Ghent University SN - 9789083125053 U1 -

Gertrudis Van De Vijver

ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The ICE-theory of technical functions JF - Metascience Y1 - 2013 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Reydon, Thomas A1 - Boon, Mieke A1 - Houkes, Wybo A1 - Vermaas, Pieter VL - 22 SP - 23–44 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts JF - Journal of Philosophical Logic Y1 - 2013 A1 - Beirlaen, Mathieu A1 - Straßer, Christian A1 - Meheus, Joke AB -

We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic \sys{DP}$^r$, a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts. On the other hand, \sys{DP}$^r$ still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (\sys{SDL}). \sys{DP}$^r$ interprets a given premise set ‘as normally as possible’ with respect to \sys{SDL}. Whereas some \sys{SDL}-rules are verified unconditionally by \sys{DP}$^r$, others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of \sys{DP}$^r$

VL - 42 SP - 285–315 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Induction from a single instance: Incomplete frames JF - Foundations of science Y1 - 2013 A1 - Urbaniak, Rafal A1 - Van De Putte, Frederik AB -

In this paper we argue that an existing theory of concepts called dynamic frame theory, although not developed with that purpose in mind, allows for the precise formulation of a number of problems associated with induction from a single instance. A key role is played by the distinction we introduce between complete and incomplete dynamic frames, for incomplete frames seem to be very elegant candidates for the format of the background knowledge used in induction from a single instance. Furthermore, we show how dynamic frame theory provides the terminology to discuss the justification and the fallibility of incomplete frames. In the Appendix, we give a formal account of incomplete frames and the way these lead to induction from a single instance.

VL - 18 SP - 641–653 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Inferential explanations in biology JF - Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences Y1 - 2013 A1 - Gervais, Raoul A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

Among philosophers of science, there is now a widespread agreement that the DN model of explanation is poorly equipped to account for explanations in biology. Rather than identifying laws, so the consensus goes, researchers explain biological capacities by constructing a model of the underlying mechanism. We think that the dichotomy between DN explanations and mechanistic explanations is misleading. In this article, we argue that there are cases in which biological capacities are explained without construct- ing a model of the underlying mechanism. Although these explanations do not conform to Hempel’s DN model (they do not deduce the explanandum from laws of nature), they do invoke more or less stable generalisations. Because they invoke generalisations and have the form of an argument, we call them inferential explanations. We support this claim by considering two examples of explanations of biological capacities: pigeon navigation and photoperiodism. Next, we will argue that these non-mechanistic expla- nations are crucial to biology in three ways: (i) sometimes, they are the only thing we have (there is no alternative available), (ii) they are heuristically useful, and (iii) they provide genuine understanding and so are interesting in their own right. In the last sections we discuss the relation between types of explanations and types of experiments and situate our views within some relevant debates on explanatory power and explanatory virtues.

VL - 44 SP - 356–364 ER - TY - Generic T1 - An Interdisciplinary Focus on the Concept of Causation: What philosophy can learn from psychology Y1 - 2012 A1 - De Vreese, Leen ED - Aerts, Diederik ED - Broekaert, Jan ED - D'Hooghe, Bart ED - Note, Nicole AB -

In philosophy of science, it is still a mainstream practice to search for the `truth' about fundamental scientific concepts in isolation, blind to knowledge achieved in other domains of science. I focus on the topic of causation. I argue that it is worthwhile for philosophy of science to leave its metaphysical tower in order to pick up knowledge from other domains where empirical research on causal reasoning is carried out, such as psychology. I will demonstrate what the psychologist Peter White's theory, on the origin and development of causal reasoning, can impart to philosophy of causation. It concerns different but interre- lated subjects with respect to the philosophy of causation: conceptual pluralism, a core causal concept of causation, the analysis of \what cau- sation is", epistemological pluralism, causation as a secondary quality and weak causal realism. The divide between metaphysical and epis- temological approaches to causation|and hence between philosophy and psychology|may be much smaller than is often presupposed. Keywords: philosophy of causation, developmental psychology, causal pluralism, interdisciplinarity

JA - Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World. PB - World Scientific Publishing Company CY - Singapore SP - 55-71 ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Intuitionistic Logic of Proofs with dependent proof terms Y1 - 2012 A1 - Primiero, Giuseppe AB -

The basic logic of proofs extends the usual propositional language by expressions of the form "s is a proof of A", for any proposition A. In this paper we explore the extension of its intuitionistic fragment to a language including expressions of the form "t is a proof of B, dependent from sbeing a proof of A". We aim at laying down a ground comparison with equivalent constructions present in theories of dependent types, especially those similarly based on the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics. We further translate this extended language to a natural deduction calculus which allows for a double interpretation of the construction on which a proof term may depend: as actually proven, or valid assumption, or as possibly proven, locally true assumption. We show meta-theoretical properties for this calculus and explain normalisation to a language with only unconditional proofs. We conclude by stating the characterization of our calculus with standard intutionistic logic of proofs

JA - Preprint Series of the Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematical Sciences ER - TY - JOUR T1 - It might have been Classical Logic JF - Logique et Analyse Y1 - 2012 A1 - Batens, Diderik AB -

In this paper, a propositional logic Q is presented. This logic is more attractive than classical propositional logic P for explicating actual proofs. Moreover, while Q and P assign the same consequence set to consistent premise sets, Q assigns a sensible and non-trivial consequence set to in- consistent premise sets.

VL - 55 SP - 241–279 ER - TY - Generic T1 - The IARC and mechanistic evidence Y1 - 2011 A1 - Leuridan, Bert A1 - Weber, Erik ED - McKay Illari, Phyllis ED - Russo, Federica ED - Williamson, Jon AB -

The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is an organization which seeks to identify the causes of human cancer. For each agent, such as betel quid or Human Papillomaviruses, they review the available evidence deriving from epidemiological studies, animal experiments and information about mechanisms (and other data). The evidence of the different groups is combined such that an overall assessment of the carcinogenicity of the agent in question is obtained. In this paper, we critically review IARC's carcinogenicity evaluations. First we show that serious objections can be raised against their criteria and procedures - more specifically regarding the role of mechanistic knowledge in establishing causal claims. Our arguments are based on the problems of confounders, of the assessment of the temporal stability of carcinogenic relations, viz. How we should treat the carcinogenicity evaluations that were based on the current procedures. After showing that this question is important we argue that an overall dismissal of the current evaluations would be too radical. Instead, we argue in favour of a stepwise re-evaluation of the current findings.

JA - Causality in the Sciences PB - Oxford University Press SP - 91–109 SN - 9780199574131 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Incommensurability and rationality in engineering design: the case of functional decomposition JF - SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY & TECHNOLOGY QUARTERLY ELECTRONIC JOURNAL Y1 - 2011 A1 - van Eck, Dingmar VL - 15 SP - 118–136 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Indispensability arguments in favour of reductive explanations JF - Journal for General Philosophy of Science Y1 - 2011 A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - De Vreese, Leen AB -

Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction – traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism – can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.

VL - 42 SP - 33–46 ER - TY - Generic T1 - The intended window of epistemic opportunity: a comment on Miriam Solomon Y1 - 2011 A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo ED - Van Kerkhove, Bart ED - Libert, Thierry ED - Vanpaemel, Geert ED - Marage, Pierre AB -

In this paper, I argue that Miriam Solomon fails to show that medical consensus conferences, as organised by the National Institute of Health (NIH), miss the intended window of epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007: 170), and thus typically take place after the experts have reached consensus. This is done, on the one hand, by differentiating between, what I intend to call, ‘academic’ and ‘non-academic consensus’, and, on the other hand, by analyzing the arguments and argumentation style Solomon uses to make her claim explicit. At the very least, the overall argument suggests that her statement is inadequately supported, if not that the opposite claim is true. In this manner, I intend to bring additional insight into the notion of ‘consensus’ when applied in scientific practice. Any decision as to change the NIH consensus development program should take these actual achievements into account.

JA - Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II PB - Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Inconsistency-adaptive modal logics: on how to cope with modal inconsistency JF - Logic and Logical Philosophy Y1 - 2010 A1 - Lycke, Hans ED - Tanaka, Koji ED - Berto, Francesco ED - Mares, Edwin ED - Paoli, Francesco AB -

In this paper, I will characterize a new class of inconsistency–adaptive logics, namely inconsistency–adaptive modal logics. These logics cope with inconsistencies in a modal context. More specifically, when faced with inconsistencies, inconsistency–adaptive modal logics avoid explosion, but still allow the derivation of sufficient consequences to adequately explicate the intended part of human reasoning.

VL - 19 SP - 31–61 UR - http://www.logika.umk.pl/llp/pi.html ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Increasing returns in science: a model of the dynamics of scientific activity JF - Logic Journal of the IGPL Y1 - 2010 A1 - De Langhe, Rogier A1 - Greiff, Matthias VL - 18 SP - 278-294 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Introduction: Contemporary Analytic Metaphysics, Its Crisis and Challenge Y1 - 2009 A1 - Vanderbeeken, Robrecht ED - Vanderbeeken, Robrecht ED - D'Hooghe, Bart JA - Worldviews, Science and Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics. A Selection of Topics From a Methodological Perspective PB - World Scientific Publishing Company SP - 4–9 SN - 978-981-4295-81-9 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Isaac Newton's 'Of The Church' Manuscript Description and Analysis of Bodmer Ms. in Geneva JF - European journal of science and theology Y1 - 2009 A1 - Ducheyne, Steffen ED - Rusu, Iulian AB -

In this essay, a manuscript description and analysis of Isaac Newton's manuscript 'Of the Church' (Bodmer Ms., Fondation Martin Bodmer, Geneva, Switzerland) is provided.

VL - 5 SP - 25–35 UR - http://www.ejst.tuiasi.ro/issue.html ER - TY - JOUR T1 - An introduction to wasan, native Japanese mathematics JF - History and Pedagogy of Mathematics Y1 - 2008 A1 - Heeffer, Albrecht VL - 68 SP - 20–24 UR - http://dx.doi.org/1854/11413 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - "Ignorance is Bliss": On Bernard Nieuwentijt's Doctrina Ignorantia and His Contribution to Our Understanding of Scientific Idealisation JF - Rivista di storia della filosofia Y1 - 2007 A1 - Ducheyne, Steffen VL - 62 SP - 699-710 ER - TY - CONF T1 - On the Implementation of Concept Structures in Fuzzy Logic. T2 - Proceedings of the European Cognitive Science Conference 2007 Y1 - 2007 A1 - van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan ED - Vosniadou, S. ED - Kayser, D. ED - Athanassios, P. AB -

A procedure is presented which can modify a large number of fuzzy logics in such a way that the result integrates a logically meaningful representation of the family resemblance structure of fuzzy concepts. The most important aspect of this modification is the implementation of so-called ‘concept matrices’. The interpretation and construction of these new formal objects is based upon Fintan Costello’s ‘Diagnostic Evidence Model’ (2000), a contemporary cognitive scientific model of concept structure and concept combination. As a result, it becomes possible to formalize, explain and simulate new logical aspects of cognitive fuzziness such as meaning transformations by means of non-scalar hedges, and interpretational and inferential operations over non-intersective concept combinations.

JA - Proceedings of the European Cognitive Science Conference 2007 ER - TY - Generic T1 - The idea of social mechanisms in social scientific explanations. Y1 - 2006 A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen ED - Arlsdale, John Z. JA - Progress in Social Psychology Research T3 - Advances in social psychology research PB - Nova Science SP - 83–95 SN - 1594546584 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Imagination's Grip on Science JF - Metaphilosophy Y1 - 2006 A1 - De Mey, Tim AB -

In part because ˝imagination˝ is a slippery notion, its exact role in the production of scientific knowledge remains unclear. There is, however, one often explicit and deliberate use of imagination by scientists that can be (and has been) studied intensively by epistemologists and historians of science: thought experiments. The main goal of this article is to document the varieties of thought experimentation, not so much in terms of the different sciences in which they occur but rather in terms of the different functions they fulfil. I argue that thought experimentation (and hence imagination) plays a role not only in theory choice but in singular causal analysis and scientific discovery as well. I pinpoint, moreover, some of the rules governing the use of thought experiments in theory choice and in singular causal analysis, that is, some of the criteria they should meet in order to fulfil those functions successfully.

VL - 37 SP - 222–239 ER - TY - Generic T1 - INUS Conditions Y1 - 2005 A1 - Horsten, Leon A1 - Weber, Erik JA - Encyclopedia of statistics in behavioral science PB - John Wiley & Sons VL - 2 SP - 955–958 SN - 0470860804 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Imperialistische tendensen in de economiebeoefening en politieke wetenschappen. Over heterodoxie en pluralisme in de sociale wetenschappen JF - Ethiek & maatschappij Y1 - 2004 A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen VL - 7 SP - 32–45 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Introduction: beyond Empiricism in the Social Explanation of Action JF - Philosophical Explorations Y1 - 2004 A1 - Vanderbeeken, Robrecht A1 - Cuypers, Stefaan VL - 7 SP - 197–201 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Inconsistencies and the Dynamics of Science JF - Logic and Logical Philosophy Y1 - 2003 A1 - Meheus, Joke VL - 11/12 SP - 129–148 ER - TY - Generic T1 - In Defence of a Programme for Handling Inconsistencies Y1 - 2002 A1 - Batens, Diderik ED - Meheus, Joke AB -

This paper states and defends the philosophical programme underlying the Ghent approach to adaptive logics. Two central arguments are epistemic in nature, one logical. The underlying claim is that even people with rather classical views should see adaptive logics as the only sensible way to handle the inconsistencies that regularly arise in human knowledge, including scientific theories.

JA - Inconsistency in Science PB - Kluwer CY - Dordrecht SP - 129–150 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Inconsistencies in Scientific Discovery. Clausius's Remarkable Derivation of Carnot's Theorem Y1 - 2002 A1 - Meheus, Joke ED - Krach, Helghe ED - Vanpaemel, Geert ED - Marage, Pierre JA - History of Modern Physics. Acta of the XXth International Congress of History of Science PB - Brepols CY - Turnhout (Belgium) SP - 143–154 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Inconsistencies in the history of mathematics: the case of infinitesimals. Y1 - 2002 A1 - Van Bendegem, Jean Paul ED - Meheus, Joke AB -

In this paper I will not confine myself exclusively to historical considerations. Both philosophical and technical matters will be raised, all with the purpose of trying to understand (better) what Newton, Leibniz and the many precursors (might have) meant when they talked about infinitesimals. The technical part will consist of an analysis why apparently infinitesimals have resisted so well to be formally expressed. The philosophical part, actually the most important part of this paper, concerns a discussion that has been going on for some decennia now. After the Kuhnian revolution in philosophy of science, notwithstanding Kuhn’s own suggestion that mathematics is something quite special, the question was nevertheless asked how mathematics develops. Are there revolutions in mathematics? If so, what do we have to think of? If not, why do they not occur? Is mathematics the so often claimed totally free creation of the human spirit? As usual, there is a continuum of positions, but let me sketch briefly the two extremes: the completists (as I call them) on the one hand, and the contingents (as I call them as well) on the other hand.

JA - Inconsistency in Science T3 - Origins PB - Kluwer Academic CY - Dordrecht VL - 2 SP - 43–57 SN - 1-4020-0630-6 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_3 ER - TY - Generic T1 - An Inconsistency-Adaptive Proof Procedure for Logic Programming Y1 - 2002 A1 - Vermeir, Timothy ED - Carnielli, Walter A. ED - Coniglio, Marcelo E. ED - Loffredo D'Ottaviano, Itala M. AB -

It is the goal of this paper to de ne a paraconsistent proof procedure that has the best of two mechanisms, in casu logic programming and inconsistency-adaptive logics. From logic programming we will maintain the ease of computing, and from adaptive logics their paraconsistency, dynamics and non-monotonicity. This will be done by combining the notion of competitor from logic programming together with the conditionallity that is common in all adaptive proofs.

JA - Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent PB - Marcel Dekker CY - New York SP - 323-340 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Isaac Newton on space and time: metaphysician or not? JF - Philosophica Y1 - 2002 A1 - Ducheyne, Steffen AB -

But whereas we can blame Bohr, Schrodinger and Einstein for our problems, Newton has only God to blame for his. (Tamny, 1979: 58). After all, if Newton does not believe in the reality of space and time themselves, over and above the material inhabitants of them, who does? (Sklar, 1990: 68).

VL - 67 SP - 77–114 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Inconsistency-adaptive Arithmetic JF - Logique et Analyse Y1 - 2000 A1 - Vermeir, Timothy AB -

In this article, it is shown that inconsistent arithmetic, as proposed by Jean Paul Van Bendegem and Graham Priest, does not have all the properties they claim the system has. The search for a system of inconsistent arithmetic that does have the intended properties, will lead us through different axiomatizations and different logics, the final result being inconsistency-adaptive arithmetic.

VL - 42 SP - 221-241 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics Y1 - 1999 A1 - Batens, Diderik ED - Orłowska, Ewa AB -

After a general description of adaptive logics and their intended applications, I study the proof theory and semantics of two closely related predicative inconsistency-adaptive logics, ACLuN1 and ACLuN2. To this end, I first describe their monotonic basis: the paraconsistent logic CLuN obtained by dropping the consistency requirement from classical logic. The propositional fragments of these inconsistency-adaptive logics have been studied elsewhere. The predicative versions involve several interesting difficulties that lead to new results.

JA - Logic at Work. Essays Dedicated to the Memory of Helena Rasiowa PB - Physica Verlag (Springer) CY - Heidelberg, New York SP - 445–472 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Introduction. JF - FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE Y1 - 1999 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 3 SP - 231–234 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Inconsistencies and Beyond. A Logical-Philosophical Discussion JF - Revue Internationale de Philosophie Y1 - 1997 A1 - Batens, Diderik AB -

The paper starts off by epistemological arguments for the need of paraconsistent logics. Next it is argued that some contexts require that one allows for other abnormalities, next to or instead of inconsistencies. The feasibility of such moves is defended in terms of a contextual epistemology. Finally, adaptive logics are defended as means to interpret theories `as normally as possible', even if they contain some abnormalities.

VL - 200 SP - 259–273 ER - TY - Generic T1 - In-world realism vs. reflective realism. Y1 - 1996 A1 - Batens, Diderik A1 - Meheus, Joke ED - Douven, Igor ED - Horsten, Leon JA - Realism in the Sciences PB - Universitaire Pers CY - Leuven SP - 35–53 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - In defence of discrete space and time JF - Logique et Analyse Y1 - 1995 A1 - Van Bendegem, Jean Paul AB -

In this paper several arguments are discussed and evaluated concerning the possibility of discrete space and time.

VL - 38 SP - 127-150 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics and the Foundation of Non-Monotonic Logics JF - Logique et Analyse Y1 - 1994 A1 - Batens, Diderik AB -

This paper contains the reconstruction of (what I shall call) mixed non-monotonic logics as a combination of a deductive and a preferential component. The first leads from the premises to a possibly inconsistent consequence set; the second weeds out the inconsistencies. Among the candidates for the deductive component inconsistency-adaptive logics prove most suitable. The ensuing preferential component is formulated in terms of models and is itself split into two parts: (i) a transparent, purely logical procedure leads from a set of inconsistent models to a set of associated consistent models and (ii) the choice between the latter relies on the preferences. The real fight between mixed non-monotonic logics should concentrate on this last aspect. The outlined approach has a broader domain of application than mixed non-monotonic logics.

VL - 37 SP - 57–94 N1 - Appeared 1996 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Indexed Inconsistency-Adaptive Logic JF - Logique et Analyse Y1 - 1994 A1 - Van Meirvenne, Joachim VL - 37 SP - 41-55 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The indirect practical functions of explanations JF - PHILOSOPHICA (GENT) Y1 - 1993 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 51 SP - 105–124 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Introduction JF - Philosophica Y1 - 1993 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 51 SP - 5–7 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Incommensurability is not a threat to the rationality of science or to the anti-dogmatic tradition JF - Philosophica Y1 - 1983 A1 - Batens, Diderik VL - 32 SP - 117–132 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Inductie Y1 - 1977 A1 - Batens, Diderik ED - De Block, A. ED - Ten Have, T.T. ED - De Keyser, C.C. JA - Standaard Encyclopedia voor Opvoeding en Onderwijs PB - Standaard SP - 180 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Inferentie Y1 - 1977 A1 - Batens, Diderik ED - De Block, A. ED - Ten Have, T.T. ED - De Keyser, C.C. JA - Standaard Encyclopedie voor Opvoeding en Onderwijs PB - Standaard SP - 382–383 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Inductieve logica. Een inleiding tot enkele basisproblemen JF - Communicatie en Cognitie Y1 - 1969 A1 - Batens, Diderik VL - 3 SP - 128–154 ER -