TY - JOUR T1 - Deontic Reasoning on the Basis of Consistency Considerations Y1 - Submitted A1 - Straßer, Christian A1 - Meheus, Joke A1 - Aleks Knoks AB -

Deonticconflictsposeanimportantchallengetodeonticlogicians. The standard account —standard deontic logic, SDL— is not apt for addressing this challenge since it trivializes con flicts. Two main stratagems for gaining conflict-tolerance have been proposed: to weaken SDL in various ways, and to contextualize the reign of SDL to consistent subsets of the premise set. The latter began with the work of van Fraassen and has been further developed by Horty. In this paper we characterize this second approach in general terms. We also study three basic ways to contextualize SDL and supplement each of these with a dynamic proof theory in the framework of adaptive logics.

ER - TY - Generic T1 - Dynamic Derivations for Sequent-Based Deductive Argumentation T2 - COMMA 2014 Y1 - 2014 A1 - Straßer, Christian A1 - Arieli, Ofer ED - Parsons, Simon ED - Oren, Nir ED - Reed, Chris ED - Cerutti, Federico AB -

We introduce a general approach for representing and reasoning with argumentation-based systems. In our framework arguments are represented by Gentzen-style sequents, attacks (conflicts) between arguments are represented by sequent elimination rules, and deductions are made by dynamic proof systems. This framework accommodates different languages and logics in which arguments may be represented, supports a variety of attack relations, and tolerates dynamic changes in the argumentation setting by revising derivations of assertions in light of new information.

JA - COMMA 2014 VL - Computational Models of Argument SP - 89–100 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - A deontic logic framework allowing for factual detachment JF - Journal of applied logic Y1 - 2010 A1 - Straßer, Christian AB -

Since our ethical and behavioral norms have a conditional form, it is of great importance that deontic logics give an account of deontic commitments such as “A commits you to do/bring about B”. It is commonly agreed that monadic approaches are suboptimal for this task due to several shortcomings, for instance their falling short of giving a satisfactory account of “Strengthening the Antecedent” or their difficulties in dealing with contrary-to-duty paradoxes. While dyadic logics are more promising in these respects, they have been criticized for not being able to model “detachment”: A and the commitment under A to do B implies the actual obligation to do B. “We seem to feel that detachment should be possible after all. But we cannot have things both ways, can we? This is the dilemma on commitment and detachment.” (Lennart Åqvis. Deontic logic. In D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, editors, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, p. 199, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2002). In this paper I answer &\#197;qvist's question with “Yes, we can”. I propose a general method to turn dyadic deontic logics in adaptive logics allowing for a defeasible factual detachment while paying special attention to specificity and contrary-to-duty cases. I show that a lot of controversy about detachment can be resolved by analysing different notions of unconditional obligations. The logical modeling of detachment is paradigmatically realized on basis of one of Lou Goble's conflict tolerant CDPM logics.

VL - 9 SP - 61–80 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2010.11.001 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - A Deontic Logic Framework Allowing for Factual Detachment –- Appendix JF - Journal of Applied Logic Y1 - 2009 A1 - Straßer, Christian AB -

This Appendix contains in part A the semantic characterization of logics CDPM.2d and CDPM.2e defined in [3]. Soundness and completeness are proven. In part B the logical framework presented in [3] is generalized such that it is able to deal with nested permissible contexts.

VL - 9 SP - 61–80 ER -