TY - Generic T1 - Rethinking the explanatory power of extended cognition Y1 - In Press A1 - van Eck, Dingmar ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Function ascription and explanation: elaborating an explanatory utility desideratum for ascriptions of technical functions JF - Erkenntnis Y1 - 2014 A1 - van Eck, Dingmar A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

Current philosophical theorizing about technical functions is mainly focused on specifying conditions under which agents are justified in ascribing functions to technical artifacts. Yet, assessing the precise explanatory relevance of such function ascriptions is, by and large, a neglected topic in the philosophy of technical artifacts and technical functions. We assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions in the following three explanation-seeking contexts: (i) why was artifact x produced?, (ii) why does artifact x not have the expected capacity to $\phi$;?, (iii) how does artifact x realize its capacity to $\phi$;? We argue that while function ascriptions serve a mere heuristic role in the first context, they have substantial explanatory leverage in the second and third context. In addition, we assess the relevance of function ascriptions in the context of engineering redesign. Here, function ascriptions also play a relevant role: (iv) they enable normative statements of the sort that component b functions better than component a. We unpack these claims by considering philosophical theories of technical functions, in particular the ICE theory, and engineering work on function ascription and explanation. We close the paper by relating our analysis to current debates on the explanatory power of mechanistic vis-à-vis functional explanations.

VL - 79 SP - 1367–1389 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Reconciling Ontic and Epistemic Constraints on Mechanistic Explanation, Epistemically JF - Axiomathes Y1 - 2014 A1 - van Eck, Dingmar AB -

In this paper I address the current debate on ontic versus epistemic conceptualizations of mechanistic explanation in the mechanisms literature. Illari recently argued that good explanations are subject to both ontic and epistemic constraints: they must describe mechanisms in the world (ontic aim) in such fashion that they provide understanding of their workings (epistemic aim). Elaborating upon Illari’s ‘integration’ account, I argue that causal role function discovery of mechanisms and their components is an epistemic prerequisite for achieving these two aims. This analysis extends Illari’s account in important ways, putting more pressure on ontic readings of mechanistic explanation and providing an answer to the question how ontic and epistemic constraints on mechanistic explanation are related. I argue these point in terms of cases on memory research drawn from neuroscience and research on extinct neurogenetic mechanisms from early nervous systems biology.

VL - 25 SP - 5–22 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Validating function-based design methods: an explanationist perspective JF - Philosophy and Technology Y1 - 2014 A1 - van Eck, Dingmar AB -

Analysis of the adequacy of engineering design methods, as well as analysis of the utility of concepts of function often invoked in these methods, is a neglected topic in both philosophy of technology and in engineering proper. In this paper, I present an approach—dubbed an explanationist perspective—for assessing the adequacy of function-based design methods. Engineering design is often intertwined with explanation, for instance, in reverse engineering and subsequent redesign, knowledge base-assisted designing, and diagnostic reasoning. I argue that the presented approach is useful for validating function-based design methods with respect to their explanatory elements and that it supports assessment of the explanatory and design utility of “function”, and the different conceptualizations thereof, as used in such engineering design methods. I deploy two key desiderata from the explanation literature to assess the viability of function-based design methods: explanatorily relevant difference-making factors and counterfactual understanding defined in terms of what-if-things-had-been-different questions. I explicate the approach and its merits in terms of two case studies drawn from the engineering functional modeling literature: reverse engineering and redesign and malfunction analysis. I close the paper by discussing ramifications of the presented approach for the philosophy of design and the philosophy of explanation.

SP - 511 - 531 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The conceptual elusiveness of engineering functions: a philosophical analysis JF - Philosophy and Technology Y1 - 2013 A1 - Vermaas, Pieter A1 - van Eck, Dingmar A1 - Kroes, Peter AB -

In this paper, we describe the conceptual elusiveness of the notion of function as used in engineering practice. We argue that it should be accepted as an ambiguous notion, and then review philosophical argumentations in which engineering functions occur in order to identify the consequences of this ambiguity. Function is a key notion in engineering, yet is used by engineers systematically in a variety of meanings. First, we demonstrate that this ambiguous use is rational for engineers by considering the role of functions in design methods and by analysing the ambiguity in terms of Kuhn’s notion of methodological incommensurability. Second, we discuss ontological and mereological analyses of engineering functions and describe a proof that subfunctions cannot formally be taken as parts of the functions they decompose. Engineering functions figure sometimes in philosophical work and are then typically taken as having an unambiguous, well-defined meaning. Finally, we therefore revisit work in philosophy of technology on the dual nature of technical artefacts, in philosophy of science on functional and mechanistic explanations, and in philosophy of biology on biological functions, and explore the consequences of the fact that engineering function is an ambiguous notion. It is argued that one of these consequences may be that also the notion of biological function has an ambiguous meaning

VL - 26 SP - 159-185 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Incommensurability and rationality in engineering design: the case of functional decomposition JF - SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY & TECHNOLOGY QUARTERLY ELECTRONIC JOURNAL Y1 - 2011 A1 - van Eck, Dingmar VL - 15 SP - 118–136 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Supporting design knowledge exchange by converting models of functional decomposition JF - JOURNAL OF ENGINEERING DESIGN Y1 - 2011 A1 - van Eck, Dingmar VL - 22 SP - 839–858 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09544828.2011.603692 ER -