TY - JOUR T1 - Modelling mechanisms with causal cycles JF - Synthese Y1 - 2014 A1 - Clarke, Brendan A1 - Leuridan, Bert A1 - Williamson, Jon AB -

Mechanistic philosophy of science views a large part of scientific activity as engaged in modelling mechanisms. While science textbooks tend to offer qualitative models of mechanisms, there is increasing demand for models from which one can draw quantitative predictions and explanations. Casini et al. (Theoria 26(1):5–33, 2011) put forward the Recursive Bayesian Networks (RBN) formalism as well suited to this end. The RBN formalism is an extension of the standard Bayesian net formalism, an extension that allows for modelling the hierarchical nature of mechanisms. Like the standard Bayesian net formalism, it models causal relationships using directed acyclic graphs. Given this appeal to acyclicity, causal cycles pose a prima facie problem for the RBN approach. This paper argues that the problem is a significant one given the ubiquity of causal cycles in mechanisms, but that the problem can be solved by combining two sorts of solution strategy in a judicious way.

VL - 191 SP - 1651–1681 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - General theories of explanation: buyer beware JF - Synthese Y1 - 2013 A1 - Díez, José A1 - Khalifa, Kareem A1 - Leuridan, Bert AB -

We argue that there is no general theory of explanation that spans the sciences, mathematics, and ethics, etc. More specifically, there is no good reason to believe that substantive and domain-invariant constraints on explanatory information exist. Using Nickel (Noûs 44(2):305–328, 2010) as an exemplar of the contrary, generalist position, we first show that Nickel’s arguments rest on several ambiguities, and then show that even when these ambiguities are charitably corrected, Nickel’s defense of general theories of explanation is inadequate along several different dimensions. Specifically, we argue that Nickel’s argument has three fatal flaws. First, he has not provided any compelling illustrations of domain-invariant constraints on explanation. Second, in order to fend off the most vehement skeptics of domain-invariant theories of explanation, Nickel must beg all of the important questions. Third, Nickel’s examples of explanations from different domains with common explanatory structure rely on incorrect formulations of the explanations under consideration, circular justifications, and/or a mischaracterization of the position Nickel intends to critique. Given that the best and most elaborate defense of the generalist position fails in so many ways, we conclude that the standard practice in philosophy (and in philosophy of science in particular), which is to develop theories of explanation that are tailored to specific domains, still is justified. For those who want to buy into a more ambitious project: beware of the costs!

VL - 190 SP - 379–396 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The Structure of Scientific Theories, Explanation, and Unification. A Causal-Structural Account JF - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Y1 - 2013 A1 - Leuridan, Bert AB -

What are scientific theories and how should they be represented? In this article, I propose a causal–structural account, according to which scientific theories are to be represented as sets of interrelated causal and credal nets. In contrast with other accounts of scientific theories (such as Sneedian structuralism, Kitcher’s unificationist view, and Darden’s theory of theoretical components), this leaves room for causality to play a substantial role. As a result, an interesting account of explanation is provided, which sheds light on explanatory unification within a causalist framework. The theory of classical genetics is used as a case study.

VL - 65 SP - 717–771 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Causality and explanation in the sciences JF - Theoria - revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia Y1 - 2012 A1 - Leuridan, Bert A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

Editors' introduction to the special issue on the Causality and Explanation in the Sciences conference, held at the University of Ghent in September 2011.

VL - 27 SP - 133–136 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - On lawfulness in history and historiography JF - HISTORY AND THEORY Y1 - 2012 A1 - Leuridan, Bert A1 - Froeyman, Anton AB -

The use of general and universal laws in historiography has been the subject of debate ever since the end of the nineteenth century. Since the 1970s there has been a growing consensus that general laws such as those in the natural sciences are not applicable in the scientific writing of history. We will argue against this consensus view, not by claiming that the underlying conception of what historiography is-or should be-is wrong, but by contending that it is based on a misconception of what general laws such as those of the natural sciences are. We will show that a revised notion of law, one inspired by the work of Sandra D. Mitchell, in tandem with Jim Woodward's notion of ˝invariance,˝is indeed applicable to historiography, much in the same way as it is to most other scientific disciplines. Having developed a more adequate account of general laws, we then show, by means of three examples, that what are called ˝pragmatic laws˝and ˝invariance˝do in fact play a role in history in several interesting ways. These examples-from cultural history, economic history, and the history of religion-have been selected on the basis of their diversity in order to illustrate the widespread use of pragmatic laws in history.

VL - 51 SP - 172–192 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - What are mechanisms in social science? (review) JF - Metascience Y1 - 2012 A1 - Leuridan, Bert AB -

Why should we introduce the notion of ‘analytical sociology’ into the field of sociology, and why should it be linked to the concept of ‘mechanism’? With these two principal questions, Pierre Demeulenaere, Professor of Sociological Theory and Philosophy of the Social Sciences at the University of Paris-Sorbonne, opens his Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms, a collection of thirteen papers written by social scientists and philosophers of the social sciences (1). Not every contributor should be considered an analytical sociologist. Rather than being a manifesto either pro or contra analytical sociology and the use of mechanisms, it is an attempt to reflect upon the key issues involved in sociological explanation (3). Even though several chapters raise very interesting points, the overall impression one gets from this book is that analytical sociology fails to redeem its main promise, viz. to add clarity, precision, and conceptual rigor to sociology, especially regarding one of it

VL - 21 SP - 395-398 ER - TY - Generic T1 - The IARC and mechanistic evidence Y1 - 2011 A1 - Leuridan, Bert A1 - Weber, Erik ED - McKay Illari, Phyllis ED - Russo, Federica ED - Williamson, Jon AB -

The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is an organization which seeks to identify the causes of human cancer. For each agent, such as betel quid or Human Papillomaviruses, they review the available evidence deriving from epidemiological studies, animal experiments and information about mechanisms (and other data). The evidence of the different groups is combined such that an overall assessment of the carcinogenicity of the agent in question is obtained. In this paper, we critically review IARC's carcinogenicity evaluations. First we show that serious objections can be raised against their criteria and procedures - more specifically regarding the role of mechanistic knowledge in establishing causal claims. Our arguments are based on the problems of confounders, of the assessment of the temporal stability of carcinogenic relations, viz. How we should treat the carcinogenicity evaluations that were based on the current procedures. After showing that this question is important we argue that an overall dismissal of the current evaluations would be too radical. Instead, we argue in favour of a stepwise re-evaluation of the current findings.

JA - Causality in the Sciences PB - Oxford University Press SP - 91–109 SN - 9780199574131 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Three problems for the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms JF - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Y1 - 2011 A1 - Leuridan, Bert AB -

In this article, I present two conceptual problems for Craver's mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms. First, constitutive relevance threatens to imply causal relevance despite Craver (and Bechtel)'s claim that they are strictly distinct. Second, if (as is intuitively appealing) parthood is defined in terms of spatio-temporal inclusion, then the mutual manipulability account is prone to counterexamples, as I show by a case of endosymbiosis. I also present a methodological problem (a case of experimental underdetermination) and formulate two partial, but fallible solutions based on the notions of parthood and synchronicity.

VL - 63 SP - 399–427 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Where the design argument goes wrong: auxiliary assumptions and unification JF - Philosophy of Science Y1 - 2011 A1 - Boudry, Maarten A1 - Leuridan, Bert AB -

Sober (2008) has reconstructed the biological design argument in the framework of likelihoodism, purporting to demonstrate that it is defective for intrinsic reasons. We argue that Sober’s restrictions on the introduction of auxiliary hypotheses is too restrictive, as it commits him to rejecting types of everyday reasoning that are clearly valid. Our account shows that the design argument fails, not because it is intrinsically untestable, but because it clashes with the empirical evidence and fails to satisfy certain theoretical desiderata (in particular, unification). Likewise, Sober’s critique of the arguments from imperfections and from evil against design is off the mark.

VL - 78 SP - 558–578 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/661753 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Can mechanisms really replace laws of nature? JF - Philosophy of Science Y1 - 2010 A1 - Leuridan, Bert AB -

Today, mechanisms and mechanistic explanation are very popular in philosophy of science and are deemed a welcome alternative to laws of nature and deductive-nomological explanation. Starting from Mitchell's pragmatic notion of laws, I cast doubt on their status as a genuine alternative. I argue that (1) all complex-systems mechanisms onto-logically must rely on stable regularities, while (2) the reverse need not hold. Analogously, (3) models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, while (4) such laws themselves need not always refer to underlying mechanisms. Finally, I show that Mitchell's account is more encompassing than the mechanistic account

VL - 77 SP - 317–340 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/652959 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Causal discovery and the problem of ignorance: an adaptive logic approach JF - Journal of Applied Logic Y1 - 2009 A1 - Leuridan, Bert AB -

In this paper, I want to substantiate three related claims regarding causal discovery from non-experimental data. Firstly, in scientific practice, the problem of ignorance is ubiquitous, persistent, and far-reaching. Intuitively, the problem of ignorance bears upon the following situation. A set of random variables VV is studied but only partly tested for (conditional) independencies; i.e. for some variables A and B it is not known whether they are (conditionally) independent. Secondly, Judea Pearl's most meritorious and influential algorithm for causal discovery (the IC algorithm) cannot be applied in cases of ignorance. It presupposes that a full list of (conditional) independence relations is on hand and it would lead to unsatisfactory results when applied to partial lists. Finally, the problem of ignorance is successfully treated by means of ALIC, the adaptive logic for causal discovery presented in this paper.

VL - 7 SP - 188–205 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2007.11.004 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Laws of Nature and Causality in the Special Sciences: A Philosophical and Formal Analysis Y1 - 2008 A1 - Leuridan, Bert PB - Ghent University U1 -

Joke Meheus

ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The practical value of spurious correlations: selective versus manipulative policy JF - Analysis Y1 - 2008 A1 - Leuridan, Bert A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Van Dyck, Maarten VL - 68 SP - 298–303 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Galton's blinding glasses: modern statistics hiding causal structure in early theories of inheritance. Y1 - 2007 A1 - Leuridan, Bert ED - Russo, Federica ED - Williamson, Jon JA - Causality and probability in the sciences PB - College Publications SP - 243–262 SN - 1-904987-35-4 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Supervenience: Its logic and its inferential role in classical genetics JF - Logique et analyse Y1 - 2007 A1 - Leuridan, Bert AB -

Supervenience is mostly conceived of as a purely philosophical concept. Nevertheless, I will argue, it played an important and very fruitful inferential role in classical genetics. Gregor Mendel assumed that phenotypic traits supervene on underlying factors, and this assumption allowed him to successfully predict and explain the phenotypical regularities he had experimentally discovered. Therefore it is interesting to explicate how we reason about supervenience relations. I will tackle the following two questions. Firstly, can a reliable method (a logic) be found for inferring supervenience claims from data? Secondly, can a reliable method (a logic) be found to empirically test supervenience claims? I will answer these questions within the framework of the adaptive logics programme.

VL - 50 SP - 147–171 ER -