TY - JOUR T1 - What science is fair? Representations of science in a Dutch creationist campaign JF - Public Understanding of Science Y1 - Submitted A1 - Blancke, Stefaan A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo AB -

In the Netherlands, creationists have started up a civil initiative by which they demand “fair science”. This paper offers an analysis of this peculiar notion. Fair science depends on two representations of science, one as an unimpressive label, and one as an authority. Each of these representations hinges on a different conception of the authority of science: on the one hand, science is endowed with authority because it produces technology and is able to make reliable predictions. On the other hand, science’s authority is only a matter of reputation. To the extent that these two conceptions tap into representations of science and its authority among the larger public, the notion of fair science might prove to be a compelling rhetorical tool. Suggestions are made as to how the appeal of the notion can be reduced.

ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Groepsbeslissingen: kwaliteit, autoriteit en vertrouwen JF - Tijdschrift voor Filosofie Y1 - In Press A1 - Baartmans, Tim A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The semantics of untrustworthiness JF - Topoi. An International Reiew of Philosophy Y1 - In Press A1 - Primiero, Giuseppe A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo AB -

We o er a formal treatment of the semantics of both complete and incomplete mistrustful or distrustful information transmissions. The se- mantics of such relations is analysed in view of rules that dene the be- haviour of a receiving agent. We justify this approach in view of human agent communications and secure system design. We further specify some properties of such relations.

ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Social epistemology meets the philosophy of the humanities JF - Foundations of science Y1 - 2016 A1 - Froeyman, Anton A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen AB -

From time to time, when I explain to a new acquaintance that I’m a philosopher of science, my interlocutor will nod agreeably and remark that that surely means I’m interested in the ethical status of various kinds of scientific research, the impact that science has had on our values, or the role that the sciences play in contemporary democracies. Although this common response hardly corresponds to what professional philosophers of science have done for the past decades, or even centuries, it is perfectly comprehensible. For there are large questions of the kinds just indicated, questions that deserve to be posed and answered, and an intelligent person might well think that philosophers of science are the people who do the posing and the answering (Kitcher in Science, truth and democracy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. xi, 2001).

VL - 21 (1) ER - TY - Generic T1 - Explicating ways of consensus-making in science and society: distinguishing the academic, the interface and the meta-consensus Y1 - 2015 A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen ED - Martini, Carlo ED - Boumans, Marcel AB -

In this paper, we shed new light on the epistemic struggle between establishing consensus and acknowledging plurality, by explicating different ways of consensus-making in science and society and examining the impact hereof on their field of intersection, i.e. consensus conferences (in particular those organized by the National Institute of Health). We draw a distinction between, what we call, academic and interface consensus, to capture the wide appeal to consensus in existing literature. We investigate such accounts - i.e. Solomon (2007), Beatty & Moore (2010) and Miller (2013) – as to put forth a new understanding of consensus-making, focusing on the meta-consensus. We further defend how (NIH) consensus conferences enable epistemic work, through demands of epistemic adequacy and contestability, contrary to the claim that consensus conferences miss a window for epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007). Paying attention to this dynamics surrounding consensus, moreover allows us to illustrate how the public understanding of science and the public use of the ideal of consensus could be well modified.

JA - Experts and consensus in social science PB - Springer SP - 71–92 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Mathematical proofs in practice: Revisiting the reliability of published mathematical proofs JF - Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia Y1 - 2015 A1 - Frans, Joachim A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo VL - 29 SP - 345–360 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - 'Peer review is melting our glaciers': the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) went astray JF - Journal for general philosophy of science Y1 - 2015 A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo SP - 351--366 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Editorial and interview with Justin Biddle JF - The Reasoner Y1 - 2014 A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo VL - 8 SP - 47–50 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Health, food, and science: an ethical assessment of research agendas JF - Logique & Analyse Y1 - 2014 A1 - De Winter, Jan A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo AB -

We offer several new arguments for the view that existing research agendas in the health sciences and the agricultural sciences are morally deficient. More specifically, the following kinds of distortion of the agenda are discussed: in the health sciences, the health problems of the poor are more or less neglected, as well as non-medicinal solutions to health problems, and in the agricultural sciences, insufficient attention is paid to agroecology. We justify the claim that these three kinds of distortion are problematic on ethical grounds, showing that they are moral failures. Instead of starting from one ethical theory to show this, we present different ethical justifications, based on different ethical theories (Bentham’s utilitarianism, Rawls’s theory of justice, Pogge’s rights-based account of minimal justice, Kitcher’s ethical theory, and classical liberalism). This should make our conclusion (i.e. that the distorted research agendas in the health sciences and the agricultural sciences pose a moral problem) at least initially convincing to adherents of different ethical theories.

VL - 228 SP - 701-726 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The epistemic integrity of NASA practices in the space shuttle program JF - ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH - POLICIES AND QUALITY ASSURANCE Y1 - 2013 A1 - De Winter, Jan A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo AB -

This article presents an account of epistemic integrity and uses it to demonstrate that the epistemic integrity of different kinds of practices in NASA's Space Shuttle Program was limited. We focus on the following kinds of practices: (1) research by working engineers, (2) review by middle-level managers, and (3) communication with the public. We argue that the epistemic integrity of these practices was undermined by production pressure at NASA, i.e., the pressure to launch an unreasonable amount of flights per year. Finally, our findings are used to develop some potential strategies to protect epistemic integrity in aerospace science.

VL - 20 SP - 72–92 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The epistemic integrity of scientific research JF - SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS Y1 - 2013 A1 - De Winter, Jan A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo AB -

We live in a world in which scientific expertise and its epistemic authority become more important. On the other hand, the financial interests in research, which could potentially corrupt science, are increasing. Due to these two tendencies, a concern for the integrity of scientific research becomes increasingly vital. This concern is, however, hollow if we do not have a clear account of research integrity. Therefore, it is important that we explicate this concept. Following Rudolf Carnap’s characterization of the task of explication, this means that we should develop a concept that is (1) similar to our common sense notion of research integrity, (2) exact, (3) fruitful, and (4) as simple as possible. Since existing concepts do not meet these four requirements, we develop a new concept in this article. We describe a concept of epistemic integrity that is based on the property of deceptiveness, and argue that this concept does meet Carnap’s four requirements of explication. To illustrate and support our claims we use several examples from scientific practice, mainly from biomedical research.

VL - 19 SP - 757–774 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Fraud in academic medical research: lessons from Flanders, Belgium JF - The reasoner Y1 - 2013 A1 - De Winter, Jan A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo AB -

A scientific survey on fraud in academic medical research in Flanders , of which the results were recently published in popular science magazine Eos, has caused tumult in the Flemish academic community. The reason is that these results suggest that scientific fraud (which could indirectly cause ill health and death among patients) is not as rare as earlier estimates indicate . Malpractices are primarily attributed to the pressure to publish. In this piece , we elaborate on the content of the study and pave the way for reform.

VL - 7 SP - 2 UR - http://thereasoner.org/ ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The rationality of scientific reasoning in the context of pursuit: drawing appropriate distinctions JF - PHILOSOPHICA Y1 - 2012 A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo A1 - Šešelja, Dunja A1 - Straßer, Christian AB -

The aim of this paper is to disambiguate between different notions of pursuit worthiness regarding scientific inquiries. To this end we propose a unifying pattern of pursuit worthiness: “It is rational for Y to pursue X if and only if pursuing X is conducive of the set of goals Z.” By showing in which ways variables X, Y, and Z can be changed, we present different notions of pursuit and pursuit worthiness. With respect to variable X, we distinguish the pursuit of scientific theories, epistemic objects, and technological developments. With respect to variable Z, we distinguish between epistemic and practical pursuit worthiness. Finally, with respect to variable Y, we distinguish between individual and communal pursuit worthiness. By means of these distinctions we are able to explicate some of the major ambiguities underlying the concept of pursuit of pursuit worthiness, as well as to shed light on some confusions in philosophical literature that have resulted from their neglect.

VL - 86 SP - 51–82 ER - TY - Generic T1 - The intended window of epistemic opportunity: a comment on Miriam Solomon Y1 - 2011 A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo ED - Van Kerkhove, Bart ED - Libert, Thierry ED - Vanpaemel, Geert ED - Marage, Pierre AB -

In this paper, I argue that Miriam Solomon fails to show that medical consensus conferences, as organised by the National Institute of Health (NIH), miss the intended window of epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007: 170), and thus typically take place after the experts have reached consensus. This is done, on the one hand, by differentiating between, what I intend to call, ‘academic’ and ‘non-academic consensus’, and, on the other hand, by analyzing the arguments and argumentation style Solomon uses to make her claim explicit. At the very least, the overall argument suggests that her statement is inadequately supported, if not that the opposite claim is true. In this manner, I intend to bring additional insight into the notion of ‘consensus’ when applied in scientific practice. Any decision as to change the NIH consensus development program should take these actual achievements into account.

JA - Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II PB - Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België ER - TY - CONF T1 - Who guards the guardians/experts? Philosophers? T2 - 32e Vlaams-Nederlandse Filosofiedag, Proceedings Y1 - 2011 A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo JA - 32e Vlaams-Nederlandse Filosofiedag, Proceedings PB - Ghent University, Department of Philosophy and moral sciences ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Expertise doordacht: reflectie via klimaatanalyse JF - Ethiek en Maatschappij Y1 - 2010 A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo AB -

This paper analyses four theoretical problems concerning the notion of expertise and tries to formulate answers by scrutinizing these problems in light of scientific practice. The focus will be on the problems arising from the interference of experts in democratic decision making. I formulate my answers by referring to the Review-process of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Analysing how expertise influences this particular scientific practice is an example of how social-epistemological research is done and has to be done.

VL - 13 SP - 72–82 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Report LRR10: Logic, reasoning and rationality JF - The Reasoner Y1 - 2010 A1 - Beirlaen, Mathieu A1 - Gauderis, Tjerk A1 - Gervais, Raoul A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo VL - 4 SP - 165–166 UR - http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol4/TheReasoner-4(11).pdf ER -