TY - Generic T1 - How to take heroin (if at all). A new approach to detachment in deontic logic T2 - Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: 14th International Conference Y1 - 2018 A1 - Van De Putte, Frederik A1 - Frijters, Stef A1 - Meheus, Joke ED - Condoravdi, Cleo ED - Nair, Shyam ED - Pigozzi, Gabriella JA - Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: 14th International Conference PB - College Publications CY - London SP - 317-335 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Can economics become a purely experimental science? A comparative study Y1 - 2012 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Aerts, Diederik ED - Broekaert, Jan ED - D'Hooghe, Bart ED - Note, Nicole AB -

The role of experiments in economics is increasing. This paper deals with a philosophical question that is raised by this evolution: can economics become a purely experimental science? I answer this question by comparing economics with a branch of biomedical science.

JA - Worldviews, science and us : bridging knowledge and its implications for our perspectives on the world PB - World Scientific Publishing Company SN - 9789814383073 UR - http://www.worldscibooks.com/general/8341.html ER - TY - Generic T1 - History and Philosophy of Science: From Peaceful Coexistence to Golden Age of Interdisciplinarity? Y1 - 2012 A1 - Ducheyne, Steffen ED - Aerts, Diederik ED - Broekaert, Jan ED - D'Hooghe, Bart ED - Note, Nicole JA - Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World. PB - World Scientific Publishing Company CY - Singapore SP - 26-36 ER - TY - Generic T1 - An Interdisciplinary Focus on the Concept of Causation: What philosophy can learn from psychology Y1 - 2012 A1 - De Vreese, Leen ED - Aerts, Diederik ED - Broekaert, Jan ED - D'Hooghe, Bart ED - Note, Nicole AB -

In philosophy of science, it is still a mainstream practice to search for the `truth' about fundamental scientific concepts in isolation, blind to knowledge achieved in other domains of science. I focus on the topic of causation. I argue that it is worthwhile for philosophy of science to leave its metaphysical tower in order to pick up knowledge from other domains where empirical research on causal reasoning is carried out, such as psychology. I will demonstrate what the psychologist Peter White's theory, on the origin and development of causal reasoning, can impart to philosophy of causation. It concerns different but interre- lated subjects with respect to the philosophy of causation: conceptual pluralism, a core causal concept of causation, the analysis of \what cau- sation is", epistemological pluralism, causation as a secondary quality and weak causal realism. The divide between metaphysical and epis- temological approaches to causation|and hence between philosophy and psychology|may be much smaller than is often presupposed. Keywords: philosophy of causation, developmental psychology, causal pluralism, interdisciplinarity

JA - Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World. PB - World Scientific Publishing Company CY - Singapore SP - 55-71 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Metaphysics and Cinema Y1 - 2012 A1 - Christiaens, Wim ED - Aerts, Diederik ED - Broekaert, Jan ED - D'Hooghe, Bart ED - Note, Nicole JA - Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World. PB - World Scientific Publishing Company CY - Singapore SP - 118-141 ER - TY - CONF T1 - An Adaptive Logic for the Formal Explication of Scalar Implicatures T2 - New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAI-isAI 2009 Workshops Y1 - 2010 A1 - Lycke, Hans ED - Nakakoji, Kumiyo ED - Murakami, Yohei ED - McCready, Eric AB -

Hearers get at the intended meaning of uncooperative utterances (i.e. utterances that conflict with the prescriptions laid down by the Gricean maxims) by pragmatically deriving sentences that reconcile these utterances with the maxims. Such pragmatic derivations are made according to pragmatic rules called implicatures. As they are pragmatic in nature, the conclusions drawn by applying implicatures remain uncertain. In other words, they may have to be withdrawn in view of further information. Because of this last feature, Levinson argued that implicatures should be formally modeled as non–monotonic or default rules of inference. In this paper, I will do exactly this: by relying on the Adaptive Logics Programme, I will provide a formal explication of implicatures as default inference rules. More specifically, I will do so for a particular kind of implicatures, viz scalar implicatures.

JA - New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAI-isAI 2009 Workshops PB - Springer Verlag SN - 978-3-642-14887-3 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14888-0\_20 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Two type-theoretical approaches to privative modification Y1 - 2009 A1 - Primiero, Giuseppe A1 - Jespersen, Bjørn ED - Nakakoji, Kumiyo ED - Murakami, Yohei ED - McCready, Eric AB -

In this paper we apply two kinds of procedural semantics to the problem of privative modification. We do this for three reasons. The first reason is to launch a tough test case to gauge the degree of substantial agreement between a constructivist and a realist interpretation of a procedural semantics; the second is to extend Martin-Lof's Type Theory to privative modification, which is characteristic of natural language; the third reason is to sketch a positive characterization of privation.

JA - New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAI-isAI 2009 Workshops PB - Springer Verlag CY - Berlin, Heidelberg SP - 239–258 SN - 4-915905-37-3 C3004 ER - TY - CONF T1 - On the boundaries of solvability and unsolvability in tag systems. Theoretical and experimental results. T2 - The complexity of simple programs Y1 - 2008 A1 - De Mol, Liesbeth ED - Woods, Damien ED - Neary, Turlough ED - Seda, Tony AB -

Several older and more recent results on the boundaries of solvability and unsolvability in tag systems are surveyed. Emphasis will be put on the significance of computer experiments in research on very small tag systems.

JA - The complexity of simple programs PB - Cork University Press ER - TY - Generic T1 - A logical approach to the analysis of metaphors Y1 - 2002 A1 - D'Hanis, Isabel ED - Magnani, Lorenzo ED - Nersessian, Nancy ED - Pizzi, Claudio AB -

In this paper, I will present an adaptive logic that grasps the way we analyze metaphors. Metaphors are powerful tools to generate new scientific ideas. Therefore, it is important to have a good theory on what metaphors are and how they function. The first question we have to answer when we want to develop such a theory is obviously ˝what metaphors are˝. Philosophy of language can offer some interesting ideas but most views do not allow for a cognitive function of metaphors. One of the sparse views that does allow for it is interactionism. The basic version, however, has some serious shortcomings that need solving when we want to use this theory. First of all the terminology is too vague. Furthermore, the description of the reasoning process we use when we analyze a metaphor, only works for very simple examples. The logic I will present, ALM, is based on a broadened version of this view. A logical approach of metaphors allows us to gain a profound insight in the way we analyze metaphors. The analysis of metaphors is a dynamical reasoning process. When we want to capture this process in a logical system, we need a logic that is capable of grasping that specific type of dynamics. An adaptive logic seems to be the best choice. Therefore, I shall present an adaptive logic that grasps the analysis of metaphors.

JA - Logical and Computational Aspects of Model-Based Reasoning PB - Kluwer Academic CY - Dordrecht VL - 25 SP - 21–37 SN - 1402007124 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Model-Based Reasoning in Creative Processes Y1 - 1999 A1 - Meheus, Joke ED - Magnani, Lorenzo ED - Nersessian, Nancy ED - Thagard, Paul AB -

Combining a contextual approach to problem solving with results on some recently developed (non-standard) logics, I present in this paper a general frame for the methodological study of model-based reasoning in creative processes. I argue that model-based reasoning does not require that we turn away from logic. I also argue, however, that in order to better understand and evaluate creative processes that involve model-based reasoning, and in order to formulate guidelines for them, we urgently need to extend the existing variety of logics.

JA - Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery PB - Kluwer/Plenum CY - Dordrecht SP - 199–217 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Dynamic Dialectical Logics Y1 - 1989 A1 - Batens, Diderik ED - Priest, Graham ED - Routley, Richard ED - Norman, Jean JA - Paraconsistent Logic. Essays on the Inconsistent PB - Philosophica Verlag SP - 187–217 ER -