@article {Blancke, title = {What science is fair? Representations of science in a Dutch creationist campaign}, journal = {Public Understanding of Science}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

In the Netherlands, creationists have started up a civil initiative by which they demand “fair science”. This paper offers an analysis of this peculiar notion. Fair science depends on two representations of science, one as an unimpressive label, and one as an authority. Each of these representations hinges on a different conception of the authority of science: on the one hand, science is endowed with authority because it produces technology and is able to make reliable predictions. On the other hand, science’s authority is only a matter of reputation. To the extent that these two conceptions tap into representations of science and its authority among the larger public, the notion of fair science might prove to be a compelling rhetorical tool. Suggestions are made as to how the appeal of the notion can be reduced.

}, author = {Blancke, Stefaan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {Meheus2013, title = {Which Style of Reasoning to Choose in the Face of Conflicting Information?}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, year = {2016}, pages = {361--380}, abstract = {

In the context of non-monotonic reasoning different kinds of consequence relations are defined for reasoning from (possibly) inconsistent information. Examples are consequence relations that are characterized in terms of maximal consistent subsets of the premise set. The strong consequences are those formulas that follow by Classical Logic from every maximal consistent subset. The weak consequences follow from some maximal consistent subset. The free consequences follow from the set of formulas that belong to every maximal consistent subset. In this paper the question is discussed which of these consequence relations should be applied in which reasoning context. First the concerns that are expressed in the literature with respect to the usefulness of the weak consequences are addressed. Then it is argued that making weak inferences is sensible for some application contexts, provided one has a (dynamic) proof theory for the corresponding consequence relation. Such a dynamic proof theory is what adaptive logics offer. Finally, all this is illustrated by means of a very simple adaptive logic reconstruction of the free, strong, and weak consequences

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @incollection {strasser2015withstanding, title = {Withstanding Tensions: {S}cientific Disagreement and Epistemic Tolerance}, booktitle = {Heuristic Reasoning}, series = {Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics}, volume = {16}, year = {2015}, pages = {113{\textendash}146}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Many philosophers of science consider scientific disagreementto be a major promoter of scientific progress. However, we lack an ac-count of the epistemically and heuristically appropriate response scien-tists should have towards opposing positions in peer disagreements. Eventhough some scientific pluralists have advocated a notion of tolerance,the implications of this notion for one’s epistemic stance and, more gen-erally, for the scientific practice have been insuficiently explicated in theliterature. In this paper we explicate a characteristic tension in whichdisagreeing scientists are situated and on this basis we propose a notionof epistemic tolerance.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Wieland, Jan Willem}, editor = {Ippoliti, Emiliano} } @article {wieland2013carroll, title = {What Carroll’s tortoise actually proves}, journal = {Ethical theory and moral practice}, volume = {16}, number = {5}, year = {2013}, pages = {983{\textendash}997}, abstract = {

Rationality requires us to have certain propositional attitudes (beliefs, intentions, etc.) given certain other attitudes that we have. Carroll’s Tortoise repeatedly shows up in this discussion. Following up on Brunero (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:557–569, 2005), I ask what Carroll-style considerations actually prove. This paper rejects two existing suggestions, and defends a third.

}, doi = {10.1007/s10677-012-9397-9}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {Leuridan2012, title = {What are mechanisms in social science? (review)}, journal = {Metascience}, volume = {21}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {395-398}, abstract = {

Why should we introduce the notion of ‘analytical sociology’ into the field of sociology, and why should it be linked to the concept of ‘mechanism’? With these two principal questions, Pierre Demeulenaere, Professor of Sociological Theory and Philosophy of the Social Sciences at the University of Paris-Sorbonne, opens his Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms, a collection of thirteen papers written by social scientists and philosophers of the social sciences (1). Not every contributor should be considered an analytical sociologist. Rather than being a manifesto either pro or contra analytical sociology and the use of mechanisms, it is an attempt to reflect upon the key issues involved in sociological explanation (3). Even though several chapters raise very interesting points, the overall impression one gets from this book is that analytical sociology fails to redeem its main promise, viz. to add clarity, precision, and conceptual rigor to sociology, especially regarding one of it

}, issn = {0815-0796}, doi = {10.1007/s11016-011-9610-9}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @incollection {1890996, title = {What is there beyond Mertonian and dollar green science? {E}xploring the contours of epistemic democracy}, booktitle = {Drunk on capitalism : an interdisciplinary reflection on market economy, art and science}, volume = {11}, year = {2012}, pages = {35{\textendash}48}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

The story is sometimes told as follows: Once science was a disinterested activity giving scientists the opportunity to freely solve the puzzle of nature to the benefit of all. Nowadays science seems more and more driven by the search for patents and dollars compelling scientists to follow the logic of capitalism and corporatization. Take-home lesson: science is for sale and we should do everything to reverse this evolution. In this contribution, I want to analyze the narrator{\textquoteright}s assumptions implicit in this account of science. In particular, the rosy description of earlier disinterested forms of scientific research will be questioned, as well as the lack of alternatives to the dichotomy disinterested versus corporatized. I will argue that beyond the dichotomy an interest-driven science can be conceived framed within an epistemic democracy.

}, isbn = {9789400720817}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Le Roy, Frederik and Stalpaert, Christel and Aerts, Diederik} } @article {1905403, title = {Where the design argument goes wrong: auxiliary assumptions and unification}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {78}, number = {4}, year = {2011}, pages = {558{\textendash}578}, abstract = {

Sober (2008) has reconstructed the biological design argument in the framework of likelihoodism, purporting to demonstrate that it is defective for intrinsic reasons. We argue that Sober{\textquoteright}s restrictions on the introduction of auxiliary hypotheses is too restrictive, as it commits him to rejecting types of everyday reasoning that are clearly valid. Our account shows that the design argument fails, not because it is intrinsically untestable, but because it clashes with the empirical evidence and fails to satisfy certain theoretical desiderata (in particular, unification). Likewise, Sober{\textquoteright}s critique of the arguments from imperfections and from evil against design is off the mark.

}, issn = {0031-8248}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/661753}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/661753}, author = {Boudry, Maarten and Leuridan, Bert} } @conference {1182635, title = {Who guards the guardians/experts? {P}hilosophers?}, booktitle = {32e Vlaams-Nederlandse Filosofiedag, Proceedings}, year = {2011}, publisher = {Ghent University, Department of Philosophy and moral sciences}, organization = {Ghent University, Department of Philosophy and moral sciences}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {981629, title = {{W}hewell{\textquoteright}s tidal researches: scientific practice and philosophical methodology}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, volume = {41}, number = {1}, year = {2010}, pages = {26{\textendash}40}, abstract = {

Primarily between 1833 and 1840, William Whewell attempted to accomplish what natural philosophers and scientists since at least Galileo had failed to do: to provide a systematic and broad-ranged study of the tides and to attempt to establish a general scientific theory of tidal phenomena. I document the close interaction between Whewell’s philosophy of science (especially his methodological views) and his scientific practice as a tidologist. I claim that the intertwinement between Whewell’s methodology and his tidology is more fundamental than has hitherto been documented.

}, issn = {0039-3681}, doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.12.011}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.12.011}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {D:WS, title = {Waar stoppen?}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {102}, number = {3}, year = {2010}, pages = {196{\textendash}198}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {909568, title = {What About Interdisciplinarity Within Philosophy?}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and Its Implications For Our Perspectives on the World}, year = {2010}, pages = {10{\textendash}25}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik} } @conference {812480, title = {Why social emergence? {D}iscussing the use of analytical metaphysics in social theory}, booktitle = {Worldviews, science and us : studies of analytical metaphysics}, year = {2010}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, organization = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

Recently the concept of emergence has been used in social theory to understand and defend social causation and nonreductive individualism (cf., Refs. 1, 2 and 3). In this paper, I want to analyse what the contribution of analytical metaphysics, and, in particular, the concept of emergence is, or might be, to the discussion in social theory. Especially Keith Sawyer{\textquoteright}s use of emergence in his defence of social explanation will be scrutinized. Therefore, it will be important to distinguish ontological from epistemological emergence. Where Sawyer focuses on ontological emergence, I will argue that social explanation might better be defended by putting emphasis on pragmatic aspects of explanation and considering emergence as an epistemological category.

}, isbn = {9789814295819}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789814299053\_0010}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart} } @incollection {DeMey2010, title = {William {H}arvey en de ontdekking van de bloedsomloop.}, booktitle = {Fascinerend Leven. {M}arkante Figuren en Idee{\"e}n uit de Geschiedenis van de Biologie.}, year = {2010}, note = {

In print

}, publisher = {Nieuwezijds}, address = {Amsterdam}, author = {De Mey, Tim and Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Van Speybroeck, Linda and Braeckman, Johan} } @article {DeVreese2010a, title = {Work in Progress in Causal and Probabilistic Reasoning}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {4}, number = {9}, year = {2010}, pages = {141}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @incollection {812495, title = {Where the Epistemic and the Political Meet.}, booktitle = {The Social Sciences and Democracy}, series = {The Social Sciences and Democracy}, year = {2009}, pages = {1{\textendash}13}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, isbn = {978-0230224391}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {981621, title = {Whewell, necessity and the inductive sciences: a philosophical-systematic survey}, journal = {South African Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {28}, number = {4}, year = {2009}, pages = {333{\textendash}358}, abstract = {

In this paper Whewell{\textquoteright}s concept of necessity is scrutinized and its historical development is outlined (ca. 1833-1860). Particular attention will be paid to how Whewell interpreted the laws of the inductive sciences as being necessary since the laws of nature are concretizations of the Fundamental Ideas which can be partially described by Axioms.

}, issn = {0258-0136}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {2009, title = {Why should I adopt pluralism?}, booktitle = {Economic Pluralism}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Routledge}, abstract = {

If the most perplexing thing in the world is a lack of theory, the second mostperplexing must be an abundance of it. This contribution clarifies the notion of pluralism byintroducing an often neglected but crucial distinction between different levels at whichpluralism can be situated. It intends to provide a framework for scholars dealing with thequestion how to manage the divergence of views they are confronted with.

}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier}, editor = {Garnett, Rob and Olsen, Erik and Starr, Martha} } @conference {430672, title = {A week-end off: the first extensive number-theoretical computation on the ENIAC}, booktitle = {Logic and Theory of Algorithms}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, organization = {Springer Verlag}, abstract = {

The first extensive number-theoretical computation run on the ENIAC, is reconstructed. The problem, computing the exponent of 2 modulo a prime, was set up on the ENIAC during a week-end in July 1946 by the number-theorist D.H. Lehmer, with help from his wife Emma and John Mauchly. Important aspects of the ENIAC{\textquoteright}s design are presented-and the reconstruction of the implementation of the problem on the ENIAC is discussed in its salient points.

}, isbn = {978-3-540-69405-2}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-69407-6_19}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth and Bullynck, Maarten}, editor = {Beckmann, Arnold and Dimitracopoulos, Costas and L{\"o}we, Benedikt} } @article {924333, title = {What problem of universals}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {81}, year = {2008}, pages = {7{\textendash}21}, abstract = {

What is the Problem of Universals? In this paper we take up the classic question and proceed as follows. In Sect. 1 we consider three problem solving settings and define the notion of problem solving accordingly. Basically I say that to solve problems is to eliminate undesirable, unspecified, or apparently incoherent scenarios. In Sect. 2 we apply the general observations from Sect. 1 to the Problem of Universals . More specifically, we single out two accounts of the problem which are based on the idea of eliminating apparently incoherent scenarios, and then propose modifications of those two accounts which, by contrast, are based on the idea of eliminating unspecified scenarios. In Sect. 3 we spell out two interesting ramifications.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {445650, title = {Whewell{\textquoteright}s metaphorical usage of light and the ultimate reality underlying it}, journal = {Semiotica}, volume = {172}, number = {1-4}, year = {2008}, month = {November}, pages = {269{\textendash}278}, abstract = {

In this article, I seek to study Whewell as writer of philosophical doctrines by focusing on his frequent usage of the metaphor of light, which symbolized (human) knowledge. It is my primary claim that Whewell choose to visually illustrate his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas, which are the bearers of ultimate reality and meaning in Whewell{\textquoteright}s epistemology, by means some key metaphors that made reference to light.

}, issn = {0037-1998}, doi = {10.1515/SEMI.2008.098}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @book {371040, title = {Wetenschapsfilosofie.}, year = {2007}, pages = {238 p.}, publisher = {Koninklijke Van Gorcum}, organization = {Koninklijke Van Gorcum}, isbn = {978-90-232-4312-0}, author = {Horsten, Leon and Douven, Igor and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {vanackere2006world, title = {A World of Experiences, an Adequate Language, and Self-Reference Revised}, booktitle = {Essays in Logic and Ontology}, volume = {91}, number = {1}, year = {2006}, pages = {243{\textendash}256}, publisher = {Rodopi}, abstract = {

The paper presents a new, intuitive formal language, L E , that fits in with a world view in which experiences are central entities. It is shown how classical logic and an "objective making" adaptive logic can be applied to formulas of L E . The latter logic sheds an interesting light on the creation of theories about "the objective world". The paper also contains a small comment on sentences that are not translatable in L E . In the last section, I revise self-referring sentences by means of their translations in L E.

}, author = {Vanackere, Guido}, editor = {Malinowski, Jacek and Pietruszczak, Andrzej} } @article {vanweighing, title = {Weighing Falling Bodies. {G}alileo{\textquoteright}s Thought Experiment in the Development of his Dynamical Thinking.}, year = {2005}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {371043, title = {Wie rookt gaat sneller dood en betaalt dus meer: {O}ver het belang van oorzaak-gevolg-relaties in verzekeren en de moeilijkheid bij het onderzoeken ervan}, journal = {Ethiek en Maatschappij}, volume = {8}, number = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {58{\textendash}69}, abstract = {

Smokers die sooner and therefore pay more. On the importance of cause-effect- relations in insurance and the difficulties researching them. For insurers, a correct knowledge of causes are important. An insurance companies who failes to adequatly assess the causes of particular risks will loose its market position due to wrong price setting. In this paper, I discuss possible methods determine the causes of risks, as well as problems and imperfections of those methods.

}, issn = {1373-0975}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {219576, title = {When unveiling the epistemic fallacy ends with committing the ontological fallacy. {O}n the contribution of critical realism to the social scientific explanatory practice}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {71}, year = {2003}, pages = {81{\textendash}98}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {152663, title = {Why the logic of explanation is inconsistency-adaptive.}, booktitle = {Inconsistency in science}, year = {2002}, pages = {165{\textendash}184}, publisher = {Kluwer}, isbn = {1-4020-0630-6}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_10}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Clercq, Kristof}, editor = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {109728, title = {World Models and Inconsistencies.}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {3}, year = {1999}, pages = {285{\textendash}311}, abstract = {

A worldview has sic components. We concentrate on the first two: descriptive world model and the explanatory world model. In the first half of the paper we make some general remarks on the methodology of world construction. In the second part, we discuss inconsistencies in world models. Adding new fragments to our world model can lead to inconsistencies Three strategies are distinguished: (i) a partial return to instrumentalism, (ii) paraconsistency, and (iii) the adaptive option. The latter option is elaborated by means of several historical examples and by means of the EPR paradox.

}, issn = {1233-1821}, author = {Weber, Erik and Christiaens, Wim} } @incollection {von1998if, title = {What, if anything, is an experiment in mathematics?}, booktitle = {Philosophy and the Many Faces of Science}, year = {1998}, pages = {172{\textendash}182}, publisher = {Rowman \& Littlefield}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Anapolitanos, Dionysios and Baltas, Aristides and Tsinorema, Stavroula} } @article {VanBendegem1997a, title = {Wetenschap en religie: zo verzoenbaar als men maar wil.}, journal = {Mores}, volume = {42}, year = {1997}, pages = {381-388}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @phdthesis {J:thesis, title = {Wetenschappelijke ontdekking en creativiteit. {E}en poging tot theorievorming op basis van een conceptuele, methodologische en logische studie}, year = {1997}, month = {March 12}, publisher = {Universiteit Gent (Belgium)}, type = {phd}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {241638, title = {Waarom {W}esley {S}almons causaal-mechanische model van verklaring niet volstaat}, booktitle = {Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. {A}cta 16de {N}ederlands-{V}laamse Filosofiedag}, year = {1994}, pages = {81-86}, publisher = {VUB Press}, isbn = {9789054870845}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Cornelis, Gustaaf C} } @incollection {241636, title = {Wetenschappelijke verklaringen en subjectief verwacht nut}, booktitle = {Actueel Filosoferen}, year = {1993}, pages = {53-60}, publisher = {Eburon}, address = {Delft}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {van Dooren, Wim and Hoff, Tineke} } @incollection {D:w\&vw, title = {Wetenschap en Vrijzinnige Waarden}, booktitle = {De specificiteit van Vrijzinnig Humanistische Waarden}, year = {1986}, pages = {1{\textendash}14}, publisher = {UPV}, author = {Batens, Diderik} }