@article {Pawlowski2017c, title = {Tree-like proof systems for finitely-many valued deterministic and indeterministic consequence relations}, year = {Submitted}, author = {Pawlowski, Pawel} } @article {VanDePutte2017-VANTWD-2, title = {That will do: Logics of Deontic Necessity and Sufficiency}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, year = {2017}, pages = {473{\textendash}511}, abstract = {
We study a logic for deontic necessity and sufficiency, as originally proposed in van Benthem :36{\textendash}41, 1979). Building on earlier work in modal logic, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it, consider some standard extensions, and study other important properties. After that, we compare this logic to the logic of {\textquotedblleft}obligation as weakest permission{\textquotedblright} from Anglberger et al. :807{\textendash}827, 2015).
}, author = {Frederik Van De Putte} } @article {4188922, title = {Towards democratic models of science: exploring the case of scientific pluralism}, journal = {Perspectives on science}, volume = {23}, number = {2}, year = {2015}, pages = {149{\textendash}172}, abstract = {

Scientific pluralism, a normative endorsement of the plurality or multiplicity of research approaches in science, has recently been advocated by several philosophers (e.g., Kellert et al. 2006, Kitcher 2001, Longino 2013, Mitchell 2009, and Chang 2010). Comparing these accounts of scientific pluralism, one will encounter quite some variation. We want to clarify the different interpretations of scientific pluralism by showing how they incarnate different models of democracy, stipulating the desired interaction among the plurality of research approaches in different ways. Furthermore, the example of scientific pluralism is used to advocate the application of democratic theory to philosophy of science problems in general. Drawing on the parallels between models of science and models of democracy, we can articulate how the plurality of research approaches in science should interact within a democratic framework as well as how to cultivate multiple research approaches in the epistemically most productive way possible. This will not only improve our understanding of scientific plurality, but it can also help us stipulating how different research approaches should interact to constitute the most objective account possible or how the ideal of scientific consensus has to be understood. Ultimately, developing democratic models of science bears on the question of how deeply science and democracy are entwined.

}, issn = {1063-6145}, doi = {10.1162/POSC_a_00165}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {D:IALtut, title = {Tutorial on Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, booktitle = {New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2015}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

This paper contains a concise introduction to a few central features of inconsistency-adaptive logics. The focus is on the aim of the program, on logics that may be useful with respect to applications, and on insights that are central for judging the importance of the research goals and the adequacy of results. Given the nature of adaptive logics, the paper may be read as a peculiar introduction to defeasible reasoning.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {B{\'e}ziau, Jean-Yves and Chakraborty, Mihir and Dutta, Soma} } @incollection {D:tmdm, title = {Two, Many, And Differently Many}, booktitle = {The Road to Universal Logic. Festschrift for the 50th Birthday of Jean-Yves B{\'e}ziau}, volume = {II}, year = {2015}, pages = {213{\textendash}242}, publisher = {Birkh{\"a}user}, address = {Basel}, abstract = {

This paper is a modest contribution to a universal logic approach to many-valued semantic systems. The main focus is on the relation between such systems and two-valued ones. The matter is discussed for usual many-valued semantic systems. These turn out to exist for more logics than expected. A new type of many-valued semantics is devised and its use illustrated. Truth-functionality has a rather central place in the discussion, which leads to philosophical conclusions.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Koslow, Arnold and Buchsbaum, Arthur} } @article {4341742, title = {To envision a new particle or change an existing law? Hypothesis formation and anomaly resolution for the curious spectrum of beta decay}, journal = {STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF MODERN PHYSICS}, volume = {45}, year = {2014}, pages = {27{\textendash}45}, abstract = {

This paper addresses the question of how scientists determine which type of hypothesis is most suitable for tackling a particular problem by examining the historical case of the anomalous {\ss} spectrum in early nuclear physics (1927-1934), a puzzle that occasioned the most diverse hypotheses amongst physicists at the time. It is shown that such determinations are most often implicitly informed by scientists’ individual perspectives on the hierarchical relations between various elements of the theory and the problem at hand. In addition to this main result, it is suggested that Wolfgang Pauli’s neutrino idea may well have been an adaptation of Ernst Rutherford’s original and older neutron idea, which would provide evidence that the adaptation of older ideas is a more common practice than is often thought.

}, issn = {1355-2198}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2013.11.002}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk} } @article {primiero2013taxonomy, title = {A taxonomy of errors for information systems}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, volume = {24}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, pages = {249{\textendash}273}, abstract = {

We provide a full characterization of computational error states for information systems. The class of errors considered is general enough to include human rational processes, logical reasoning, scientific progress and data processing in some functional programming languages. The aim is to reach a full taxonomy of error states by analysing the recovery and processing of data. We conclude by presenting machine-readable checking and resolve algorithms.

}, doi = {10.1007/s11023-013-9307-5}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {3152459, title = {Three formats of prioritized adaptive logics: a comparative study}, journal = {Logic journal of the IGPL}, volume = {21}, year = {2013}, pages = {127{\textendash}159}, abstract = {

A broad range of defeasible reasoning forms has been explicated by prioritized adaptive logics. However, the relative lack in meta-theory of many of these logics stands in sharp contrast to the frequency of their application. This article presents the first comparative study of a large group of prioritized adaptive logics. Three formats of such logics are discussed: superpositions of adaptive logics, hierarchic adaptive logics from F. Van De Putte (2011, Log. J. IGPL, doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzr025) and lexicographic adaptive logics from F. Van De Putte and C. Stra\&\#223;er (2012, Log. Anal., forthcoming). We restrict the scope to logics that use the strategy Minimal Abnormality. It is shown that the semantic characterizations of these systems are equivalent and that they are all sound with respect to either of these characterizations. Furthermore, sufficient conditions for the completeness and equivalence of the consequence relations of the three formats are established. Some attractive properties, including Fixed Point and the Deduction Theorem, are shown to hold whenever these conditions are obeyed.

}, issn = {1367-0751}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzs004}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {3152453, title = {Two adaptive logics of norm-propositions}, journal = {JOURNAL OF APPLIED LOGIC}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {147{\textendash}168}, abstract = {

We present two defeasible logics of norm-propositions (statements about norms) that (i) consistently allow for the possibility of normative gaps and normative conflicts, and (ii) map each premise set to a sufficiently rich consequence set. In order to meet (i), we define the logic LNP, a conflict- and gap-tolerant logic of norm-propositions capable of formalizing both normative conflicts and normative gaps within the object language. Next, we strengthen LNP within the adaptive logic framework for non-monotonic reasoning in order to meet (ii). This results in the adaptive logics LNPrLNPr and LNPmLNPm, which interpret a given set of premises in such a way that normative conflicts and normative gaps are avoided ‘whenever possible’. LNPrLNPr and LNPmLNPm are equipped with a preferential semantics and a dynamic proof theory.

}, issn = {1570-8683}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2013.02.001}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {CJM:demi, title = {Tolerating Deontic Conflicts by Adaptively Restricting Inheritance}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {219}, year = {2012}, pages = {477-506}, abstract = {

In order to deal with the possibility of deontic conflicts Lou Goble developed a group of logics DPM that are characterized by a restriction of the inheritance principle. While they approximate the deductive power of standard deontic logic, they do so only if the user adds certain statements to the premises. By adaptively strengthening the DPM logics, this paper presents logics that overcome this shortcoming. Furthermore, they are capable of modeling the dynamic and defeasible aspect of our normative reasoning by their dynamic proof theory. This way they enable us to have a better insight in the relations between obligations and thus to localize deontic conflicts.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Meheus, Joke and Beirlaen, Mathieu} } @phdthesis {PhD_Mathieu, title = {Tolerating Normative Conflicts in Deontic Logic.}, year = {2012}, month = {September 13}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu} } @incollection {Beirlaen2012a, title = {Towards More Conflict-Tolerant Deontic Logics}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2012}, pages = {1-8}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, abstract = {

In Ethical Consistency, Bernard Williams vindicated the possibility of moral conflicts; he proposed to consistently allow for the presence of such conflicts within the logic of ought. In determining the nature of moral conflict, Williams stressed its contingency. In this paper, Williams’ characterization of moral conflict is defended. However, Williams’ solution for consistently allowing for such conflicts within the logic of ought is shown to be too crude. Whereas Williams rejects all applications of the agglomeration rule in the logic of ought, it is shown that a more sophisticated approach is needed. An alternative solution is presented in which the application of the agglomeration rule is made conditional upon the principle that" oughtimplies can."

}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @article {Weber2012, title = {Two Gaps in the Contextual Theory of Scientific Understanding}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {6}, number = {8}, year = {2012}, pages = {130-131}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {2079127, title = {Two problems for the contextual theory of scienitfic understanding}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {6}, number = {4}, year = {2012}, pages = {60{\textendash}62}, abstract = {

In this paper I argue that the contextual theory of scientific understanding as developed by Henk De Regt and Dennis Dieks (2005: “A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding”, Synthese 144, 137–170) and further developed by Henk De Regt (2009: “The Epistemic Value of Understanding”, Philosophy of Science 76: 585–597) is not contextual in one crucial respect: the meaning of understanding. I also argue that its scope needs to be restricted: it cannot be a theory of scientific understanding in general.

}, issn = {1757-0522}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {primiero2012type, title = {Type-Theoretical Dynamics. {E}xploring Belief Revision in a Constructive Framework}, booktitle = {The realism-antirealism debate in the age of alternative logics}, year = {2012}, pages = {191{\textendash}212}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In the present paper a dynamics for type theory is introduced. The formalization provides epistemic explanations for the basic notions of belief state and belief set by referring to assertion conditions for type-theoretical judgements; it interprets expectations in terms of default assumptions for such a structure and it adapts the usual revision operations and the analogous of the Ramsey test. The model, restricted to operations of revision, merging and information preference, provides a constructive type-theoretical approach to epistemic dynamics.

}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1923-1_11}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Rahman, Shahid and Primiero, Giuseppe and Marion, Mathieu} } @article {1234908, title = {Testing universal gravitation in the laboratory, or the significance of research on the mean density of the earth and big {G}, 1798-1898: changing pursuits and long-term methodological-experimental continuity}, journal = {Archive for History of Exact Sciences}, volume = {65}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {181{\textendash}227}, abstract = {

This article seeks to provide a historically well-informed analysis of an important post-Newtonian area of research in experimental physics between 1798 and 1898, namely the determination of the mean density of the earth and, by the end of the nineteenth century, the gravitational constant. Traditionally, research on these matters is seen as a case of {\textacutedbl}puzzle solving.{\textacutedbl} In this article, the author shows that such focus does not do justice to the evidential significance of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century experimental research on the mean density of the earth and the gravitational constant. As Newton{\textquoteright}s theory of universal gravitation was mainly based on astronomical observation, it remained to be shown that Newton{\textquoteright}s law of universal gravitation did not break down at terrestrial distances. In this context, Cavendish{\textquoteright} experiment and related nineteenth-century experiments played a decisive role, for they provided converging and increasingly stronger evidence for the universality of Newton{\textquoteright}s theory of gravitation. More precisely, the author shall argue that, as the accuracy and precision of the experimental apparatuses and the procedures to eliminate external disturbances involved increasingly improved, the empirical support for the universality of Newton{\textquoteright}s theory of gravitation improved correspondingly.

}, issn = {0003-9519}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00407-010-0075-9}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {leuridan2011three, title = {Three problems for the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {63}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {399{\textendash}427}, abstract = {

In this article, I present two conceptual problems for Craver{\textquoteright}s mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms. First, constitutive relevance threatens to imply causal relevance despite Craver (and Bechtel){\textquoteright}s claim that they are strictly distinct. Second, if (as is intuitively appealing) parthood is defined in terms of spatio-temporal inclusion, then the mutual manipulability account is prone to counterexamples, as I show by a case of endosymbiosis. I also present a methodological problem (a case of experimental underdetermination) and formulate two partial, but fallible solutions based on the notions of parthood and synchronicity.

}, doi = {10.1093/bjps/axr036}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @article {1101225, title = {Towards the proof-theoretic unification of {D}ung{\textquoteright}s argumentation framework: an adaptive logic approach}, journal = {Journal of logic and computation}, volume = {21}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {133{\textendash}156}, abstract = {

The article presents a unifying adaptive logic framework for abstract argumentation. It consists of a core system for abstract argumentation and various adaptive logics based on it. These logics represent in an accurate sense all standard extensions defined within Dung{\textquoteright}s abstract argumentation system with respect to sceptical and credulous acceptance. The models of our logics correspond exactly to specific extensions of given argument systems. Additionally, the dynamics of adaptive proofs mirror the argumentative reasoning of a rational agent. In particular, the presented logics allow for external dynamics, i.e. they are able to deal with the arrival of new arguments and are therefore apt to model open-ended argumentations by providing provisional conclusions.

}, issn = {0955-792X}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exq015}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja} } @article {1234613, title = {Towards a fruitful formulation of {N}eedham{\textquoteright}s grand question}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {82}, year = {2010}, pages = {9{\textendash}26}, abstract = {

As it stands, Needham’s Grand Question is simply too general and ill-posed to be answered in a meaningful way. In this paper it is argued that Needham’s Grand Question, to wit Why did science emerge in the West and not in China?, can only be fruitfully pursued, (1) on the condition that one explicates the assumptions and conceptions involved in an informative and motivated way, and (2) on the condition that the question is concretized and fine-tuned by means of and in terms of a series of specific questions. In this paper, I attempt to reformulate Needham’s Grand Question on the basis of a minimal conception of modern science. Next I will split up the Grand Question into a series of more specific, controllable and arguably more fruitful questions.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/philosophica/fulltexts/82-2.pdf}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {strasser2010towards, title = {Towards more conflict-tolerant deontic logics by relaxing the interdefinability between obligations and permissions}, year = {2010}, abstract = {

While conflict-tolerant logics (CTDLs) usually allow for obligation- obligation conflicts, they fall short of tolerating obligation-permission con- flicts (OP-conflicts) of the type OA \&\#8743; P\&\#172; A. Moreover, for the sake of conflict-tolerance these logics usually do not validate the very intuitive principle (D), OA \&\#8835; PA. We demonstrate in this paper that by relaxing the interdefinability between obligations and permission PA =df \&\#172;O\&\#172;A that is characteristic for most deontic logics, the logics get more conflict-tolerant since they allow for OP-conflicts. Moreover, this way they can be equipped with (D) without the need to sacrifice conflict-tolerance. In this paper we offer a generic procedure that transforms a given CTDL into a logic that tolerates OP-conflicts and validates (D).

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Beirlaen, Mathieu} } @article {ducheyne2009times, title = {The Times and Life of {J}ohn {T}h. {D}esaguliers (1683-1744): Newtonian and Freemason}, journal = {Revue belge de philologie et d{\textquoteright}histoire}, volume = {87}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {349{\textendash}363}, abstract = {

Jean Theophile Desaguliers (1683-1744) (geboren : Desaguillers) was een centrale figuur in twee aan belang winnende stromingen : het Newtonianisme en de Vrijmetselarij. Desaguliers werd lid van de Royal Society en hij was een persoonlijke kennis van Isaac Newton. Hij schreef talrijke wetenschappelijke boeken en artikelen waarin hij de Newtoniaanse natuurfi losofi e verdedigde. Om deze reden was hij centraal voor de popularisering van het Newtonianisme. Terwijl hij in London verbleef, werd Desaguliers eveneens een cruciale fi guur binnen de Vrijmetselarij : in 1719 werd hij grootmeester van de Grootloge van Londen en hij was rechtstreeks betrokken in de totstandkoming van James Andersons The Constitutions of the Free-masons (1723).

}, doi = {10.3406/rbph.2009.7676}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {ducheyne2009treat, title = {“To treat of the world”: {P}aul {O}tlet{\textquoteright}s ontology and epistemology and the circle of knowledge}, journal = {Journal of Documentation}, volume = {65}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {223{\textendash}244}, abstract = {

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to document how Paul Otlet, founding-father of what is termed at present as “information science”, attempted to provide a complete “image of the world” (and reality in general) by establishing the scientific discipline he dubbed “documentation”. The paper also aims to focus on how Otlet represented human knowledge and reality in a systematic and unified way. Design/methodology/approach – A close reading of Otlet{\textquoteright}s primary works and some of his personal archives was undertaken. Findings – Most importantly, it is shown that Otlet{\textquoteright}s views on documentation were immersed in a cosmological, objectivist, humanitarian and ontological framework that is alien to contemporary information science. Correspondingly, his alleged affinity with positivism is reassessed. Originality/value – The philosophical foundations of the origins of information science are highlighted. Indirectly, this paper is relevant to the ongoing debate on realism and anti-realism in information science.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {D:shahid, title = {Towards a Dialogic Interpretation of Dynamic Proofs}, booktitle = {Dialogues, Logics and Other Strange Things. Essays in Honour of {S}hahid {R}ahman}, year = {2009}, pages = {27{\textendash}51}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

The main result presented in this paper concerns a dialogic or game-theoretical interpretation of dynamic proofs. Dynamic proofs in themselves do not form a demonstration of the derivability of their last formula from a given premise set. Apart from the proof, such a demonstration requires a specific metalevel argument. In a natural and appealing form, the metalevel argument is phrased in terms of the existence of a winning strategy for the proponent.\par The aforementioned point is presented in terms of an approach that is in a sense Hilbertian and anti-Tarskian: the characterization of logical inference in terms of types of proofs, rather than in terms of properties of the consequence relation.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {D{\'e}gremont, C{\'e}dric and Keiff, Laurent and R{\"u}ckert, Helge} } @conference {524726, title = {Trading off explanatory virtues}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, abstract = {

The paper draws on Graham Allison{\textquoteright}s case-study of the Cuban Missile Crisis in which three different accounts are constructed from three different explanatory models, each situated at a different level of analysis. First, it is shown that each model produces genuine explanations which could not have been arrived at from one of the other accounts. With this prima facie case for pluralism in hand, the indispensability of the different models is then accounted for by linking the relevance of each model to different explanatory contexts.

}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Van Paemel, Geert} } @article {DC\&P:tdl, title = {On the Transparency of Defeasible Logics: Equivalent Premise Sets, Equivalence of Their Extensions, and Maximality of the Lower Limit}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {207}, year = {2009}, pages = {281{\textendash}304}, abstract = {

For Tarski logics, there are simple criteria that enable one to conclude that two premise sets are equivalent. We shall show that the very same criteria hold for adaptive logics, which is a major advantage in comparison to other approaches to defeasible reasoning forms.
A related property of Tarski logics is that the extensions of equivalent premise sets with the same set of formulas are equivalent premise sets. This does not hold for adaptive logics. However a very similar criterion does.
We also shall show that every monotonic logic weaker than an adaptive logic is weaker than the lower limit logic of the adaptive logic or identical to it. This highlights the role of the lower limit for settling the adaptive equivalence of extensions of equivalent premise sets.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @incollection {802714, title = {Two type-theoretical approaches to privative modification}, booktitle = {New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAI-isAI 2009 Workshops}, year = {2009}, pages = {239{\textendash}258}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, address = {Berlin, Heidelberg}, abstract = {

In this paper we apply two kinds of procedural semantics to the problem of privative modification. We do this for three reasons. The first reason is to launch a tough test case to gauge the degree of substantial agreement between a constructivist and a realist interpretation of a procedural semantics; the second is to extend Martin-Lof{\textquoteright}s Type Theory to privative modification, which is characteristic of natural language; the third reason is to sketch a positive characterization of privation.

}, isbn = {4-915905-37-3 C3004}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Jespersen, Bj{\o}rn}, editor = {Nakakoji, Kumiyo and Murakami, Yohei and McCready, Eric} } @article {436211, title = {Tag systems and Collatz-like functions}, journal = {Theoretical Computer Science}, volume = {390}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {92{\textendash}101}, abstract = {

Tag systems were invented by Emil Leon Post and proven recursively unsolvable by Marvin Minsky. These production systems have shown very useful in constructing small universal (Turing complete) systems for several different classes of computational systems, including Turing machines, and are thus important instruments for studying limits or boundaries of solvability and unsolvability. Although there are some results on tag systems and their limits of solvability and unsolvability, there are hardly any that consider both the shift number n, as well as the number of symbols {\textmu}. This paper aims to contribute to research on limits of solvability and unsolvability for tag systems, taking into account these two parameters. The main result is the reduction of the 3n + 1-problem to a surprisingly small tag system. It indicates that the present unsolvability line – defined in terms of {\textmu} and v – for tag systems might be significantly decreased.

}, issn = {0304-3975}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/12954}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {heeffer2008text, title = {Text production, reproduction and appropriation within the abbaco tradition: a case study}, journal = {SCIAMVS}, volume = {9}, year = {2008}, pages = {101-145}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {Ducheyne2008d, title = {Towards an Ontology of Scientific Models}, journal = {Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {119-127}, abstract = {

Scientific models occupy centre stage in scientific practice. Correspondingly, in recent literature in the philosophy of science, scientific models have been a focus of research. However, little attention has been paid so far to the ontology of scientific models. In this essay, I attempt to clarify the issues involved in formulating an informatively rich ontology of scientific models. Although no full-blown theory—containing all ontological issues involved—is provided, I make several distinctions and point to several characteristic properties exhibited by scientific models that are relevant for individuating scientific models.

}, keywords = {Abstraction, Idealisation, Ontology of scientific models}, issn = {1437-2053}, doi = {10.1007/s12133-008-0026-y}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0026-y}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {382923, title = {The tacit appropriation of {H}indu algebra in renaissance practical arithmetic}, journal = {Ganita Bharati}, volume = {29}, number = {1-2}, year = {2007}, pages = {1{\textendash}60}, issn = {0970-0307}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {531119, title = {Is there no alternative?}, journal = {Ethiek en Maatschappij}, volume = {10}, number = {4}, year = {2007}, pages = {101{\textendash}111}, issn = {1373-0975}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/rogier/alternative.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @conference {Urbaniak2007, title = {Time Travel and Conditional Logics}, booktitle = {Logica 2007 Yearbook}, year = {2007}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @phdthesis {PhD_Liesbeth, title = {Tracing Unsolvability. A Mathematical, Historical and Philosophical Analysis with a Special Focus on Tag Systems}, year = {2007}, month = {May 23}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {detheory, title = {Theory and Experiment in the work of {A}lonzo {C}hurch and {E}mil {P}ost}, journal = {unpublished}, year = {2006}, abstract = {

While most mathematicians would probably agree that ‘experimentation’ together with an ‘empirical’ attitude – both understood in their most general sense – can be important methods of mathematical discovery, this is often obscured in the final presentation of the results for the sake of mathematical elegance. In this paper it will be shown how this “method” has played a significant role in the work of two major contributors to the rather abstract discipline called mathematical logic, namely Alonzo Church and Emil Post.

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {322177, title = {Tales of the Unexpected: Incongruity-Resolution in Joke Comprehension, Scientific Discovery and Thought Experimentation}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {14}, year = {2005}, pages = {69{\textendash}88}, abstract = {

Some scholars suspect that thought experiments have something in common with jokes. Moreover, Thomas Kuhn has suggested that what happens to someone who thinks through a thought experiment “is very similar to what happens to a man, like Lavoisier, who must assimilate the result of a new unexpected experimental discovery” (1964: 321). In this paper, I pinpoint the presumed commonalities. I identify, more specifically, what cognitive linguists call “incongruity-resolution” as the problem-solving process not only involved in humor comprehension, but in scientific discovery and thought experimentation as well

}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {D:explanat, title = {The Theory of the Process of Explanation Generalized to Include the Inconsistent Case}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {143}, year = {2005}, note = {doi:10.1007/s11229-005-3114-3}, pages = {63{\textendash}88}, abstract = {

This paper proposes a generalization of the theory of the process of explanation to include consistent as well as inconsistent situations. The generalization is strong, for example in the sense that, if the background theory and the initial conditions are consistent, it leads to precisely the same results as the theory from the lead paper \cite{H\&H:tpe}. The paper presupposes (and refers to arguments for the view that) inconsistencies constitute problems and that scientists try to resolve them.

}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-005-3114-3}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {van2005towards, title = {Towards a framework for pluralisms in economics}, journal = {Post-Autistic Economics Review}, volume = {30}, year = {2005}, pages = {24{\textendash}27}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @phdthesis {PhD_Tim, title = {Thinking Through Thought Experiments}, year = {2003}, note = {

Promotor: Erik Weber

}, month = {March 24}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {152486, title = {Thought experiments, conceivability arguments and conceptual blending}, journal = {Odense Working Papers in Language and Communication}, volume = {24}, year = {2002}, pages = {143{\textendash}156}, issn = {0906-7612}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @proceedings {carnielli_tableau_2001, title = {Tableau systems for logics of formal inconsistency}, journal = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence ({IC}-{AI}{\textquoteright}2001)}, year = {2001}, pages = {848-852}, publisher = {{CSREA} Press, Athens {GA}, {USA}}, abstract = {

The logics of formal inconsistency (LFI’s) are logics that allow to explicitly formalize the concepts of consistency and inconsistency by means of formulas of their language. Contradictoriness, on the other hand, can always be expressed in any logic, provided its language includes a symbol for negation. Besides being able to represent the distinction between contradiction and inconsistency, LFI’s are non-explosive logics, in the sense that a contradiction does not entail arbitrary statements, but yet are gently explosive, in the sense that, adjoining the additional requirement of consistency, then contradictoriness do cause explosion. Several logics can be seen as LFI’s, among them the great majority of paraconsistent systems developed under the Brazilian and Polish tradition. We present here tableau systems for some important LFI’s: bC, Ci and LFI1.

}, author = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o}, editor = {Arabnia, Hamid R.} } @incollection {carnielli2001taxonomy, title = {A taxonomy of C-systems}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2001}, pages = {1-94}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {

A thorough investigation of the foundations of paraconsistent logics. Relations between logical principles are formally studied, a novel notion of consistency is introduced, the logics of formal inconsistency, and the subclasses of C-systems and dC-systems are defined and studied. An enormous variety of paraconsistent logics in the literature is shown to constitute C-systems.

}, author = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E.} } @article {christiaens2001universe, title = {This Universe Is the {\textquoteleft}Best{\textquoteright} of All Possible Worlds. {A} Tentative Reconstruction of the Metaphysical System of Leo Apostel}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {67}, year = {2001}, pages = {115-146}, abstract = {

After presenting Apostel’s views on scientific realism, I present definitions of the concepts of ontology and metaphysics. I then proceed to develop Apostel’s basic ontology and his metaphysics. Apostel proposed a particular understanding of existence based on his views on causation. He also developed a view of the universe as a causal self-explaining system. I discuss and illustrate three kinds of what he calls “metaphysical deductions” that aim to deliver such a view of the universe. The most important one is the Leibnizian variational method, that should allow us to deduce the existing universe as the ‘best’ of all possible worlds.

}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @incollection {DJ:tabl1, title = {A Tableau Method for Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, booktitle = {Automated Reasoning with Analytic Tableaux and Related Methods}, series = {Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence}, volume = {1847}, year = {2000}, pages = {127{\textendash}142}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

We present a tableau method for inconsistency-adaptive logics and illustrate it in terms of the two best studied systems. The method is new in that adaptive logics require a more complex structure of the tableaus and of some rules and conditions. As there is no positive test for derivability in inconsistency-adaptive logics, the tableau method is important for providing criteria for derivability.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Dyckhoff, Roy} } @article {D:unific, title = {Towards the Unification of Inconsistency Handling Mechanisms}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {8}, year = {2000}, note = {Appeared 2002}, pages = {5{\textendash}31}, abstract = {

It is shown that the (flat) consequence relations defined from the Rescher-Manor Mechanism (that is: in terms of maximal consistent subsets of the premises) are all inconsistency-adaptive logics combined with a specific interpretation schema for the premises. Each of the adaptive logics is obtained by applying a suitable adaptive strategy to the paraconsistent logic CLuN.

This result provides all those consequence relations with a (dynamic) proof theory and with a static (as well as a dynamic) semantics.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {322468, title = {Two New Strategies for Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {8}, year = {2000}, pages = {65{\textendash}80}, abstract = {

In this paper I present two new strategies for inconsistency- adaptive logics: the reliable sufficient information strategyof ACLuN3 and the minimally abnormal sufficient information strategyof ACLuN4. I give proof theory and semantics for both ACLuN3 and ACLuN4. I also com- pare them with the well-known inconsistency-adaptive logics ACLuN1 and ACLuN2.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, doi = {10.12775/LLP.2000.004}, author = {De Clercq, Kristof} } @incollection {VanBendegem1997c, title = {Twee grote verhalen over wetenschap (voor allen en voor niemand).}, booktitle = {Ik \& het verhaal}, year = {1997}, pages = {107-130}, publisher = {Uitgaven Woord en Argument}, address = {Hasselt}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Vandormael, Jan} } @article {D\&PC:tep, title = {The two-envelope paradox: the infinite case}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {54}, year = {1994}, pages = {46{\textendash}49}, author = {Castel, Paul and Batens, Diderik} } @book {DJp:t\&e, title = {Theory and Experiment. {R}ecent Insights and New Perspectives on Their Relation}, year = {1988}, publisher = {Reidel}, organization = {Reidel}, address = {Dordrecht}, editor = {Batens, Diderik and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {3063662, title = {The transformation of cognitive values into methodological rules}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {40}, year = {1987}, pages = {151{\textendash}164}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {D:two-enrich, title = {Two semantically motivated enrichments of relevant logics}, booktitle = {Essays in Philosophical Logic}, year = {1987}, pages = {65{\textendash}74}, publisher = {Jagiellonian University Press}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Perzanowski, Jerzy} }